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Abstract 
This thesis is a study of the relationship between deontological liberal principles 
and consequentialism in legal rhetoric. The argument developed is that these 
supposedly separate bases for judgment are actually mutually defining in cases 
involving an apparent ethical dilemma. The content of a principle cannot be 
known a priori, since its interpretation gains its persuasive force from a 
calculation of the benefit and detriment of a potential decision. We argue that, in 
order to prevent the deontological authority of liberal principles from being 
undermined by such a mixing, consequentialist calculations are themselves 
made by appealing to an interpretation of principled arguments. The effect of 
this symbiosis of principle and consequential ism is that ethical problems are 
resolved in legal rhetoric by assigning conflicting parties a higher or lower 
status within a moral hierarchy that prioritises those that assimilate more closely 
to the liberal ideal of the reasonable, responsible individual. This assignation 
itself requires the weighing up the possible consequences of this or that 
interpretation of the relevant Principles and the 'facts' of the parties' moral 
status. The characterisation of judicial rhetoric as a narrative of what we might 
call moral consequential ism leads on to a deconstructive turn in the second half 
of the thesis. We seek to show that the relationship between principle and 
consequence is not simply one of binary opposition, but rather of 
undecidability. The implications of such a destabilisation of the line between 
apparently distinct concepts for political and ethical theory is recognised and 
addressed in the final chapters. We consider how deconstruction both poses 
dangers and also creates new possibilities for critique. The final move of the 
thesis is to consider the ethical implications of our critique of law's moral 
hierarchy. We argue that emphasising the undecidability of law's moral 
hierarchies allows for new perspectives on ethical problems. 
Introduction 
Introduction 
These introductory remarks attempt to provide an indication of some of the 
foundational assumptions of the thesis. There are two major themes introduced 
here. Considered first is the relationship between facts and values as concepts 
central to the argument of the thesis. The distinction and relationship that is 
identified as between these concepts gives some indication of how my argument 
will unfold and what presuppositions it makes regarding the roles of 
interpretation and justification in legal judgment. The second theme introduced 
here is the choice of liberalism as a theoretical starting point: why liberalism as 
opposed to any other perspective? The third section of this introduction provides 
an outline of the structure of the thesis. 
1. The Possibility of an Ethical Perspective on Law: Facts and Values 
An initial problem is the relationship between the two key concepts studied in 
this thesis: between facts (here, facts of the cases and also considerations of 
possible consequences of particular judgments) and values (liberal principles). 
This is a relationship that is given central prominence in the argument of this 
thesis, as it attempts to identify a close connection within legal rhetoric between 
assertions as to what is 'true' (i. e. what are the facts of a case and what 
consequences will result from this or that course of action) and what is 'right' 
(i. e. what matters of principle guide the process of judgement). It cannot be 
denied that such an attempt faces certain theoretical objections. As Stanley Fish 
I 
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points out, ' western philosophy since Plato has been preoccupied with matters 
of verification: 'how can we know that x is trueT One of the more radical 
objections to considering both facts and values as this thesis does is the 
suggestion that, since comments on values do not refer definitely to anything in 
the empirical world, we can never know whether they are true or false and are 
therefore literally meaningless. Such is the position of the logical positivists, for 
whom questions and statements can only make sense if there is a possibility of 
empirical verification. 2 The specific objections raised by logical positivism will 
not be discussed in this thesis, but the wider issue of verification with regard to 
a supposed distinction between facts and values is a relevant concern and 
deserves some introduction here. It is argued in the following chapters that 
'principled' judgments are made possible because matters of 'principle' (value) 
and matters of 'fact' are interpreted in the light of each other. The distinction 
drawn by logical-positivists between facts and values is rejected here because, 
as is argued in the chapters, no independent or objective empirical verification 
exists even for the factual propositions made in the cases. The empirical world 
of 'facts' is not treated as an objective source of verification to which ethical 
statements have no recourse, but rather as a 'text' in the post-modem sense: as 
that which must be read and interpreted in the light of the multiplicity of other 
sources which contribute towards the making of decision. Both categories are 
treated as subject to the ravages of rhetoric, politics and context. There is no 
clear distinction made as between statements for verification and the sources of 
' See Chapter Six, note 58; Fish (1989) Doing What Comes Naturally Change Rhetoric and 
the Practice of Literary and Legal Studies, Duke University Press, pp. 482-4 
2 See Ayer, A. J. Language, Truth and Logic (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980) 
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verification since both statements as to facts and statements as to values are 
used by judges to verify each other rhetorically. 
The thesis adopts the theoretical proposition that there is nothing outside 
of the realm of interpretation inasmuch as there is no attempt made to bracket 
out certain types of discourse as improper for critical examination for lack of 
independent verification. By way of introduction to the shift in theoretical focus 
that takes place midway in the thesis towards deconstruction, it might be stated 
that there is an acceptance (at least in part) of the Derridean notion that "there is 
nothing outside the text")3 in the sense that there is no interpretation that is not 
itself subject to further interpretation. The texts of factual description are key in 
interpreting the texts on matters of principle, and these in turn find meaning 
through interpretation of facts and so on. This is the idea that nothing is known 
which is not the product of some previous interpretation, and facts as well as 
values are read here as being verified not by objective outside referents but 
through interpretation. It is a central plank of the argument that this process has 
no logical finish point. 
2. The Difficulties of a Liberal Perspective 
Accepting that discourse on matters of principle is possible, there remains the 
problem as to what (or whose) principles the thesis are concerned with. This is a 
question that calls for the determination of the criteria of criticism and 
justification in reading legal decisions. By what standard or measure can it be 
' See Chapter Six, infra, n. 105, Derrida, Of Grammatology, Spivak, G. C. (trans. ) (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 1998) p. 158 
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decided that a legal judgment is justified on principle? Liberal inheritors of 
Kant's critical metaphysics tend to take as a foundation a notion of the rights- 
bearing 'individual', and as a guiding principle the imperative that the liberty of 
the individual is not sacrificed to any other cause. This principled individualism 
is historically rooted largely in the desire to find a secular basis for morality in 
Eighteenth Century Europe, and finds opposition in a variety of communitarian 
and identity discourses. The question as to whether the principled content of 
legal judgments ought to be measured according to liberal or any other standard 
cannot be answered in the absence of some third perspective of judgment (and 
such a perspective is certainly not claimed here). I will not try ultimately to 
justify my own decision to focus upon liberal principles as opposed to other 
kinds of principles. However there are reasons why a focus upon liberalism may 
be interesting in a study such as this of law in the U. K. Liberal principles are 
codified in English statute law under the Human Rights Act 1998 and this 
provides a legal imperative for judges in deciding cases, even when the facts of 
the cases profoundly challenge liberalism's individualistic foundational 
assumptions. It is by examining the way that judicial rhetoric is deployed to 
meet this challenge that reveals the role of principle and its relationship with 
non-principled notions in law. 
Of course this begs the question as to the precise relationship between 
Kantian liberalism and laws such as those enacted in the Human Rights Act. 
Although for many commentators the move from Kant's notion of the rational 
subject to a system of rights for individuals is a natural one, other traditions 
suggest that the relationship is more complicated. Even amongst those who 
forecast positive consequences for individual emancipation and self-realization 
4 
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within western democracies, 4 there is a wide spectrum of opinion as to where, if 
at all, the legal principles codified in legal texts such as the Hunan Rights Act or 
European Convention on Human Rights derive ethical grounding. Costas 
Douzinas points out that despite the vast amount of rights literature and the 
apparent "triumph of Human Rights on the world stage", 5 rights are not 
adequately theorised. The problem appears to be a nagging uncertainty as to 
whether, as was insisted by the Natural Law tradition, human rights are simply a 
given by virtue of 'humanity', or whether, as the Hegelian tradition stresses, 
their validity is historically grounded. Taking a different approach, Pragmatists 
such as Rorty celebrate a 'groundless' idea of liberalism and rights, arguing that 
they need no theoretical foundation except that it is the way 'we' in the west 
find most useful in talking about ourselves and the sort of world we find most 
appealing. 6 It is important to understand that this thesis is not a critique on the 
theoretical presuppositions of rights principles, and so there is no attempt made 
in this thesis to resolve this conflict of theorisations. 
3. The Structure of the Thesis 
The argument of the thesis unfolds over the course of seven chapters. The 
chapters are arranged so as to develop my argument as to the inter-relation 
between liberal principle and non-principled (factual) consequentialism in legal 
' Contrast, for example, Habermas, J. The Philosophical Discourses of Modernity (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1990a) against Adorno, T. Negative Dialectics, Ashton, E. B. (trans. ) (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973) 
5 Douzinas, C. The End of Human Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000) p. I 
6 See Chapter Six, infra, s. 3 on Rorty's pragmatism 
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rhetoric, involving a certain shift of perspective after the Fourth chapter. 
Chapters One and Two introduce and develop a theoretical perspective on 
liberal moral and legal theory respectively and discusses how, from a 'liberal' 
viewpoint, matters of principle are derived. These chapters introduce some of 
the central themes and salient differences between liberal theorists in terms of 
conceptions of the 'individual', reason, universalism, procedure and substance. 
Also explored here are the difficulties faced by Rawls and Habermas in each 
theorising a modem liberalism that is both responsive to the pluralistic and 
multicultural conditions of modem western democracies, and also principled in 
the Kantian sense. 
Chapter Three sets the 'scene' for the liberal viewpoint. It is here that the 
cases of the conjoined twins, 7 Myra HindleY8 and Thompson and Venables9 are 
introduced. The purpose is to draw attention to the particular type of problem 
that these cases pose for the liberal viewpoint. The account given here of the 
legal judgments suggests the point, developed later, that these cases are 
examples of dilemmas, insofar as they seem to demand a decision that the 
liberal perspective is not qualified to provide. The case of the conjoined twins 
confronts the judges with a situation involving two lives, only one of which is 
viable in the long term. How is the situation to be judged, given that the right to 
life deems that each life is sacred in itseIV The cases of Myra Hindley and 
Thompson and Venables involve the length of rightful sentence. In Hindley, 
Re A (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) [2000] 4 All ER 961 
' See R v. Secretary ofState For the Home Department, ex parte Hindley [2000] QB 152; also 
R v. Secretary of State For the Home Department, ex parte Hindley [2000] 2 All ER 3 85 (HL) 
R v. Secretary of State For the Home Department, ex parte Thompson [ 1998] AC 407 (HL); 
See also Re Thompson and Another (Tariff Recommendations) [2001] 1 All ER 737 
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judges must decide whether life imprisonment may mean imprisonment for her 
whole natural life; Thompson and Venables requires a judgment as to the 
sentencing and release of child (ten year-old) murderers. 
Chapter Four comprises the arena in which the role of liberal principle is 
examined in detail through an analysis of judicial rhetoric in the appeal cases. 
The chapter identifies the way in which the facts of the cases are constructed in 
judicial rhetoric in order to allow the application of liberal principle in drawing 
a moral distinction between the parties of a case, depending on how closely they 
are respectively held to approximate to liberal ideals. Chapter Five uses this 
analysis of the judicial decisions in order to introduce a deconstructive 
perspective on the rhetoric of legal judgement. In Chapter Four the symbiosis of 
principle and facts is shown to make a judgment possible by enabling the moral 
differences between otherwise equal parties to become visible. This process is 
shown to operate in rather different ways as between Re A and the 'punishment' 
cases, but in both instances there is a distinction made between those who are 
inside and those who are outside the scope of liberal principles and hence for 
making a decision at all. The key point here - and it is this that links the 
perspectives of chapters Four and Five - is this principled distinction is only 
made possible by a mixing of principled and non-principled ideas. Adopting the 
language of deconstruction, Chapter Five reads this as symptomatic of a larger 
process of unstable prioritisation and subordination or 'self and 'other' within 
western thought, in which the apparently 'natural' hierarchies are actually 
infected with undecidability. 
The shift towards a deconstructive perspective on judicial rhetoric leads 
us to three insights: that principled judgments are made by morally 
7 
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distinguishing conflicting parties locked in a dilemma (such as Re A); that this 
distinction is only made possible by accessing the arguments of non-principled 
(factual) consequentialism; and that since the co-relatedness of principle and 
fact is constructed in rhetoric, the distinction is not in itself stable or ultimately 
justifiable. From a liberal perspective, to describe the consequent divide 
between Self and Other as 'unethical' is nonsensical since it represents only the 
ordinary and necessary process of categorisation and moral judgment. In 
shifting our perspective to deconstruction, it is possible to view these apparently 
natural hierarchies of inclusion and exclusion with regard to liberalism's 
principles as open to challenge and reinterpretation. ' 0 
Chapters Six and Seven discusses some of the implications of the 
destabilisation of conceptual distinctions for political and ethical theory. 
Considered here is a range of the different ways in which the strategies of 
deconstruction have been read, interpreted and criticised in philosophical, 
literary and political debate. The focus here is upon potential that deconstructive 
perspectives have for critique in these areas. With regard to the possibilities of 
political critique, Chapter Six considers criticisms that have been aimed at 
cleconstruction and also attempts to demonstrate its potential. Chapter Seven 
further develops the examination of the Self/Other divide, produced by legal 
rhetoric, in terms of its ethical implications. In an attempt to respond both to 
what deconstruction regards as an ethical problem and also to the criticisms 
levelled at deconstruction itself, this chapter suggests a positive, non-nihilistic, 
The concept of the 'Other' appears with a capital '0' in this context to distinguish it from 
the more common usage of the word 'other' in English, and 'Self' appears similarly capitalised 
so as to signify the binary relationship between the two concepts. 
8 
Introduction 
ethical critical role for rhetoric and metaphor in conceiving notions of justice in 
law. Beginning from a premise that the Self/Other difference identified in the 
legal judgments is a rhetorical construct, the chapter deploys rhetorical and 
metaphorical devices in a way that strives towards what deconstructive 
perspectives might regard as an ethical relation towards the other. Drawing on 
the scholarship of Derrida, Levinas, Rose, Goodrich and Cornell, the chapter 
presents a reading of two apparently unconnected literary sources - Ovid's Echo 
and Narcissus and the traditional tale of The Sly Fox and the Little Red Hen - in 
order to ethically address the question of exclusion of the other. Also considered 
are conflicting interpretations of Sophocles' tragedy of Antigone, and the 
chapter takes issue with Douzinas' reading of the play in the light of Rose's 
scholarship. An interpretation of these literary texts is presented to support the 
contention that, while there may be no escaping the structures of Self and Other 
identified in the legal judgments by the analysis of chapters three and four, these 
structures are not natural or fixed but offer opportunities for positive 
reconstruction and reinvention. 
9 
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Chapter 1 
The Liberal Universal Viewpoint 
1. Introduction 
The theoretical positions attracting the label of 'liberalism' inform some of the most 
important of today's global issues. Both liberal rights and global capitalist 
discourses transcend national borders and affect local traditions and cultures in 
increasingly profound ways. In opposition to moral empiricists, sceptics and 
relativists, liberals sustain a basic Premise that, with regard to normative questions 
of morality and law, rational objectivity is possible, and have spent much effort in 
trying to show how this is so. For liberals, objectively rational norms - which might 
form a set of moral or legal rules - are 'valid' insofar as they are derived in a 
universally applicable way and 'just' insofar as they appeal to a universal sense of 
justice. Starting with this belief, liberal theory constructs its own objective 
foundations from which to make its judgments, using a priori (essential, universal, 
prior to experience) principles which provide the footing for a universal viewpoint. 
Since this viewpoint is constructed from universal principles, the judgments it 
makes are (for liberals) themselves universal. For reasons that one might call 
6pol itical' or perhaps 'moral', ' these foundational principles are not open to 
empirical doubt. These foundational principles relate to fundamental liberal beliefs 
1 We shall attend more closely to the uses of these words throughout the thesis. 
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in the nature of humanity and its moral status and capabilities. These are not 
questions of human science, but rather a normative scheme. 2 To seek empirical 
grounds for a universal point of view would contradict the liberal definition of 
justice as right in itself, since knowledge about the empirical world cannot be 
secured in advance. Judgments cannot be justified purely on what seems to work 
best, or what is currently considered most beneficial, since these are given to 
constant change. It is necessary for liberal theorists to assume that the basis for 
normativity is secure in the face of change. 
In sustaining that this objective viewpoint is a possibility, the modem liberal 
projects discussed here set themselves apart from anti -foundational theory, 
proponents of which regard any principles given a priori as mere metaphysical 
posturing. But despite openly setting up initial foundations for their theories, Rawls 
and Habermas fiercely reject metaphysics as such and describe their own approach 
as Post-metaphysical. This chapter will examine just what these foundational 
principles are and in what sense they justify making such an apparently ambitious 
claim to a Post-metaphysical universal point of view. Through explication of the 
major themes of the liberal point of view it will highlight some of the links and 
relationships between classical and modem forms and how this view informs a 
conception of liberal democracy. 
Rawls, J. Political Liberalism (New York, N. Y.: Colombia University Press, 1996) p. 87. See 
also Plant, R. Modern Political Thought (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1995) p. 23 
Chapter I 
2. Liberalisms, Morality and Impartiality 
What follows here is a very sparse outline of the formulations of the universal 
viewpoint constructed by certain classical and modem liberals. The overarching 
theme of this section is to identify the peculiarly liberal approach of equating 
justifiability with impartiality. A recurrent problematic is the notion of morality. As 
this section shows, morality functions in different ways for different formulations 
of liberal impartiality. In Kant and Hegel we find morality very much an integral 
part of their theses. As such the liberal viewpoint discussed might also be called the 
moral viewpoint. For Kant, at least, the two are the same. However, morality 
becomes more problematic for the modem liberals who are anxious to respond to 
criticisms of moral sceptics and relativists. 
2.1 Introduction to Kant - The Categorical Imperative 
For Kant, the moral law is given by practical reason and is expressed in three 
formulations of the 'categorical imperative' 3 in his Groundwork of the Metaphysics 
of Morals. Firstly, "I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will 
that my maxim should become a universal law". 4 And later: "Act only on that 
maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a 
3 Kant, 1. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (London: Routledge, 1995) p. 88 
bid, p. 67 
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universal law". 5 What commands the person is the undeniable claim that the moral 
law makes upon the person's rational will. In other words, we cannot act contrary to 
the categorical imperative without knowing that we thereby act against morality 
and thus against our rational will. The position of Reason (as practical reason) in 
Kant's theory is crucial because it provides the key characteristic of morality itself- 
The moral viewpoint is rational because it is universal, and hence moral commands 
are objective. So, for Kant, 'reason', 'moral', 'universal' and 'objective' are 
mutually dependant and defining concepts. Reason also provides the key to Kant's 
conception of the morally virtuous person: A person is morally praiseworthy if he 
acts according to the universal moral law. Mere kindness or benevolence as reasons 
for acting are not 'moral' in the Kantian sense because they are not necessarily 
oriented towards universal observance. Hence reason is associated with the 
universal law and unreason with anything outside it. In order to take a moral 
position one must take the moral law as one's guide and not one's subjective (and 
therefore possibly fleeting) sentiments. 
In the Groundwork, the Critique of Practical Reason and the Metaphysics of 
Morals Kant attempts to provide an explanation for the relationship between 
practical reason, the moral law, the will, and freedom. In the Metaphysics, Kant 
begins by making practical reason itself synonymous with the Will. 
6 The will in turn 
determines what choices we make. When our will is obliged to act rationally (i. e. 
according to the universal practical law) by the categorical imperative then it is a 
Ibid., p. 84 
6 Kant, 1. The Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) p. 42 
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'pure' will (and also a 'free' will) and its bearer is himself deemed to be free .7 
It iS 
in the pure will that the objective moral law finds its ground. 8 In the Critique 
however, the categorical imperative is itself held to be entirely unconditional, i. e. 
given a priori. In fact, Kant describes it as "originally legislative"9 and the free will 
finds its motivation in it. Which, then, is prior - the free will or the moral law? 
Both, it seems, as elsewhere in the Critique Kant states: "freedom and an 
unconditional practical law reciprocally imply one another. "10 It appears, then, that 
at the base of Kant's moral theory lies a circular foundation of free will (man's 
moral sense) and practical reason (the moral law). Both are, in different places, 
described as conceived entirely a priori and at the same time co-dependent. When a 
person wants to know what he ought to do, Kant insists that he will intuitively 
know "because he is conscious that he ought, and he recognises that he is free". 11 
What he is conscious of, presumably, is the moral law itself which must be 
accepted, as Kant says, as a "fact": It cannot be shown exactly empirically or 
deduced theoretically but makes itself known a priori; It proves the faculty of 
freedom through expressing the autonomy of practical reason (i. e. independence 
from objects of desire). 12 It is our moral sense - our free will - which is itself 
Ibid, p. 48 
Mid. Also p. 52 
Kant, 1. Critique of Practical Reason, Abbot, T. K. (trans. ) (Amherst, N. Y.: Prometheis Books, 
1996) p. 47 
10 Ibid. ) p. 
44 
" lbid. 1 p. 
46 
12 bid, p. 49, p. 64 
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practical reason, that makes it possible to know the moral law (based in the a priori 
principles of practical reason) and it is the moral law that gives us knowledge of 
what we ought to do and of our freedom. If we are to accept this conception of 
reason it seems as though one must be content to accept that reason is a 
metaphysical entity: it is simply 'there' and is not to be questioned further. Being 
'there' makes the moral law meaningful as the proper guide for our actions. 
Kant's conception of the person (and the essential characteristics of reason 
and intuitive moral sense that persons are assumed to have) is introduced in the 
third formulation of the moral law. The ability to rationally formulate one's own 
ends is the mark of humanity for Kant, 13 and leads to the imperative to "use 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the 
same time as an end, never merely as a means". 14 Persons are thus accorded respect 
as rational, autonomous agents. Acting in accordance with the universal moral law 
is rational because it is a way to express respect for another rational person. Having 
such autonomy and rationality, each person has dignity that "cannot be brought into 
reckoning or comparison without ... profanation of its sanctity". 
15 This point shall 
be returned to in the next chapter in the context of what it means to treat a person as 
an 'end in itself. 
13 Kant, supra, n. 6, p. 392. See also Caygill, H. A Kant Dictionary (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: 
Blackwell Reference, 1995) p. 230 
Kant (1998) Groundwork o the Metaphysics ofMorals, Gregor, M. (ed. ) Korsgaard, C. M. )f 
(introduction) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) p. 38 (s. 4: 429) 
15 Kant (1995) supra, n. 3, p. 97 
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Kant's categorical imperative relates both to inner virtue and external 
behaviour. It is the latter which, for Kant, establishes the primacy of the basic 
liberal right of freedom in the negative sense that each person's 'freedom' must not 
interfere with that of anyone else. The only "innate" 16 right is 'freedom', the source 
of which is reason itself (the autonomous will - which is assumed to be given a 
priori) and innate freedom is qualified only by innate equality. This constitutes 
Kant's Principle of Right. As a reformulation of the categorical imperative, Right is 
"the sum of conditions under which the choice of one can be united with the choice 
of another with a universal law of freedom". 17 Kant describes all other rights in a 
society as flowing from this natural right of freedom: right to property' 8 and self- 
defence 19 are all considered necessary derivatives from it. In the Principle of Right 
then, we begin to see the emergence of a Kantian legal theory, to which this chapter 
shall return. 
2.2 Introduction to Hegel - Morality as apart ofA bsolute Spirit 
Hegel's liberalism tends to be regarded as distinct from Kant's because of the 
greater emphasis that Hegel places upon the individual's interaction with other 
people and participation in the State in realising one's freedom. Hegel's Philosophy 
of Right develops this notion in the context of participation in the public life of 
16 Kant, I (199 1) supra, n. 6, p. 63 
17 bid, p. 56 
" Ibid, p. 68-70 
19 Ibid, p. 57 
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ethics, morality and civil society. 20 In Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel traces the 
intersubjective struggle for mutual recognition of one's individuality through one's 
work .21 Hegel's view of freedom is therefore very much bound up with 
being a 
participant in the world and a member of a state. Employing his dialectical 
philosophical method, Hegel constructs a theorisation of the rational harmonisation 
between individual and state in which the proper roles and duties of each are 
determined. As a political theorist, the close proximity of individual and rational 
state has meant that Hegel has been read as providing a grounding both for 
participatory democracy and also for totalitarian government. 22 Hegelian dialectics 
is a process in which 'new' concepts are derived from a systematic combination of 
conceptual binary oppositions. The process begins by comparing very basic 
intuitive concepts in binary opposition such as the concepts of Being and 
Nothingness. A new concept ('actual' being) is produced when one realises that 
neither of these concepts is wholly and completely opposite to the other. For 
instance, abstract Being is marked by nothingness since it is empty of actual 
substance, and Nothingness implies the presence of 'something' for there to be a 
concept to speak about at all. Hence 'actual being' is an implied third thing that 
Ibid. 
21 liting, K. -H. 'The Dialectics of Civil Society' in Z. A. Pelczynski (ed. ) The State and Civil 
Society: Studies in Hegel's Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) 
pp. 211-226 
22 See Taylor, C. 'Hegel's Ambiguous Legacy for Modem Liberalism' in Cardozo Law Review 
(1989) 10 pp. 857 - 870 
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would supplement both concepts. 23 In the political philosophy of Philosophy of 
Right, the universal idea of the person who has an 'Abstract Right' to do as his 
freewill determines is at first found to be an unacceptably empty expression of 
human freedom. The dialectical method leads Hegel to gradually flesh out the 
concept with ethical and moral content, ending ultimately with the fully free 
individual as a participant in the public life of the rational state. 
Like Kant, Hegel associates morality with reason and universality, and 
immorality with unreason and mere particularity, but unlike Kant, Hegel's 
universalism finds an active role for the world of particular ends in defining the 
requirements of moral duty, and the just state. Morality, it must remembered, is part 
of the substantive flesh that Hegel applies to the dry bones of individualistic 
Abstract Right. In his Philosophy of Right Hegel characterises morality as a 
unification, or harmonisation between the pursuing of one's own subjective 
purposes and the possibility of all others doing the same. Pursuing one's own 
purposes is a right in an abstract sense, given by a person having a free will, but this 
Abstract Right can only be rational once we consider all others affected by the 
exercise of it. Subjective purposes that can be thus shown to also have "universal 
val Ue,, 24 may be regarded as rational and moral. Immorality -a wrong - is a 
purpose whose particularity cannot be reconciled with the universal. In Hegelian 
23 Hegel, G. W. F. The Hegel Reader, Stephen Houlgate (ed) (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998) p. 129 and 
pp. 170-199, e. g. p. 190: "The commonest injustice done to a speculative content is to make it one- 
sided, to give prominence only to one of the propositions into which it can be resolved. " 
24 Hegel, G. W. F. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Wood, A. W. (ed. ) (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000) p. 14 1 /s. 113 
18 
Chapter I 
morality, therefore, an individual's subjectivity is preserved in unity with other 
people's wills, allowing for a connection between the particular and the universal to 
be maintained. If my own particular purposes are not in disharmony with those of 
others, then they can be included within Hegel's wider conception of reason, and 
are thus simultaneously universal and universally subjective. 25 The motivation 
towards marriage of the particular and universal leads Hegel towards the moral 
prescription: "I ought to be aware, not only of my individual action, but also of the 
universal which is associated with it.,, 
26 However, Hegel is critical of Kant's belief 
that moral duty can be fully accounted for in such formulations alone. As we have 
seen, Kant's idea of moral duty is given by the categorical imperative itself, but 
Hegel regards this device as too abstract to provide sufficient indication as to what 
moral duty is without having to perform the extra task of adding moral substance. 
Kant uses his categorical imperative to show that certain actions must be wrong, 
since they would contradict the idea of universal observance. 27 Hegel criticises this 
move by pointing out that such a contradiction can only be assumed after one has 
presupposed substantive conditions of the world. For example, for theft to be 
judged as 'wrong' according to the categorical imperative, we have to first 
presuppose the conditions of property and ownership. For Kant, these conditions 
flow naturally from the idea of a person's 'innate' freedom, making such 
presuppositions possible without sacrificing the impartiality of the moral structure. 
25 Ibid, p. I 39/s. III 
26 bid, p. 146/s. 118 
27 See Kant (1995) supra, n. 3, pp. 85-6. Kant uses the categorical imperative to show that lying, 
selfishness, idleness and suicide are universally wrong. 
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However, for Hegel, if the idea is to act purely from duty then surely such 
presuppositions defeat the object of the imperative. 28 
2.3 Introduction to Rawls - Political Liberalism and Justice as Fairness 
Rawls's attempts to determine principles of justice which might be acceptable to all 
reasonable people 29 is Kantian at least in spirit. Although in later writings (notably 
Political Liberalism) he has critically addressed the problematic nature of the 
4universalist' assumptions of his earlier work (i. e. the Theory of Justice), Rawls's 
dream of providing the groundwork for an inclusive framework for conceptions of 
justice has not changed. However, Rawls is keen to distance himself from much of 
Kant's metaphysics of Reason, morality, and the pure will. For instance, Rawls 
gives to 'morality' a far humbler role than does Kant or Hegel. Rather than being 
synonymous with universality (as it is in Kant), morality is a merely personal affair 
for citizens, not really important in the search for a public, universal framework for 
justice. His technique (which he calls 'Kantian Constructivism') is to try to derive 
principles of justice from the premise that, notwithstanding the normative diversity 
28 Jbid, p. 162-3/s. 135 
29 Reasonable people as distinguished from "fundamentalists" are those who, although having 
different 'comprehensive doctrines' (religious or moral beliefs about life and its meaning) are 
willing to also affirm a reasonable - i. e. generally acceptable - conception ofjustice. See Rawls, J. 
The Law of Peoples: with 'The Idea of Public Reason Revisited' (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1999a) pp. 126-7 
20 
Chapter I 
30 
of modem society, there exists a narrow piece of shared self-identity. In society 
marked by 'reasonable pluralism', this shared self-identity forms Rawls's 'political' 
conception of the person as free and equal. This conception is fundamental to 
Rawls's liberalism since, unlike any of the citizens' personal prejudices (or 
4 31 comprehensive doctrines'), it is universally shared by reasonable people . 
Principles of justice thus based are described as "freestanding', 32 and "political" as 
opposed to moral or metaphysical. 33 A 'reflective equilibrium' is achieved when 
34 
citizens see that these are compatible with their own personal moral judgments . 
This situation of stability Rawls regards as a good enough reason not to seek any 
further justification for conceptions of justice in the real world. 35 
In order to derive the essential principles of justice, these factors are linked 
together in a theoretical device that Rawls calls the 'original position'. Rawls 
invites us to imagine that this original position is inhabited by parties that are cut 
30 Rawls, J. 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory' (1980) 77 Journal of Philosophy, pp. 515 - 
572, p. 519 
31 Rawls (1996) supra, n. 2, p. 12; Rawls regards Kant's metaphysics of the person as such a 
comprehensive doctrine, since it cannot be assumed that all reasonable people will accept Kant's 
metaphysical ideas about Reason. 
32 b id. ' p. 10, p. 3 74 
33 Ibid, p. 374 
34 Rawls (1996) supra, n. 2 at p. 391-2. See also Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press: 1999) p. 18 A move that some regard as indicative of Rawls finding his 
justification in morality rather than rationality, see Gunnarsson, L. Making Moral Sense: Beyond 
Habermas and Gauthier (Cambridge University Press, 2000) p. 8 
35 Rawls Political Liberalism (1996) supra n. 2 at p. 28,51-3 
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off from contingent facts of the world by a 'veil of ignorance', 36 which ensures that, 
although aware of general ideas about politics and economics, they know nothing 
of the class, social status, fortune, abilities or desires of the people they represent 37 . 
They must choose the first principles of justice equipped only with the knowledge 
that people in the real-world all want a share of life's essentials - the 'primary 
goods' 38 : basic liberties, freedom of movement, powers of office, wealth and self- 
respect. 39 Since the veil of ignorance prevents them from knowing or deciding who 
gets what, they will ensure that these goods are distributed equally without favour. 
In this way, Rawls ensures that the parties of the original position will act to 
advance their own interests while remaining fair4o. Hence Rawls describes this 
process as "justice as fairness"41 . Liberty is the most important 'good', which 
means that the first concern of the parties behind the veil of ignorance will be to 
distribute it in the most equally advantageous way possible. Interpreted as liberties, 
rights are primary goods to be distributed fairly amongst the citizenS42. Interpreting 
36 Rawls (1999) supra, n. 34, p. 222 
17 Ibid., p. II 
38 Ibid, p. 54-5 
39 Rawls, Political Liberalism (1996) supra, n. 2, p. 308. But see Walzer, who argues, contra, that 
because 'goods' do not have the same value in all societies, there cannot be one universal index of 
primary goods: Walzer, M. Spheres ofJustice. - A Defence ofPluralism and Equality (Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1983) p-8 
40 Rawls (1980) supra, n. 30 at p. 524 
" Rawl s( 1999) supra n. 34 at p. II 
42Rawls assigns the "freedom from psychological oppression and physical assault and 
dismemberment (integrity of the person)" as liberties in Rawls (1999) supra n. 34, at p. 53 
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the effect of this set up requires that one appreciates the difference in emphasis that 
Rawls gives to the role of Kantian Constructivism in his earlier as compared to his 
later writings. The Rawls of the Theory 43 regards that the process shows that in 
such conditions there are two principles that would always be chosen in deciding 
upon a just constitution. These principles are that everyone "has an equal right to 
the most extensive scheme of basic liberties" and that any inequalities are "to 
everyone's advantage" and "attached to positions and offices open to all .,, 
44 It iS 
possible to regard Rawls's first principle of justice and Kant's theory of Right as 
4C 45 virtually identical" . Just as Kant's 'Right' gives rise to a right to self defence, (so 
Guyer suggests) Rawls's first principle of justice ensures that the rational agents in 
the original position would agree upon a system of justified coercion to ensure that 
hindrances to freedom could be removed. 46 After parties choose the principles of 
justice the veil is removed and they find themselves in a society (all with their own 
position in society, life plans, ends, desires etc) governed by those principles. All 
parties in the original position are motivated by the possibility that s/he might turn 
out to be in the society's worst position and will ensure that it is acceptable. 
Following this procedure, subsequent principles will satisfy this basic indicator of 
43 In contrast to his later reworking in Political Liberalism. 
44 Rawls (1999) supra n. 34, p. 53 
45 Guyer, P. Kant on Freedom, Law and Happiness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000) p. 277 
40 jbid, p. 276 
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fairness, "whatever they happen to be". 47 However, the original position is properly 
understood as a representational device rather than a blueprint for constitution- 
making. Characterised in Political Liberalism as a "framework of thought", 48 the 
original position allows citizens in the real-world to adopt a standpoint that is 
impartial, "hypothetical and non-historical" representing persons as free and equal 
and reciprocally regarding all others as such. 49 
2.4 Introduction to Rabermas - The Intersubjective Moral Viewpoint 
Haben-nas's discourse theory is a response to what he sees as a crisis facing 
legitimating foundations of modernism in the contemporary climate of moral 
fracture and relativism. Habermas's approach is significantly different to Rawls 
insofar as he does not seek to detach morality from the universal viewpoint. 
Presenting an argument for the conditions for universal normativity, Habermas 
attempts to meet the moral sceptic on his own terms in order to convince that moral 
and legal principles can be justified, not merely by adopting culturally specific 
sensibilities, but rationally. 50 Therefore, like Rawls, Habermas can in a sense be 
47 Williams, M. 'Justice Toward Groups: Political, Not Juridical' Political Theory (1995) 23 (1) 
pp. 67-91, p. 70 
48 Rawls (1996) supra, n. 2, p. 397 
49 jbjdý p. 23 
50 Gunnarsson (2000) supra, n. 34 , p. 101 
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regarded as taking up the Kantian mantle. Habermas takes a "work- i n-progreSS,, 51 
approach to justice, in that he makes it clear that his theoretical apparatus are 
intended to construct the conditions for citizens to construct their own substantive 
52 
moral and legal principles in discourse. Instead of Rawls's contracting rational 
agents (or Dworkin's Herculean judge of 'integrity' 53 ), Habermas attempts to find a 
universal viewpoint through an identification of the essential characteristics of 
democratic processes. 
Habermas's approach is Kantian in the sense that moral norms are 
categorical imperatives, but he rejects Kant's practical reason in favour of an 
intersubjective rationality. This he (with reservations) attributes to Hege 1,54 and for 
51 McCormick, J. P. 'Habermas's Discourse Theory of Law: Bridging Anglo-American and 
Continental Legal Traditions? ' MLR (1997) 60 (5) pp. 734 - 743, p. 740 
52 Habermas, J. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990) 
pp. 66 - 8, p. 122. In this way, Habermas differs significantly from Rawls, whose theoretical 
construct of the original position gives rise to certain principles. On this point, see Gunnarsson, 
(2000) supra, n. 34, p. 91 
53 See Dworkin, R. Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press:, 
1986) p. 239 and see generally Chapter Seven, infra. 
54 In Habermas, J. Justification and Application (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), Habermas 
explains (p. 1) that his discourse theory "takes its orientation for an intersubjective interpretation 
of the categorical imperative from Hegel's theory of recognition but without incurring the cost of 
historical dissolution of morality in ethical life. ". In The Philosophical Discourses of Modernity 
(Polity Press, 1990a) p. 40, Habermas marks his divergence from Hegel at the point at which 
Hegel's early recognition of intersubjectivity is replaced with an absolutist rationality. See this 
chapter, s. 3.1.4 for further discussion of Habermas on the separation of 'ethical life' from 
'morality'; see s. 4.1 for discussion of Hegel's theory of inter-subjective recognition. 
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Habermas it consists of rational argumentation and agreement between people. His 
project begins by separating strategic and communicative forms of discourse - the 
55 latter apparently being directed towards rational agreement. Habermas identifies 
the conditions of 'communicative action', by which all people can address their 
subjective claims to a universal audience. Whereas Kant held that the just principle 
is that which one could will everyone to act upon, and Rawls held that it is one 
which everyone in isolation and ignorance could choose, Habermas constructs a 
56 'dialogical' point of view of universal assent. He reformulates Kant's categorical 
imperative thus: "I must submit my maxim to all others for purposes of discursively 
testing its claim to universal isabi lity". 57 Just principles are those that "can count on 
universal assent, because they perceptibly embody an interest common to all 
affected". 58 So for the validation of any given principle, the only point of reference 
is the possibility of agreement through discourse between all persons affected by it, 
in which everyone's "needs and wants are interpreted in the light of cultural 
values". 59This requirement is described as the 'principle of universal i sation'. 60 
'5 Habermas, J. The Theory of Communicative Action VoL 1, McCarthy, T. (trans. ) (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1984) pp. 86-8 
56 Habermas, J. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996) p. 156-7,181-2; also Habermas, 'On the Pragmatic, the Ethical 
and the Moral Employments of Practical Reason' in Habermas (1993) supra, n. 54, pp. 1-17 at pp. 
7-8. 
57 Habermas (1990) supra, n. 52 at p. 67 
58 Habermas, J. A Reader, (Oxford: Polity Press, 1996a) p. 183 
59 Habermas ( 1990) supra, n. 5 2, p. 68 
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Habermas's discourse theory depends upon accepting his claim that, 
irrespective of a particular context or intent, engaging in communicative action 
entails accepting certain presuppositions. These presuppositions are twofold. 
Rational communication itself presupposes equality between participants, freedom 
to raise any claims, non-coercion, and openness to all interested persons to 
participate .61 Further to this, the parties who enter the argument themselves make 
four validity claims when they speak. These claims consist of comprehensibility (an 
agreed meaning of the particular phrases and words used), truth (factual truth/falsity 
of what is said), rightness (reasons entitling someone to make a certain statement) 
62 
and sincerity (everyone must mean what they say) .A possible ambiguity 
is 
whether or not these presuppositions are unavoidable if one wishes to engage in any 
communicative discourse at all, or whether they are idealisations that must be 
institutional ised in order to secure the conditions for rational discourse. 63 Certainly 
Habermas is clear that, in some sense, the presuppositions are an unavoidable point 
of reference for anyone who engages in discourse. For instance, Habermas states 
60 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action VoL II, McCarthy, T. (trans. ) (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1987) pp. 92-6. See also Habermas (1996) supra, n. 56, p. 108-110,230. For Raes, 
Habermas's attempt to define the universal presuppositions for rational agreement represents a 
modern form of Hegel's Absolute Spirit, since it reads a single telos into language. See Raes, K. 
'Legislation, Communication and Strategy: A Critique of Habermas's Approach to Law' J of L& 
Soc (1986) 13 (2) 183-206, p. 190 
1 Habermas (1990) supra, n. 52, p. 89 
62 Ibid, pp. 87-89; See also Outhwaite, W. Habermas: A Critical Introduction (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1994) p. 40 
63 See Gunnarsson (2000) supra, n. 34, p. 87 
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that, although participants of discourse may argue from their very different 
communities and cultural viewpoints, nevertheless universal rules underlie their 
orientation towards agreement. For Habermas, "concepts like truth, rationality or 
justification play the same grammatical role in every linguistic commun ity. 5ý64 The 
justification for this bold assertion is that, apparently, "[t]he supposition of a 
common objective world is built into the pragmatics of every single linguistic 
usage. 9ý65 Habermas adopts and adapts concepts borrowed from, among others, 
Wittgenstein; chiefly the notion that forms of discourse are "language games"66 
which, like other games, have their own rules that the participants necessarily 
accept upon joining. Elsewhere Habermas employs Cartesian logic to show that it is 
a logical contradiction to reject his argument. Just as, for Descartes, it would be a 
logical contradiction to state "I do not exist", since by saying so one is already 
presupposing the existence of an "I" who denies his own existence, so Habermas 
states that even to make a refutation of universal isabi I ity is to enter into the 
discourse of argumentation and to therefore implicitly accept the universal rules of 
argumentation. 67 However, he also describes the presuppositions as "unavoidable 
idealisationS,, 68 for an ideal speech situation . 
69Adopting such a description gives 
64Habermas, J. Post-metaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays, Hohengarten, M. (trans. ) 
(Oxford: Polity Press, 1992) p. 13 8, Original Emphasis 
65 Ibid., Emphasis added 
66 Wittgenstein, 1. Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973) 
67 Habermas (1990) supra, n. 52, p. 86 
68 Habermas ( 1996) supra, n. 5 6, p. 5 
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credence to the interpretation that rather than simply describing the factual 
conditions of all communication, they are the conditions for achieving rational 
discourse . 
70 Habermas maintains that, while the ideal presuppositions of 
communication may sometimes be counterfactual, they are nevertheless essential 
71 for universal agreement. If they are idealisations, does Habermas actually find the 
presuppositions or does he instead construct them? 72 As Habermas himself 
explicitly states, the formal conditions of the ideal speech situation are not in 
themselves moral norms. Rather, they are the necessary conditions for the 
production of moral norms by real-world participants of discourse. 73 This being so, 
on what basis can Habermas confidently derive the principle of universalism itself? 
The answer that Habermas gives is that we just know that, if norms are not derived 
in conditions of fairness, equality, openness and non-coercion, then they cannot be 
sincerely described as commanding universal assent. 74 Rather than being regulative, 
69 Habermas (1990) supra n. 52, p. 88. See also Habermas, J. 'Wahrheitstheorien' (Theories of 
Truth) in Fahrenbach, H. (ed. ) Wirklichkeit und Reflexion, Festschriftfür W. Schulz (Pfüllingen, 
1973) pp. 211-265 at 211; cited in Bemstein, J. M. Recovering Ethical Life: Jurgen Habermas and 
the Future of Critical Theory (London and New York, N. Y.: Routledge, 1995) pp. 52-3 
70 Rehg, W. Insight and Solidarity: The Discourse Ethics ofJurgen Habermas (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1994) p. 65 
" Habermas ( 1993) supra, n. 5 4, p. 56 
72 Herbert, J. Contemporary German Legal Philosophy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1996) p-55 
73 Habermas ( 1990) supra, n. 5 2, p. 93 -4 
74 Habermas (1996) supra, n. 5 6, p. 19 
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they are essential for rational democratic argument, 75 ensuring that agreement is 
achieved only through argument (and not, say, force or deception). 76 In other 
words, either we accept his communicative presuppositions or else we abandon 
hope for democratic discussion. As a Post-metaphysical liberal, Habermas is 
conscious of the fact that, unlike Kant, he is constrained from relying upon any 
philosophical metaphysics as an underlying foundation. 
For certain commentators, Habermas's view that all communication, even 
of a hostile or aggressive variety, requires an assumption of receptive abilities in the 
intended addressee shows discourse ethics to have a "subversive and emancipatory 
potentialý5.77 It has been argued by some that Habermas's insistence that the 
presuppositions of communicative action are universal enables radical critique, for 
even the most oppressive or dismissive voice will find itself inadvertently affirming 
78 
the rules of fair participation. On the other hand, the suggestion that the rules that 
Habermas finds in communication represent the only standard of rationality strike 
others as itself oppressive. Raes warns that the ambitions of dominating powers 
75 Habermas, J (1993) supra, n. 54, p. 31 
76 Habermas (1984) supra, n. 55, p. 24-5. If Habermas is concerned only with rational speech then 
this separation of language games means Raes's view that Habermas, like Hegel, unifies all forms 
of reason and rationality within one Absolute Idea or 'Spirit' is unsustainable. However, this 
interpretation sits uncomfortably with the view that the rational presuppositions are unavoidable in 
all forms of communication. 
77 McCormick, J. P. 'Habermas's Discourse Theory of Law: Bridging Anglo-American and 
Continental Legal Traditions? ' MLR (1997) 60 (5) pp. 734-43 at p. 739 
78 Ibid., p. 739 
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may also be realised through the discourse of legitimate language. 79 Others have 
suggested that Habermas's universalism should be regarded in the context of his 
own interest in German and US constitutional law . 
80 For her part, Iris Young argues 
that a system that considers only speech that is 'rational' according to a modern 
Enlightenment conception of serious argument cannot be described as 'universal', 
but rather represents only a particular western form of rationality which, although 
including some, excludes other voices .81 Even as an ideal, the value of the 'Ideal 
Speech Situation' is questionable. Some critics have argued that Habermas is 
unrealistic and too optimistic that the forces of oppression and manipulation can be 
exposed and resisted 82 or that the obstacles to universal communication can be 
overcome 83 by this idealisation. Thus, a question remains as to whether the 
presuppositions that Habermas identifies serve as a radical or a conservative 
measure of law's legitimacy. 84 
79 Raes (1986) supra, n. 60, p. 192 
80 Harvey, C. J. 'The Procedural Paradigm of Law and Democracy: Review of Jurgen Habermas's 
Between Facts and Norms' Public Law (1997) pp. 692-703 at p. 702 
81 Young, 1. M. 'Justice and Communicative Democracy' in Gottleib (ed. ), Radical Philosophy: 
Tradition, Counter- Tradition, Politics (Temple University Press, 1993) p. 129-31 
82 Raes (1986) supra, n-60 
83 Black, J. 'Procedural izing Regulation: Part II OAS (2001) 21 (1) pp. 33-58 at p. 41 
84 Salter, M. 'Habermas's New Contribution to Legal Scholarship' J of L&S (1997) 24 (2) pp. 
285-305, p. 302. Some critics have suggested that a more radical perspective would be less 
idealistic and pay greater attention to, for example, manipulative or strategic uses of language 
(Raes, (1986) supra, n. 60, pp. 188-9) and specific ways of combating actual inequalities and 
strategies of political dominance (See Black (2001) supra, n. 83, p. 46). 
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3. The Viewpoint as Universal and Deontological 
For any principle to be regarded as universal, it must be shown that its value does 
not depend upon any particular consequence or context. Liberal universalism can 
only make sense if one is ready to believe that the unknown 'other' can and should 
be incorporated into a moral order through identifying essential shared 
characteristics. As Rawls contends, 85 so long as a person is not fundamentally 
unreasonable, no differences in local tradition, religion, language, culture or politics 
should prevent this union of human beings. In such conditions of reasonable 
pluralism, each person is essentially 'just like me' and can therefore be included 
within a universal community. The techniques by which this universal community 
is theorised are the subject of this section. In general terms, liberals seek to 
distinguish all that is permanent and fixed from all that is transient and subject to 
change. For liberals, the former comprises that which can be assumed to be shared 
by all people, and the latter is all that cannot. It is worth noting that this endeavour 
is not a purely liberal one. The attempt to isolate that which is certain from that 
which is not has been a central preoccupation for western philosophers since Plato's 
separation of the "Two Orders of Reality". 86 The defining feature of the liberal 
85 See s. 2.3, supra, on Rawls's notion of 'reasonable pluralism'. 
86 Plato, "Part VII: The Philosopher Ruler", in The Republic, Lee, D. (trans. ) (London and New 
York, N. Y.: Penguin) esp. pp. 206 - 216, comprising the realm of unchanging 'form' - the proper 
object for philosophical reflection - and that of transitory and unreliable 'sense'. 
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involvement in this philosophical endeavour is its focus upon normative rather than 
epistemic certainty. 
As critics such as Fitzpatrick have noted, the idea of universalism is a 
profoundly political one. The very notion that there is a realm of universal values to 
be contrasted with merely particular ones implies a world order in which the 
'civilised' are separated from the 'savage' on the basis of moral and legal changes 
(e. g. the French and American Revolutions) in the nations of the former. 87 If one 
regards liberalism as a product of particular historical developments, then its claim 
to universality suggests an attempt to export culturally dependent values, drawing 
88 
accusations of moral imperialism. However, others argue that such a position 
criticises not universality itself, but the effects of contemporary global hegemony. 
Upendra, Baxi distinguishes the universality from the globalisation of human rights. 
The former refers to the gradual process of working to realise the rights claims of 
oppressed peoples. The latter refers to the quite different practise of using rights 
discourse as a justificatory discourse for aggressive action against one's enemies in 
the global political sphere. This process is barred from true universality by the 
"moral duplicity" of dominant states who refuse to allow peoples struggling for 
recognition of their own 'universal' human rights the same freedom to use violent 
87 Fitzpatrick, P. Modernism and the Grounds of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001) p. 36; Paliwala, 'Irresolutions of Modernity, Nation and Empire' LGD (2003) (1) 
88 See Steiner, H. J. and Alston, P. International Human Rights in Context (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996) pp. 192-255 
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means. 89 These criticisms are especially pertinent in the context of this thesis 
which, in Chapter Five, addresses the binary characteristics of law's inclusion and 
exclusion from its realm with regard to the parties of legal cases. The concepts and 
distinctions that are used here to explain and justify the liberals' claims to 
deontology and universality (here I shall discuss the right/good and a 
priori/empirical distinctions) are inextricably and intimately connected. 
Distinctions such as that between 'autonomy' 90 and 'heteronomy' and also between 
4public' or 'political' self and the 'private' self are discussed to elucidate the ways 
in which Kant and Rawls present and justify their deontological theories. 
3.1 The Right and the Good 
A principle is 'right' (rather than merely good for something or someone) if, and 
only if, it can be shown to have value in and of itself no matter what the 
circumstances. This does not mean that it has to be shown that in all possible 
contexts the principle holds, since there are bound to be innumerable conditions and 
contexts which one could not anticipate. Rather, it be must be shown that the said 
principle has its roots in a ground which is itself stable and constant, rather than one 
which is vulnerable to the uncertainties of possible consequences and changing 
context. We have already seen that liberal ideas of the rational and reasonable 
Baxi, U. The Future of Human Rights (Oxford and New York, N. Y.: Oxford University Press, 
2002) pp. 95-6 
90 Definitions autonomy in this section refer only to Kant and Rawls. Habermas uses another 
definition which will be covered in section 6.3, infra. 
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person and of reason itself form the a priori foundations for rightful judgments. 
These foundations cannot be exposed to empirical doubt. These apparently stable 
foundations are contrasted to empirical sources of knowledge, which comprise all 
that cannot be assumed in advance and is discovered only through looking at the 
world and seeing what is there. The empirical is all that is contingent and unfixed, 
and as such cannot provide a firm foundation for any theory of justice or moral 
viewpoint. In liberal theory, the a priori is associated with rightness, and the 
empirical with goodness. That which is merely good cannot be universal because it 
is defined with reference to empirical, and thus uncertain principles. What is good 
for me is not necessarily good for you; thus it has only a local application. 
Rightness, therefore, is guaranteed by following the a priori rules of moral 
reasoning and not through appeal to empirical consequences. In the subsections 
below, the distinction between right and good is discussed with reference to the 
idea of the autonomous (or free) agent as one who has the capacity to detach 
himself from the purely contingent and empirical in order to be guided by universal, 
deontological (and therefore rational) principles. 
3.1.1. Kantian Autonomy 
We have seen that the only kind of action that Kant regards as moral or rightful is 
that which is motivated by rational maxims, such as a categorical imperative. Only 
by acting on such maxims can a person be regarded as having acted autonomously. 
The heteronomous will by contrast is based on anything other than the moral law, 
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such as desires and conceptions of the good, and is thus irrational. Kant explicitly 
links the notion of acting from such a duty to that of deontological Right. In the 
Groundwork he writes: "To be truthful from duty... is something entirely different 
from being truthful out of anxiety about detrimental results, since in the first case 
the concept of the action in itself already contains a law for me while in the second 
I must first look about elsewhere to see what effects on me might be combined with 
it. "91 A confusion that arises is this: how can it be that a person is simultaneously 
bound to obey the moral law and is at the same time autonomous? The answer lies 
in the fact of universality itself and is one of Kant's many circular justifications, in 
which the autonomy of rational human beings is presupposed in order to connect 
them to the idea of universal principles of morality. Recall that all properly moral 
principles are those that are objective, and that can be universalised. Being blessed 
with the faculty of freedom, each person can choose their own maxims on which to 
act, and so they are not only the addressee but also the author of the objective law. 
This means that a person acting according to a universal maxim acts autonomously 
despite being duty-bound by the moral law. 92 Individuals express their autonomy by 
formulating maxims and enacting laws, illustrating their membership of the 
, ýintelligible [as opposed to the merely sensible] world". 93 
91 Kant (1998) supra, n. 14, p. 15 
92 Kant (1995)supra, n. 3, p. 108; See also Kant (199 1) supra, n. 6, pp. 48-9. This still leaves the 
confusion that rational persons are 'free' to act according to the moral law or not, and also that 
only when acting according to law they are acting freely (i. e. on universal rather than merely 
particular maxims). 
93 Kant (1995) supra, n. 3, p. 113 
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3.1.2 Hegel - Universal Personality and Abstract Right 
For Hegel, the possibility of a rational viewpoint and of deontological principles 
depends upon being able to construe persons as free to be self-determining, that is, 
to detach themselves from dependence upon anything external, determinate or 
contingent. 94 The achievement of this freedom comes to individuals following a life 
and death struggle to be recognised as having independent self-consciousness, with 
the power to abstract from every determining thing or force in the world and to 
provide itself with content necessary for making judgments. 95 Hegel describes as 
"personality" this abstraction of the individual and assumes it as the basis for his 
theory of Abstract Right. 96 Each is "a simple unit inwardly aware of its sheer 
independence from everything given , 97 and this situation, universally assumed 
gives rise to a formal, universal "abstract equality" between individuals. 98 In order 
that the second aspect of this idea of personality - the positive freedom to choose 
one5s own ends - does not undermine the universalism established by the formal 
94 Benson, P. 'The Priority of Abstract Right and Constructivism in Hegel's Legal Philosophy' in 
Cornell, D. Rosenfeld, M., Carlson, D. G. Hegel and Legal Theory (New York, N. Y.: and London: 
Routledge, 1991) p. 174 - 204 at 178; Hegel's method of distinguishing human agents as such is 
explained in his Phenomenology of Spirit and discussed in s. 5.1, infra. 
95 lbid, p. 179 
96 Hegel (2000) supra n. 24, s. 35 
97 Benson in Cornell et al (199 1) supra, n. 94, p. 183 
98 Hegel (2000) supra, n. 24, s. 49 
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equality, Hegel regards the contingent world of 'ends' as things or objects which 
can be used as means to furthering the ends of individuals. 99 The relationship of 
universal, abstract free personality to these contingencies gives rise to what Hegel 
describes as Abstract Right, and these form the basis for universal mutual respect 
for each other's independenceloo and rights of ownership. It is important to 
appreciate that, for Hegel, there is as yet nothing ethical about this state of affairs: 
each person is bound to respect the external independence of all others, but beyond 
these imperatives people are not equipped to make moral choices. 101 To this extent, 
Hegel's theory is identifiably liberal in the Kantian sense. 102 
3.1.3 Rawls - The Person and Public Reasoning 
For Rawls, the difference between Right and Good is understood by differentiating 
between that which is essential and that which is not essential in persons co- 
operating in a state of reasonable pluralism. For example it is essential that the 
person in the real world has the capacity for a sense of justice ('reasonableness') 
and also a sense of what ends are good for him to pursue ('rationality'). People are 
considered "free" in respect of having these two powers and "equal" in respect of 
99 Benson in Cornell et al (1991) supra, n. 94 at pp. 185-6 
100 Hegel (2000) supra, n. 24, s. 38 
101 lbid, ss. 37-8,45,49,105 
102 Stillman, P. G. 'Hegel's Critique of Liberal Theories of Rights' in American Political Science 
Review (1974) vol 68 pp 1086-92 at p. 1086 
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being willing to co-operate with others. ' 03 The abstraction from the real world 
achieved by the original position allows the purely formalistic conditions for 
'justice' to be shown. In the real-world, political conceptions of justice are affirmed 
on the basis of both moral powers of rationality and reasonableness by "fully 
autonomous" persons in the real-world. 104 The scheme of liberties (including rights) 
that the two principles of justice require to be distributed fairly are given to ensure 
that each person's moral powers have the opportunity to develop. 
As a corollary of this point, persons in a pluralist society are conceived as 
having a public (reasonable) and a private (rational) identity. 105 One's public 
identity is experienced and expressed by individuals that regard themselves as an 
original source of authentication for public claims, since every reasonable person 
has an intuitive sense of justice. One's public identity is fixed; we are not at liberty 
to change it because it is part of our essential self. Rawls states that the political 
conception of justice "expresses [citizens'] shared and public political reason". 106 
This conception is "independent of the opposing and conflicting philosophical and 
religious doctrines that citizens affirm". 107 These doctrines are determined by one's 
private self which, relating to our private conceptions of the good life, is not so 
fixed because (and this is the other measure of our freedom) we experience 
103 Rawls (1996) supra, n. 2, p. 19 
1041bid., p. 77-80 
105 bid., p. 30 
106 lbid, p. 9 
107 ibid 
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ourselves as being at liberty to adopt or reject such conceptions at Will. 
108 Thus, 
because we are free, we not only have an undeniable sense of justice, 109 but all our 
associations, attachments, beliefs and purposes are ours to "revise" and "rationally 
pursue". 110 This distinction is important in Rawls's theory in terms of deontology, 
because in order for there to be a universal conception of justice in any pluralist 
society there must be an essential realm (which Rawls calls 'the Political') that is 
shared by all - i. e. it is public - and hence can be assumed as given a priori. The 
'Good' is made secondary to the 'Right' on the basis that it occupies ground that 
cannot be shared by everyone. Having provided his political conception of person, 
Rawls goes on to apply the same logic of the political to society generally. Having a 
sense of justice, or reasonableness (everyone's public identity and the first marker 
of freedom) people understand that what justice requires of them is to limit their 
desires and purposes (everyone's private identity and the second marker of 
freedom) so as to accommodate the freedom of all others. ' 11 
Post-metaphysical liberalism accepts that reason may take many forms, 
represented by the multitude of discourses and potentially conflicting 
108 Although this thesis does not attempt to explain or take a position on the liberal/communitarian 
debate, it is worth noting that this is a point of some controversy. Rawls's notion of the 'private' 
self is fiercely rejected by Michael Sandel, who argues that Rawls leaves the person as someone 
whose lack of attachments and knowledge of others makes him incapable of forging meaningful 
relationships or allegiances. See Sandel, M. J. (ed. ), Liberalism and its Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1984) pp. 172-4 
109 Rawls (1996) supra n-2, p. 19 
110 Ibid., p. 20. See also Rawls (1980) supra, n. 30, p. 521 
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comprehensive doctrines. But in order for Rawls to realise the unifying ambitions 
of his Political Liberalism, reason must be emPloyed in such a way that it does not 
exclude any reasonable people. Rawls accepts the classical liberal belief that, in 
some way, reason must act as a guiding principle if deontological, universal 
principles are to be constructed. Like Habermas, Rawls maintains that, even if 
counter-intuitive, such rational principles embody the best safeguard of the most 
important and non-negotiable characteristics of humanity. ' 12 Rawls thus devises a 
system of reasoning on matters of justice that admits only arguments relating purely 
to the co-operation between free and equal persons, excluding 'moral' content as 
far as possible. 113 Rawls believes that if reason is kept within these narrow confines 
then it is universally acceptable (providing the people in the society are reasonable). 
It is, in other words, public reason. It is this inclusive form of reasoning that Rawls 
describes as the sole legitimate form of reasoning of the supreme court of a liberal 
democratic constitution. ' 14 
'Public Reason' requires a number of closely related conditions to be met by 
those who engage in political discourse, either as subjects or as legislators. Firstly, 
everyone must fulfil a requirement of 'reasonableness' as outlined above whereby 
citizens in the real-world propose terms of co-operation which could be accepted by 
anyone else who regards themselves as free and equal. 115 To be unreasonable is to 
Rawls (1996) supra, n. 2, p. 34 
112 Rawls (1980) supra, n. 30, p. 519 
113 See Gray, J. Liberalism (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1995) p. 54 
114 Rawls (1996) supra, n. 2, Lecture VI, s. 6 
115 Rawls, J. 'Public Reason Revisited' in Rawls (I 999a) supra, n. 29, p. 136, p. 394 
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insist that one's own comprehensive doctrine is the only legitimate perspective. " 6 
Reasonableness is itself based on 'reciprocity' - meaning simply that each person 
reciprocally recognises the other as being free and equal and hence of equal 
worth. 1 17 So long as this reciprocal regard is maintained, citizens may also make 
reference to shared history, traditions and aspirations in finding a common 
viewpoint. 118 Further to the conditions of reasonableness and reciprocity, Rawls 
adds that legislators and citizens owe a duty of civility to one another. This seems 
to mean that legislators are bound to speak and act in accordance with the 
fundamentals of public reason (i. e. reasonably) and the citizens for their part must 
continually scrutinise legislators and hold them to the requirements of public 
reason. 119 Public justification requires "proper political reasons" to be given in 
support. 120 If a conception can only be justified with reference to a comprehensive 
doctrine (such as religious teaching, moral or philosophical theory) then it cannot 
be said to satisfy the condition of reciprocity. Reasons relating to 'moral truth' (e. g. 
the existence of God or the true moral code) may operate as supplementary reasons, 
but could not count as core justifying reasons because political liberalism has no 
mechanism for validating such arguments. A reasonably pluralist society achieves 
116 Rawls, J (1996) supra, n. 2, p. 61 
117 Ibid, p. 81 
118 Rawls, J. 'Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical' in Philosophy and Public Affairs 
(1985) 14(3) pp. 223-25 1, p. 230. Arguments in the political sphere are always simply judged 
reasonable or unreasonable on this basis - see Rawls (1996) supra, n. 2, p. 394 
119 Rawls, J. 'The Idea of Public Reason Revisited' in Rawls (1999a) supra, n. 29, p. 135 
120 bid, p. 152 
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"stability for the right reasons" when its citizens come to see that the political 
conception of the person is so fundamental that it provides the basis for an 
overlapping consensus between all reasonable comprehensive doctrines. 12 1 Rawls's 
remarks on the operation of public reason within the political culture of the liberal 
democratic state provide a useful indicator of the importance of 'real-world' 
institutions and processes in his later writings. Rawls argues that so long as the 
justices of the U. S. Supreme Court make decisions by "no other reason and no other 
values than the political", 122 there is no need for constitutional first principles to be 
entrenched (i. e., put beyond amendment, as is the case in Germany 123 ), because its 
decisions will always be those that "all citizens as reasonable and rational might 
reasonably be expected to endorse". 124 In this way, the Supreme Court is an 
4exemplar' of public reason and an example to its citizens. 
3.1.4. The Moral, the Ethical and the Freedom of the Individual in Habermas 
Understanding Habermas's view of the deontological requires us to recall the 
relationship between particular and universal discourses. Habermas believes that in 
particular contexts, participants of discourse engage in 'ethical' discourse, in which 
prescriptions, or statements of 'ought', are always connected to a particular cultural 
and social context. As such the 'ought' is always contingent on what happens to be 
121 Ibid, pp. 388-390 
122 Rawls (1993) supra, n. 114, p. 235 
123 Ibid., p. 234 
'2" Ibid, p. 236 
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the practises of the particular people in a certain time and place, and given as a 
means to achieving some particular good. 125 Knowledge of what one should do is 
derived from the "unquestioned truths" of one's own lifeworld. 126 To enter into 
moral discourse, on the other hand, one is required to break away from these 
unquestioned truths and distance oneself from them in order to accommodate a 
universal viewpoint. 127 Instead of a common ethical culture, morality is founded in 
the presuppositions of rational communication. 128 However, moral discourse is not 
entirely cut off from its particular participants. Habermas explicitly aligns his 
discourse theory with Hegel in insisting on "the internal relation between justice 
and solidarity. " 129He reminds us that his universal moral point of view is not that 
of an external viewer, but the universal participant of discourse. 130 Habermas 
accepts the contextualist claim that the moral world "reveals itself only from 
within" and thus an elevated third person viewpoint could not get a proper look (so 
to speak). 131 Instead, the universal moral viewpoint "emerges" from communicative 
action as idealised through the presuppositions of argumentation. In 
Communicative Action, rational agreement on normative questions is derived from 
125 In Kantian language ethics is the realm of hypothetical imperatives. 
126 
Habermas (1993) supra, n. 54, p. 12 
127 Ibid. See also Habermas (1996) supra, n. 56, p. 25 8, where he insists that in discourse theory, 
moral discourse does not depend upon any "concrete substantively integrated community" 
128 Habermas (1996) supra, n. 56, p. 298 
"9 Habermas (1993) supra, n. 54, p. I 
' 10 Ibid, pp 48-9 
131 Ibid 
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the particular claims made by participants, who themselves accept the rational 
presuppositions of communication. In moral discourse the participants' own 
particular interested arguments are made, and only those that can stand up to the 
objections and questions of all the others, and are backed by universally accepted 
reasons, can claim to enjoy "rationally motivated agreement". 132 In order to achieve 
this, each participant is required to "project" himself to the position of all the 
others. 
133 
Habermas argues that a conception of language as publicly shared - 
transcending the borders of private experience, following insights of Frege 134 and 
Peirce 135 _ is what makes it possible for law to play such a crucial role between 
particular individuals and universal validity. This conception is that language, and 
crucially the meanings of words, does not belong to an individual user; it is shared 
by a community of language users. Hence, concepts mean identical things to 
different users and concepts are "intersubjectively recognisable" . 
136 Questions of 
normativity are regarded in a Peircian triadic fashion: Every proposition is regarded 
as representing something for interpretation by a language-using community. 137 In 
132 bid, p. 53 
133 lbid, p. 50 
134 Frege, G. Logical Investigations, Geach, P. T. (ed. ), Geach, P. T. and Stoothoff, R. H. (trans. ) 
(New Haven, Conn., 1977) p. 24; cited in Habermas (1996) supra, n. 56, p. 10 
135 Peirce, C. S. Collected Papers, 6 vols. Hartshorne, C. and Weiss, P. (ed. ) (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1935) 5: p. 311; cited in Habermas (1996) supra, n. 56, p. 15 
136 Habermas (1996) supra, n. 5 6, p. 13 
137 lb id, p. 14 
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this way a community will be able to agree through communication whether or not 
a certain proposition is valid or not. Applying this to the question of moral 
discourse, language acts here as a mediator for all citizens to make decisions based 
on common interpretations of the problems they encounter. Language mediates 
between the fractured relationship of fact and validity 138 to allow citizens to 
produce valid moral judgments. The fact/validity tension "moves into the 
presuppositions of argument", 139 where to enter into argument over the truth of any 
statement is to unavoidably accept the presupposition of rational discourse and 
hence engage in communicative reason. 
The duty of universal i sati on placed upon participants of argumentation is 
not supposed to impose superhuman burdens of foresight, empathy and 
organisation. Rather, reasonable consequences of a proposed norm on the 
participants must be considered 140 . When prima facie valid legal norms clash, 
participants must decide discursively which is to prevail, based on the generalisable 
interests at stake 141. Objectivity - the moral point of view - can thus only arise 
through encountering another with the goal of coming to an understanding. It is 
138 i. e. thefact that a particular belief is held or activity practised and the validity of such beliefs or 
activities as a universal maxim. 
139 Habermas ( 1996) supra, n. 5 6, p. 16 
140 Habermas (1993) supra, n-54, p. 37 
"' Habermas (1996) supra, n. 56, p. 64. However, this is a potentially critical problem for 
communicative rationality. How is a matter to be resolved, as Julia Black rhetorically asks, if 
participants cannot even agree as to whether an argument is a moral or a merely technical one? 
(Black (2001) supra, n. 83, pp. 44-5) 
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only through such an encounter that people "can and must" recognise each other as 
deserving of moral regard. 142 It is this moral regard that the ideal speech situation 
aims to foster in providing the conditions for each person to address his or her 
concerns to a universal audience. Habermas's concern not to break the thread that 
he spins between the local contexts of particular lives and universal morality does 
present certain conceptual difficulties. Not only does the distinction between ethics 
('what is good for us? ') and morality ('what is good for everyone? ') strike some as 
an artificial one; it is also not entirely clear that this would be a desirable 
achievement anyway. 143 What can the terrorist attacks in New York 2001 and 
142 Habermas (1993) supra, n. 54, p. 66 
143 See Bernstein, R. J. The Retrieval of the Democratic Ethos' in M Rosenfeld and Arato, A. 
Habermas on Law and Democracy: Critical Exchanges (London: University of California Press, 
1998) pp. 287-305. Bernstein describes the distinction as "a violently distortive fiction" (p. 301). 
Since the presuppositions of rational communication are apparently not contingent on any 
particular community, Habermas is clearly seeking to establish a universality that avoids criticism 
as being Eurocentric. In doing so, however, he is arguably presenting an ambiguous argument. 
Bernstein argues that Habermas is wrong to suppose (See Habermas (1996) supra, n. 56, pp. 278-9, 
p. 298) that discourse ethics can do without a substantive sittlichkeit in the Hegelian sense of a 
shared "democratic ethos" (Bernstein in Rosenfeld and Arato (1998) p. 290) and a common 
exercise of "virtues" (ibid, p. 294) to ensure that decisions are determined by the best arguments 
(ibid, p. 291). 
See also Michelman, F. I. 'Family Quarrel' in Rosenfeld and Arato (1998) ibid, pp. 309-322, 
p. 320. Michelman argues that the intersubjective recognition that Habermas strives for is 
impossible without a commitment to a shared cultural and historical context from which 
participants "draw their meaning" 
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Madrid 2004 represent if not a certain impotence of such appeals to universal 
morality underpinned by liberal ideals of communication? However, Habermas has 
recently reiterated his argument with even greater urgency. Habermas is adamant 
that if the attacks such as those of September II th 2001 carry any enlightening 
message for western governments, it is to work to build up a relationship of "trust" 
between themselves and other nations by addressing economic and power 
imbalances. The purpose of such work is, for Habermas, the development of 
communicative practises between cultures, allowing ethical values to be tested 
against the universal. 144 If the cycle of attack and counter-attack that terror and 
retaliation engender is to be broken, it will only be through a common orientation 
towards this goal of mutual understanding. 145 
Habermas's separation of the moral and ethical enables us to glimpse his 
conception of the individual as an autonomous agent. For Habermas, human 
autonomy is inextricably bound up with the conditions of the ideal speech situation. 
Not only does the possibility of realising communicative ideals depend upon the 
participants' abilities to understand and participate in rational discourse, but each 
See also Fraser, A. 'A Marx for the Managerial Revolution: Habermas on Law and Democracy' J 
of L& Soc (2001) 28 (3) pp. 361-383. Fraser maintains (ibid, p. 378) that Habermas's discourse 
ethics is disengaged from "established ways of life" and thus undermines the spiritual cohesion of 
western societies in favour of wealth and power-hungry managerial elites. Without a shared ethnic 
history and ethical sentiments, a society is trapped in a "system drained of any meaning, value or 
purpose. " (ibid, p. 383) 
'44Borradori, G. Philosophy in a Time of Terror (London and Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2003) p. 36 
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individual participant is also dependent upon the emancipatory qualities of the 
communicative ideal itself 146 In order to achieve a rational consensus in the ideal 
speech situation, participants must have recourse to an "appropriate" language. That 
is to say that there must be a language in which "participants in the discourse can 
make their inner natures transparent and know what they really want. , 147 In the 
ethical life, in which 'oughts' are derived from one's own community values, such 
self knowledge is not certain, as different communities will be at variance in terms 
of the level of equality of participation and lack of coercion. Only the ideal speech 
situation - the conditions of moral discourse rather than the merely ethical - can 
guarantee the requisite level of freedom for participants to know what they can 
achieve. In Between Facts and Norms Habermas argues that law represents a 
universally appropriate language by virtue of its power to mediate between 
148 
communities and allow norms to penetrate all of society . In ensuring that each 
participant of discourse has an equal chance to raise arguments and question others 
(through human rights provisions in law), 149 they are in a position to realise their 
"inner nature" and thus gain full freedom within discourse. In this sense, the 
145 bid., p. 38 
146 Habermas, 'Wahreitstheorien' in Fahrenbach (1973) supra, n. 69, p. 25 1; cited in Bernstein 
(1995) supra, n. 69, p. 52-3; It on this point of freedom through intersubjective recognition that 
Habermas is comparable to Hegel, whose own perspective on the matter is discussed in s. 5.1 
below. 
147 Habermas, ibid. p. 25 1; quoted in Bernstein, ibid, p. 53, emphasis added. 
148 Habermas ( 1996) supra, n. 5 6, p. 56 
149, bid, p. 88-9 
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Habermasian concept of the autonomous legal actor is richer than that of Kant, 
whose monological moral theory grounds only a negative idea of freedom. ' 50 
4. Legal and Political Theory from Liberal Universal Viewpoint 
In general terms, 'political' theory in its modem western sense is largely concerned 
with questions regarding democracy. To a greater or lesser extent, to be a liberal 
political theorist is also to be a liberal democrat (in the non party-political sense). 
Despite conceptually separating the universal from the particular and contingent, 
liberals in the Kantian tradition acknowledge that in order to engage with the 
political, it is necessary to expose carefully and rationally derived matters of 
principle to the unpredictable contingencies of a voting population. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that a concern with the 'political' involves a surrender of 
the moral high ground. The extent to which the attempts by Rawls and Habermas to 
accommodate a theorisation of democracy within their liberalisms signifies such a 
surrender is an on-going moot point which we shall discuss in s. 4.2.15 1 For each of 
150 Bernstein (1995) supra, n. 69, p. 55 
151 Contrast, for instance Melissa Williams's assertion that Rawls represents a purely procedural 
account of justice (Williams, M., 'Justice Toward Groups: Political not Juridical', 23 Political 
Theory (1995) pp. 67-9 1) with Tom Bridges' view that the later Rawls adopts a broadly 
substantive, culturally contingent approach (Bridges, T., 'Review: Political Liberalism by John 
Rawls (3): Rawls and the Rethinking of the Priority of the Right over the Good' in Philosophy and 
Civic Culture: Inventing Postmodern Culture (http: //www. civsoc. com/reviews/reviewlc. html) ) 
See also s. 4.2.1 of this chapter, infra, where we return to this debate. 
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these theorists, the 'meeting' between liberal principle and democracy involves an 
account of the individual's participation within the public affairs of society. These 
accounts represent varying attempts to give the abstract individual flesh without 
compromising liberalism's universality. The paragraphs below first examine firstly 
Hegel's account of the individual's achievement of real freedom, and then the 
attempts by Kant, Rawls and Habermas to locate the role of the 'free' and 'equal' 
individual within the democratic process. 
4.1 Hegel - Concrete Universality and Seýf-consciousness 
It is not difficult to conceive a role for democracy in Hegel since, as we have 
already noted, participation in public life is given a central place in developing his 
notion of real freedom. Hegel's self-conscious, free individual is one who gains the 
ability to independently shape and transform the world and accordingly win 
recognition from others in public life. It is through such recognition that the 
Hegelian individual emerges from its abstraction and becomes a fully formed 
citizen, capable of taking an active part in all areas of public life and of making 
moral judgments. The reunification of the 'abstract' individual and the world of 
contingencies forms the final stage of Hegel's Absolute Reason and heralds the 
attainment of 'concrete universality'. Although forming only a part of Hegel's 
philosophy of consciousness, the allegory of the 'Lord and Bondsman' 152 has been 
152 Hegel, G. W. F. Phenomenology of Spirit, Miller, A. V. (trans. ) (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977) ss. 187 - 196 
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interpreted by modem theorists as illustrating the importance of democratic 
participation in allowing people to realise their innate nature as free. ' 53 Through 
this allegory of a life and death struggle - and the aftermath of that struggle - for 
the recognition of one's independence, Hegel seeks to determine how a distinctly 
human consciousness can arise. Hegel presents us with the character of a Lord - 
who, having won an initial struggle for supremacy, holds another as his Bondsman 
to work and provide for him. ' 54 The initial struggle illustrates the human desire to 
establish its own independence from nature (and hence distinction from and 
superiority to it) in the eyes of another. The loser of this struggle is he who "fears 
death more than he desires recognition" 155 and thus failing to sustain his 
independence from nature, becomes the Bondsman of the winner. The problem is 
that full independence and self-consciousness has not yet been achieved: the 
Bondsman (of course) is shown up in his inadequacy and the Lord, although having 
153 See Taylor (1989) supra n. 22, p. 866. See also Bernstein, J. M. 'From Self-Consciousness to 
Community: Act and Recognition in the Master-Slave Relationship' in Pelczynski (1984) supra, 
n. 2 1, pp. 14-39. See also Butler, J. Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth Century 
France (New York, N. Y.: Colombia University Press, 1999) 
154 Hegel (1977) supra, n. 152, s. 189 
155 Bernstein in Pelczynski (1984) supra, n. 153, p. 16; Bernstein notes (p. 17, pp. 21-22) that 
although Hegel characterises this struggle for independence as being one to the death, it cannot be 
actually fought to the death, since - a) natural life is essential for independence, thus full 
independence from nature is not possible; b) if the loser actually dies then the victor wins no actual 
recognition from his other and thus the victory is self-defeating. This is why the Lord lets the 
Bondsman live after the struggle is over. 
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won the initial struggle and enjoying the product of the Bondsman's labour, 156 
gains only an inadequate recognition for this since he who recognises him is an 
inferior. 157 Furthermore, he soon realises that, in order to maintain his position of 
supremacy, he is in fact dependent upon the latter's work. 158 
It is through the Bondsman's labour that Hegel traces the development of 
true recognition and thus real freedom. Despite his initial failure to detach himself 
from nature, the Bondsman finds that by working on and thereby shaping and 
transforming his environment, he gains mastery over it. ' 59 In being so effective, he 
discovers that his work is valued by the Lord. He thus gains the recognition that he 
previously craved and was denied, and so begins to realise his "true nature" - his 
own "independence". 160 In this sense he gains a distinctly human subjectivity, self- 
consciousness and freedom from bondage. Although this allegory is a philosophical 
account of consciousness rather than an explicitly political treatise, reflection on 
what is meant by 'work' and what is involved in 'recognition', allows us to 
appreciate its political significance also. In order for individuals to flourish, they 
require, not just the ability to work, but to be recognised and confirmed as having 
independent value by others. 161 We are invited to consider that human agency and 
156 Hegel (1977) supra, n. 152, s. 190-1 
157 Ibid., s. 192 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid, s. 194: "Through his service he rids himself of his attachment to natural existence in every 
single detail; and gets rid of it by working on it. "; s. 195: "Work forms and shapes the thing. " 
160 Ibid, ss 194-6 
16 1 Butler (1999) supra, n. 153, p. 5 8 
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freedom is discovered through shaping the world - that is - humanising it under 
conditions in which this work can be recognised. Transplanting this notion to the 
conditions of the modern democratic state provides the groundwork for a theory of 
active participation in the generation and critique of legal, moral and social forms 
of one's community. ' 62 
It is in this light that the Hegelian aspects of Habermas's idea of 
4appropriate' language (discussed above) can be appreciated. For both Hegel and 
Habermas there is a sense in which a person's true nature is exposed under certain 
conditions of public life, enabling a genuinely emancipatory participation in 
society. Such conditions are surely those of a liberal democratic state, in which its 
citizens are recognised as valuable and independent through participation in public 
discourse. Baxi identifies the (often violent) struggles amongst localised 
communities for recognition and enjoyment of their human rights with this 
movement towards concrete universality. 163 Arendt's comments on the role of 
"speech and action" in public life as simultaneously distinguishing and uniting 
individuals. 164 They emphasise the emancipatory implications of an adapted 
Hegelian intersubjectivity. 165 It is difficult to imagine citizens adopting a self- 
162 See Bernstein in Pelczynski (1984) supra, n. 153 p. 38: "We can now be truly self-conscious 
agents only by participating in the formulation of such a community. " 
163 Baxi (2002) supra, n. 89 at p. 95 
164See Arendt, H. The Human Condition (Chicago, I. L. and London: University of Chicago Press, 
1998) Chapter V, p. 180 
165 Ibid., p. 176: "A life without speech and action... has ceased to be human life because it is no 
longer lived among men". At p. 178: "[S]peech corresponds to the fact of distinctness and the 
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conception as fully free or self-conscious within public life without there being 
space for such a role. 1 66 Hegel's own development of the idea of the fully 'free' 
individual as a participant in public life goes beyond mere Abstract Right, as he 
provides an account of the choices available for action. 167 This is why, following 
the sections on Abstract Right, the Philosophy of Right moves on to discuss the 
content of this right, and hence the building up of the full individual with ends and 
purposes 168 who owes allegiance both to historically and culturally determined 
social norms (Sittlichkeit) and to the universal moral order. 1 69 It is Hegel's 
unification of the individual and rational state through a theory of their respective 
roles in family and ethical life and civil society that forms the towering monolith of 
Hegelian Absolute Reason. It is this that Habermas regards as most different to his 
own discursive approach which, although maintaining an internal link between 
justice and community, disconnects the universal from ethical life to avoid Hegel's 
totalising implications. 
actualisation of the human condition of plurality, that is, of living as a distinct and unique being 
among equals. " 
166 For instance, Taylor links the Bondsman's struggle for recognition to Hegel's "civic 
humanism" (Taylor (1989) supra, n. 22, p. 863). Individuals are recognised as a "public space" (p. 
865) for discourse on moral and political matters. 
167 Hegel (2000) supra, n. 24, ss. 35-59 
168 bid., ss. 105-40 on morality, ss. 158-181 on family life, ss. 182-256 on civil society. 
169 Taylor (1989) supra, n. 22, p. 864. In this way, Hegel provides a critique of Kant's attempt to 
establish a political theory directly from the external doctrine of Right in which (like Hegel's own 
'Abstract Right') each rational person respects the freedom of every other (Stillman (1974) supra, 
n. 102 at p. 1089). 
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4.2 Liberalism and Democracy in Rawls and Babermas 
The tension between principles of right and the democratic participation has given 
rise to a fierce debate between the Post-metaphysical liberals. Theories of justice 
risk, on the one hand, unclemocratically imposing moral laws and, on the other 
hand, a majority sovereign people enacting laws that are perceived as unjust by 
minority groups. Rawls points to exactly this problem when he states: "Although in 
given circumstances it is justified that the majority (suitably defined and 
circumscribed) has the constitutional right to make law, this does not imply that the 
laws enacted are just. " 170 We find a similar concern expressed in Political 
Liberalism: "No institutional procedure exists that cannot be abused or distorted to 
enact statutes violating basic constitutional democratic principles. " 171 In the Theory, 
Rawls addresses this by bracketing it out of his wider concern with procedural 
justice. For instance, the question of which minority practices should be protected 
and which are 'illicit', "does not belong to the theory of justice. " 172 In later attempts 
to address the problem in the context of the U. S. constitution, Rawls seeks to 
protect its basic principles by invoking the role of the Supreme Court as protector 
of the "Higher law" from "transient majorities" 173 by always using public reason to 
170 Rawls (1999) supra, n. 34, p. 313 
17 1 Rawls, J. Political Liberalism (New York, N. Y. and Chichester: Columbia University Press, 
1993) p. 233 
172 Rawls (1999) supra, n. 34, p. 313 
173 Rawls (1993) supra, n. 17 1, p. 233 
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reach its decisions. 174 In addition to the definitions of 'autonomy' already discussed 
above, the rights-democracy tension in legal and political discourse provides 
another pair of definitions: 'public autonomy' is a person's freedom to involve 
himself in the democratic process of political will formation, and 'private 
autonomy' refers to the rights of one person against interference from others. 
Habermas criticises both Kant and Rawls for prioritising private autonomy (rights) 
over public autonomy (democracy) by generating the two principles of justice in the 
original position before the citizens of the real-world have a chance to question or 
debate them. 
4.2.1 Private Rights and Popular Sovereignty in Rawls's Justice as Fairness 
Habermas argues that the approaches of both Kant and Rawls to law subordinate 
democracy to liberalism, in both cases democratic participation is preceded by a 
pre-political philosophical conception of essential first principles. 175 The "original 
contract" 176 is Kant's idealisation of the general will of rational citizens and 
illustrates their capacity as rational beings to be both as legislators and subjects of 
laws. The 'original contract' effectively legalises the innate rights of freedom and 
equality and the derivative rights and sets the legal order in its Place within Kant's 
174 See s. 3.1.3, supra. 
175 Habermas, J (1996) supra, n. 56, p. 94 
176 Kant (199 1) supra, n. 6, p. 47 
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metaphysical order. 177 For Rawls, the two essential principles by which a political 
society is to be governed 178 are decided behind the veil of ignorance in the original 
position - i. e. before the citizens of the real world have a chance to wield their 
democratic powers. 179 Thus, Habermas argues that justice as faimess "demote[s] 
the democratic process to an inferior status", 180 and also undermines citizens' 
public autonomy since they "cannot re-ignite the radical democratic embers of the 
original position in the civic life of their society. " 181 Furthermore, since the two 
first principles of justice are already secured in the original position, Rawls's later 
appeal to the real-world formulation of principle serves, not to secure the 
democracy of the principles, but only to weaken his universalism' 82 . As the 
essential liberties are decided in the original position they can only be conceived as 
177 bid, p. 48. It should be noted here the distinction between Kant and Hegel on the passing from 
pre-political to political society. Whereas for Kant this represents a necessary limitation of 
naturally clashing interests, for Hegel it represents the realisation of liberties in a social context in 
which man as an abstract rights-bearer becomes a fully free individual (Stillman (1974) supra, 
102, p. 1092) 
"' See this chapter, s. 2.3, supra. 
179 Habermas, 'Recognition Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls's Political 
Liberalism' Journal of Philosophy Vol. 92 (March 1995) p. 128 
180 Ibid., p. 127-8; cited in Rawls (1996) supra, n. 2, p. 396 
181 Ibid Cited in Rawls (1996) supra, n. 2, p. 400 
182 Habermas (1996) supra, n. 56, p. 59-63. However Habermas rejects as "not plausible" (62) 
Rorty's argument that Rawls's appeal to "those shared notions and principles thought to be already 
latent in the common sense" (Rawls (1980) supra, n. 30, p. 518; quoted in Habermas (1996) supra, 
n. 56, p. 59) represents a wholesale rejection of universalism. 
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occupying a "pre-political domain" and thus as given metaphysically. 183 Rawls's 
response to Habermas is to deny that the operation of the original position is either 
fixed by philosophical method or out of reach from real-world citizens. First, he 
argues that the operation by which principles are derived in the original position 
should not be regarded as an actual political process (which indeed would deprive 
'real-world' citizens of choices) but as a "framework of thought" 184 for any society 
that chooses to make use of the insights of justice as fairness. If public autonomy is 
conceived in the narrow sense of terms of co-operation based on the two moral 
powers of rationality and reasonableness then this 'framework of thought' can 
always be used to critically reflect upon proposed new laws and judgments. The 
exercise of public autonomy requires a capacity to involve oneself in public 
discussion of political principles, and Rawls insists that the original position does 
not hinder this. 185 The two principles chosen in the original position are not 
compulsory. Although Rawls's continued unease regarding the prospect of anti- 
liberal majorities does lead him to assert that "right and just constitutions and basic 
laws" are not ascertained through actual political process, 186 he makes it clear that 
his idea of 'justice as fairness' is only one of many possible political conceptions of 
justice that free and equal citizens may choose to adopt. ' 87 Rawls's second point, 
against Habermas's charge that for Rawls private rights are pre-politically and 
183 Habermas, (March 1995) supra, n. 179, p. 129; Cited in Rawls (1996) supra, n. 2 at p. 404 
184 Rawls (1996) supra, n. 2, p. 397 
185 Ibid., p. 402 
186 Rawls (1993) supra, n. 17 1, p. 233 
187 Rawls (I 999a) supra, n. 29, p. 141 
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metaphysically assumed, is that although the moral powers are indeed assumed, the 
rights in themselves do not have prior, or given, status. 188 Rawls emphatically 
rejects the accusation of metaphysics by repeating his argument that the conception 
of the person is a 'political' rather than an ethical or a philosophical one. That is, 
instead of being a metaphysical principle of reason in the Kantian sense, "it is 
realised in public life by affirming the political principles of justice and enjoying 
the protections of the basic rights and liberties... [and] by participating in society's 
public affairs and sharing in its collective self-determination over time. , 189 On the 
dilemma between liberal rights and popular sovereignty, Rawls agrees with 
Habermas that neither should be regarded as prior to the other, but argues that 
Habermas is wrong to characterise 'justice as fairness' as being tied to Kant's 
metaphysical prioritisation of liberal rights at the expense of accounting for 
democracy. 190 Rawls points out that, in the original position public and private 
rights are given equal weight by the parties selecting them, and all find their 
authority in the two moral powers. 191 The dilemma between rights and popular 
sovereignty is not really a dilemma at all, since it is simply a burden on any 
democratic state to balance them and strive for both. 192 
188 Ibid, p. 404-6 
189 Ibid., pp. 77-78 
190 Ibid, p 411-12 
191 Ibid, p. 413 
192 bid., p. 416. An alternative response to Habermas's criticisms (and we do not have space to do 
more than merely draw attention to it here) would be to introduce a notion of 'group' or 
'collective' rights into liberal political theory. What Habermas regards as the subordination of 
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4.2.2 Communicative Action: The Internal Connection between Rights and Popular 
Sovereignty 
Habermas argues that where Kant and Rawls go wrong is in not appreciating the 
importance of the discursive process of public will formation. He contends that 
what is required is institutional isation of the democratic process through human 
rights principles in order that even the very first principles of justice are validated 
by universal agreement. The presuppositions of rational communication - e. g. 
democracy to liberalism by Rawls is in part due to Rawls's view that the primary goods accrue 
only to individuals rather than groups. But as critics such as William Kymlicka have argued, not 
everything that is fundamental to our lives can be described as resources for distribution between 
individuals. The survival of minority cultures and linguistic groups, for instance, is believed by 
some as crucial to individuals in determining their own life-choices and as such may be regarded 
being as important as the 'primary goods' that Rawls lists. Promoting the general interests of the 
inhabitants of a multicultural society would therefore involve the protection, not only of liberties 
that attach to individual citizens, but also to the groups themselves. (See Kymlicka, W. 
Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1995) Chapter Three). The liberty in question 
here is not simply that of the individual's right to be affiliated to a group, but of that groups' right 
to representation in the democratic process (ibid, p. 36). Such an approach is not adopted by Rawls 
because of his assertion in the Theory that notions of affiliation and minority interests are not per 
se part of his theory of justice, nor his notion of 'public reason' in later writings. They instead 
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freedom, equality and non-coercion of participation in argumentation - are 
translatable into legal rules. This is Habermas's "discourse principle 9ý , 
193 and it 
operates in both the realm of morality (the "moral principle" 194 ) and law (the 
"democracy principle" 195). When universal agreement is reached under the rules of 
democratic argument, the resulting agreement expresses the will of "freely 
associated legal persons" and is therefore legitimate. ' 96 Habermas describes the 
democracy principle as the result of an "interpenetration" 197 between the discourse 
principle and the legal language of rights. Legal rights promoting both public and 
private autonomy are defined and validated when the discourse principle is applied 
in legal argumentation. This is because, in securing the conditions for rational 
communication, the discourse principle fosters a reciprocal regard between persons 
as both authors and addressees of laws. Hence the legal norms finally validated in 
argument are those that reflect this dual character; public and private autonomy of 
each person is thereby protected simultaneously. 198 At the same time the discourse 
principle is shown to be the key to regulating and thus legitimating positive law. 
Rawls's objection to Habermas's claim to have secured rights and popular 
form the background against which individuals find themselves in a society premised on Rawls's 
two principles of justice. 
193 Habermas, J (1996) supra, n. 56, p. 107 
194 Ibid, p. 108 
'95 Ibid, P. ] 11 
196 ibid. 
197 Ibid., p. 121 
198 Ibid, p. 123 
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sovereignty together is that, whereas Political Liberalism finds basic rights and 
liberties which foster and encourage individuals' essential moral powers, Habermas 
is concerned with wider, philosophical theory of reason in the Hegelian sense. 
Indeed, Habermas's claim that the democracy principle ensures a full role for 
democratic participation is only convincing if we can accept that the 
communicative presuppositions are not merely pre-political moral principles 
constructed by Habermas to ensure that his own preferred understanding of political 
democracy seems best. Rather than leaving comprehensive doctrines alone, 
Habermas criticises them, which means (for Rawls) that communicative reason is 
itself a comprehensive doctrine, 199 or in other words, "metaphysical" . 
200 For others, 
the most significant problem is Habermas's use of law as an impartial meta- 
language to ensure that different claims are understood. If our aim is to ensure that 
different voices are given proper institutional attention, then it could be argued that 
the law - which converts all discourses on its own terms - is part of the problem 
rather than the solution. 20 1 This is especially so where there is no direct translation 
from a particular claim into legal language. For this reason, critics such as Young 
and Oquendo argue that Habermas's view that only serious, rational arguments are 
199 Rawls (1996) supra, n. 2, p. 377 
200 Ibid, p. 379 
201 Murphy, W. T. The Oldest Social Science? Configurations of Law and Modernity (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998) p. 70. See also J. Black (2001) supra, n. 83 at p. 44 
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permitted should be widened to include other forms of expression such as 
storytelling, rhetoric, poetry, 
202 
theatrical and even sporting metaphors, etc. 
203 
5. Metaphysics and Post- m etap hysics 
It is clear that Habermas and Rawls both accept the disintegration of classical 
enlightenment metaphysics. 204 As Habermas defines it, "metaphysics believes it can 
202 Young, 1. 'Justice and Communicative Democracy' in Gottleib (ed) Radical Philosophy: 
Tradition, Counter- Tradition, Politics (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993) pp. 129-131 
203 Oquendo, A. R. 'Deliberative Democracy in Habermas and Nino' (2002) OJLS 22 (2) pp. 189- 
226, p. 221. As Oquendo argues, democracy can be deliberative, but this is not all that democracy 
is, and whilst Habermas is right to posit Human Rights language at the heart of the process, his 
exclusion of non-deliberative aspects limits his understanding of democracy. Habermas's 
'democracy principle' is not the principle of democracy - merely one of many 'pictures' that we 
might construct of it (ibid, pp. 220-1). Similarly, Fraser criticises Habermas for excluding the 
"dead and unborn" from his construction of democracy (Fraser (200 1) supra, n. 143, p. 379). 
Developing his argument that legal language must be rooted in ethno-cultural traditions, a 
society's past and its future are as much a part of the formation of legal norms as the living, 
discursive present. On this point, Fraser adopts Robert Cover's notion that the law is meaningful 
because it is not merely a set of rules, but the world in which we live, see Cover, Foreword: 
Nomos and Narrative', Harvard LR (1983) 97(4), pp. I 1- 19. See also Scruton's idea that society is 
not 'political' but 'social' (Scruton, R. The Philosopher on Dover Beach: Essays (Chicago, I. L.: 
St. Augustine's Press, 1998) pp. 311-12). 
204 See Habermas (1996) supra, n. 56 at p. 98 
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trace everything back to one'5205 - that all effects can be unified in a single cause. 
'Post'-metaphysical liberalism regards this acceptance as crucial in order to 
maintain a sense of justice in pluralist, democratic societies, in which the idea of the 
4one' has become degraded and undermined by Post-metaphysical perspectives. 206 
Habermas and Rawls agree that systems of thought such as Kant's practical reason 
make presuppositions which could not be universally shared in a society of 
disparate and conflicting moral beliefs. 207 Unlike the classical liberals they know 
that there is very little that can be accepted as given by all people. Therefore, 
although Post-metaphysical liberal theory must still find some way to protect the 
universal rightness of its principles from unreliable empirical contingencies, 
metaphysics is "generally implausible". 208 What remains open to Post-metaphysical 
liberals is a commitment to political conditions that will promote the liberal 
conception of the person as free and equal. Hence the 'new' universal involves a 
political decision: the metaphysical mystery that nags at Kantian morality (the 
always present "but from where do you derive that ... ? ") is replaced by an 
acceptance that in order to find the required foundations for moral or legal 
principles, we must decide what kind of society we wish to inhabit. It is for this 
reason that the Rawls of Political Liberalism finds his principles of justice 
205 Habermas (1992) supra, n. 64 at p. 115,29-30 
206 Ibid., p. 116 
207 Rawls (1996) supra, n. 2 at p. 99; Rawls (ibid, p. 400) notes that Kant presupposes an idea of 
autonomy, itself given by reason, which, involving a notion of morality, is too broad to be 
accepted universally. 
20' Habermas (1996) supra, n. 56, p. xiii 
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confirmed not only in the abstract original position, but also in the particular 
context of western political society. For this reason, Rawls points to the central 
place of ordinary real-world citizens in his theory, who have the power to critically 
reflect and negotiate conceptions of justice . 
209 This assumption is clearly necessary 
in a society in which the 'citizens' are to play any part in the political process. The 
universalist abstraction of the original position is pulled down to the ground in 
Political Liberalism by being rooted in the particular political culture of western 
democracy. 21 0 Rawls accepts that the grounding of political liberalism both in the 
abstraction of the original position and the empirical world of western political 
democracy blurs the distinction between procedural and substantive justice. He 
states "the justice of procedure always depends upon the justice of its likely 
,, 211 outcome, or on substantive justice. In other words, the presupposed conditions 
for deriving just principles cannot exclude consideration of what principles might, 
in fact, be derived - procedure alone cannot guarantee an acceptable state of 
affairs. 212 Both Rawls and Habermas retain a reasoned approach to deriving rules 
from first-principles, even if these are described as 'unavoidable' (Habermas) or 
'political' (Rawls). 
209 Rawls (1996) supra, n. 2, p. 384 
2 10 Rorty describes Rawls's grounding of liberal principles in a political rather than philosophical 
conception as "thoroughly historicist and anti-universalist", in Rorty, R. Objectivity, Relativism 
and Truth. - Philosophical Papers Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) p. 180 
2 '' Rawls (1996) supra, n. 2, p. 421 
212 bid, pp. 421-433 
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It might be asked how successful Rawls and Habermas are in escaping from 
Kant's metaphysical conception of just laws as derived from the objective moral 
law. Even considering his insistence in later works that his conceptions of reason 
and citizenship have no metaphysical priority but are instead discoverable in public 
culture, it is tempting to conclude that Rawls actually attributes these 
characteristics, which are themselves too broad to allow for empirical evaluation. 213 
Certainly, both Rawls and Habermas make presuppositions, the universality of 
which would be impossible to establish empirically. In identifying a political sphere 
in which citizens define their own conceptions of justice, Rawls must still 
presuppose as given a conception of the person as reasonable and rational. Rawls 
insists that such a conception is political, not metaphysical, since all accounts of the 
moral nature of the person are left entirely alone as comprehensive doctrines. But 
could Rawls's own 'political' characterisation of the person not be regarded as such 
an account? Rawls's political liberalism is not neutral on the validity of 
comprehensive doctrines. In the Law of Peoples Rawls asserts that a comprehensive 
doctrine that contradicts public reason's commitment to reciprocity and attendant 
rights is itself fundamentally unreasonable. 214 Since Rawls insists that the values of 
public reason are 'complete' in the sense that "[they] alone give a reasonable 
answer to all, or nearly all... matters of basic justice", 215 the implication is that any 
213 Bridges, T. 'Review: Political Liberalism by John Rawls (2): 'Rawlsian Reasonableness and 
the Creation of Citizens' in Philosophy and Civic Culture: Inventing Postmodern Culture, 
http: //www. civsoc. com/reviews/review I b. html 
214 Rawls (I 999a) supra, n. 29, p. 173 
215 Ibid, p. 145 
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remaining feeling of basic injustice flows from an invalid source. Similarly, 
Habermas's a priori presuppositions of communication must simply be accepted as 
the persisting (though partially buried) true access to the universal. As he himself 
concedes, the universal rules of reason cannot ultimately be derived or discovered 
and may even be counterfactual: we must accept that they are necessary for rational 
discourse. 216 For Habermas, the Post-metaphysical ideas of "self determination" 
and "self realization" are the "precipitate left behind" after the breakdown of 
metaphysics. 217 That is, despite the collapse of a belief in metaphysical 
explanations in modem society, unity of reason is still perceptible in the "plurality 
of its voices" and the "possibility in principle of passing from one language game to 
another. 5218 By positing concepts such as the moral powers of the person and of 
rational communication as essential, Post-metaphysical liberalism is caught in a 
metaphysical trap that cannot be avoided by insisting that they are 'political' and 
'unavoidable'. Moreover, if the presuppositions are indeed essential (as opposed to 
merely desirable in the context of western political society) then they must arise a 
priori, and that is the very basis of metaphysics. For, as Kant reminds us (and here 
he stands in as a useful critic of his Post-metaphysical descendents) while the 
empirical world is always vulnerable to doubt, the foundations of theory must not 
be. It seems, then, that rather than being 'Post' metaphysical, Rawls's and 
Habermas's notions of the a priori are actually 'Neo' metaphysical: a narrowing 
and a modernising of Kant's broader metaphysics rather than a radical departure. 
216 Habermas (1996) supra, n. 5 6, p. 19 
217 Ibid, p. 99 
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6. Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced some of the broad themes of liberal theory, and some 
of the significant characteristics of metaphysical and Post-metaphysical approaches 
to deriving moral and legal principles. Of particular concern to us has been the 
attempts made by liberal theorists to distinguish what they regard as matters of 
principle from matters of mere contingency. Matters that relate purely to benefit 
and detriment, historical and cultural particularism and consequential ism are all 
bracketed off from that which is universal, rational and essential. Classical 
conceptions of liberalism in which abstract notions arise metaphysically are 
contrasted to Post-metaphysical conceptions that attempt reinvigorate the 
universalist project for a pluralistic, modern audience. The chapter has discussed 
Rawls and Habermas and considered the success with which they avoid the 
unfashionable metaphysical presumptions of classical liberalism whilst nevertheless 
providing universally acceptable grounds for liberal principles. It has also examined 
some of the salient distinctions between Kantian and Hegelian approaches with 
regard to the universal/Particular opposition and the significance of these 
distinctions for contemporary political debate. The chapter has identified Hegel's 
unification of abstract universal concepts and the particularities of participation in 
the ethical and public life of the state. Hegel is contrasted on this point with Kant's 
more formalistic account of morality and legitimate law as categorical imperatives 
218 Habermas (1992) supra, n. 64, p. 117 
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that arise independently of all particularities in the empirical world. It has been 
noted that this difference of approach informs related differences between Rawls 
and Habermas in their theorisations of the relationship between rights and 
democracy, and also between Habermas's explicitly discursive theory as distinct 
from the abstraction of Rawls's early work on justice as fairness. 
The next chapter shifts the discussion towards a more specifically legal 
problematic of liberal theory that will be significant in later chapters. Discussed 
first is the problem of what is means to take seriously Kant's dictum to treat a 
person as a 'means to an end' in a legal context. The chapter develops the notion of 
the end-in-itself in law in the context of the problem of justifying punishment and 
determining the degree of its severity as a matter of principle. 
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Liberal Individualism as a Matter of Principle 
1. Introduction 
The subordination of U. K law to the European Convention on Human Rights and 
the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 suggests that the broad liberal notion 
of the 'individual' has at least some normative significance in law. There are many 
who would argue that the moral foundation of Human Rights law is not to be found 
in Kant, while others argue that Human Rights has (or needs) no foundation at all. 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the ways in which liberal universal 
principles translate into addressing some specific questions of modem law. This 
chapter therefore considers the translation of the Kantian imperative to treat 
humanity never merely as a means to an end but always also as an end-in-itself 
into legal principles on the value of human life and the justification of punishment. 
2. Humanity as an End in Itself and the Right to Life 
2.1 'Humanity'as the Universal End ofMankind 
If, as Kant insists, acting morally requires us to pursue universal (rationally given) 
as opposed to merely particular (empirically discovered) ends, we must be able to 
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distinguish these two categories. This is an issue that has been the cause of much 
controversy. ' Using the interpretation of Korsgaard, it can be argued that it is 
because the things we do are important simply by virtue of our regarding them so 
that we treat our own humanity as a value in itself Since this attitude can be 
conceived as applying to all rational people, humanity itself is the only universal 
end. It is from this insight that, for Korsgaard, arises the imperative to always treat 
humanity as an end in itself. 2 Korsgaard writes: "Having humanity as an end is not 
an incentive for adopting the moral law; rather, the moral law commands that 
1 Schopenhauer, A. On the Basis of Morality, Payne, E. F. J. (trans. ), Richard Taylor (introduction) 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965) pp. 96-7: Schopenhauer argues that the categorical imperative 
does not establish any moral system at all, but is rather an egoistic reminder to refrain from doing 
to others that which you would not have them do to you. Singer, M. G. Generalization in Ethics, 
(London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1963) argues similarly that the categorical imperative is merely a 
disguised consequential ism, suggesting that Kant provides no theory of universal morality at all. 
Broad, C. D. Five Types of Ethical Theory, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1944) pp. 127-8 
argues that if people do happen to agree that certain principles are categorical imperatives, it is 
because they all recognise a universal good in their particular content, rather than in their ageless 
form. 
2 Korsgaard, C. M. 'Introduction' in Kant Groundwork of the Metaphysics ofMorals, Gregor, M. 
(ed. ) Intro. Korsgaard, C. M. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) p. xxii; Kant regards 
'humanity' as synonymous with the collection of concepts that distinguishes human life as such. 
'Humanity' thus signifies the universal moral community of rational persons capable of morality, 
and is thus accorded 'dignity' and respect as an end in itself rather than being exchangeable for a 
4price'. See Kant, ibid, s. 4: 429,4: 435: "... morality, and humanity insofar as it is capable of 
morality, is that which alone has dignity. " 
72 
Chapter 2 
humanity be treated as an end. 553 Humanity is the only rational end because only 
rational human beings have the power to set their own ends. Respecting a person's 
humanity, then, means allowing others to exercise their freedom of will rather than 
4 
trying to manipulate them or bend their will to our own purposes. Other people 
deserve respect because they have the freedom to decide their own purposes. Kant 
therefore in fact presents us with a theory of humanity that provides the prescriptive 
teleology. Guyer takes a similar view. Freedom - the ability to choose one's own 
maxims for action - is the overriding value and the foundation of Kant's laws of 
reason. 5 For Korsgaard and Galstone, this focus upon humanity as the maker of its 
own ends is enough to convince one that, far from being empty and formalistic, 
Kant provides us with a teleological conception of humanity and thus a focus for 
moral duty. The teleology (or purpose) of humanity is the fulfilment of its potential 
and realisation of chosen ends. 6 Assuming, then, that the universal end of mankind 
is humanity, the next question is: what does it mean, in practical terms, to treat a 
person as an 'end in itself ? 
3 Korsgaard, C. M. Creating the Kingdom of Ends, (Cambridge University Press, 1996) p. 109,114 
Korsgaard, C. M. 'Introduction' in Kant (1998) supra, n. 2, p. xxiii. See also Beyleveld, D. and 
Brownsword, R. Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 200 1) 
where Brownsword argues (p. 159) that the command to never treat another merely as a means to 
an end demands that we respect other peoples' autonomy. 
5 Guyer, P. Kant on Freedom, Law and Happiness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000) pp. 240-1 
Galstone, W. A. 'What is Living and What is Dead in Kant's Practical Philosophy? ' in Beiner, R. 
and Booth, W. J. Kant and Political Philosophy: The Contemporary Legacy (Yale University 
Press, 1993) pp. 207-223, pp. 216-7 
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2.2 nat does it mean to Treat Humanity as an End in Itser 
Interpretations of Kant have produced a wealth of suggestions as to what it means 
to treat human life as an end in itself, reflecting a diversity of ideas regarding the 
extent of one person's duty to another. The conservative interpretation considers 
that, as rational beings, persons can look after themselves, and respecting them 
involves simply a negative duty to not interfere with or inhibit them. 7 However it is 
possible that the imperative requires a positive duty of assistance and a more 
flexible conception of the person. O'Neill argues that a Kantian 'person' is not a 
pure abstraction of rationality but instead must be taken as a flesh and blood 8 being 
who necessarily requires assistance in realising their own ends. Therefore to treat 
someone as an end we owe them a duty both in the negative sense of respecting 
their individuality and also in the positive sense of giving assistance when required. 
O'Neill draws on Kant's comments on providing assistance to others 9 to argue that 
This would be a reasonable interpretation of the doctrine of Right, in which Kant states that one's 
external duty in exercising one's capacity for free will is simply not to interfere with the freedom 
of anyone else (Kant The Metaphysics of Morals, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 199 1) 
5 6). See Chapter One, s. 2.1., infra. 
8 O'Neill, 0. Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995) pp. 115-6 
9 Kant (1998) supra, n. 2 at p. 39/ s. 4: 430 - Each person should try "as far as he can, to further the 
ends of others. For, the ends of a subject who is an end in itself must as far as possible also be my 
ends. " 
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treating humanity as an end-in-itself is not merely a negative duty. The morally 
less-developed make demands on our moral regard just as the ideal rational agent 
does, and we owe a duty to address such people to their own level of understanding 
and thus respect their "particular capacities for agency". 10 The duty to give 
assistance is thus a categorical imperative and to wilfully withhold it is contrary to 
the imperative to respect humanity. Guyer reads the Kantian requirement of treating 
a person in this way in conjunction with Rawls's notion that liberty must be secured 
for all. " He argues that despite explicitly rejecting the notion that the state should 
promote its citizens' happiness, Kant's imperative can be interpreted along 
Rawlsian welfarist lines. Any state infringement of freedom must be acceptable to 
all - including the least well-off. In importing the language of Rawls's second 
principle of justice, Guyer, like O'Neill, provides some much-needed substantive 
content to Kant's theory. 
Kant's own writings are conspicuously vague as to what is actually required 
in order to treat others with the appropriate respect. 12 There is an indication that his 
conception of the person is not merely a cold, ideal standard of rationality. He 
admits that desires and the pursuit of happiness 13 play a large part in the human will 
and also in achieving one's ends, and even a rational person requires the help of 
10 O'Neill (1995)supra, n. 8, p. 115 
" See Guyer (2000) supra, n. 5, pp. 274-5. 
12 Skorupski, J. 'Ethics' in Bunnin, N. and Tsui-James, E. P. (ed. ) The Blackwell Companion to 
Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) pp. 198 - 228, p. 217 
13 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Abbot, T. K. (trans. ) (Amherst, N. Y.: Prometheis Books, 
1996) p. 114-5 
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others. 14 However,, Kant refers to end s- i n-themse Ives as rational beings; that is, 
beings who are at least capable of moral freedom and hence moral worth. In the 
Groundwork, Kant posits the Kingdom of Ends as an ideal state in which reciprocal 
regard between "rational beings" is universal, governed by "common objective 
laws". 15 Those who would qualify to exist in this kingdom are end s-in -themselves, 
but Kant is explicit that the kingdom of ends is made up only of "rational beings"; 16 
it is necessarily a community of moral agents whose wills are motivated by the 
moral law. Kant's test for whether a maxim is properly universalisable is that it 
must harmonise with the principle of a Kingdom of Ends. 17 And since this kingdom 
contains only rational beings, it seems that the process of universalising a maxim 
need only be compatible with rational people. In other words, only those who 
would meet the criteria for the Kingdom of Ends are considered as part of the moral 
universe. In the real world however, such moral capacity cannot be assumed. 
Rather, it can only be known empirically. O'Neill's elastic interpretation goes some 
way to meeting the criticisms of Kant's formalism, but a problem remains as to the 
fate of those with no capacity for practical reason at all. Taking incapacity into 
account, not everyone in the real world would qualify for a place in the Kingdom of 
Ends on the basis that they themselves fail to meet the requirement of reciprocity. It 
could be argued further that the condition of reciprocity itself prevents the 
14 Kant, 1. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (London: Routledge, 1995) pp. 85-6 
15 Kant (1998) supra, n. 2, p. 41/ s. 4: 433 
16 Ibid., p. 41/s. 4: 433, p. 43/ s. 4: 436 
17 lbid., s. 4: 436 
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incapable from being treated as an end-in-itself, since a person's claim to respect is 
conditional upon their capacity to give this respect in return. 18 
2.3 The End-in-Itseýf in Law: Human Rights and the Doctrine of Double Effect 
A system of respect for each individual as an end-in-itself establishes an ideal of a 
symmetrical moral community institutional ised in human rights discourse in law. 
The echoes of Kant's moral imperative in Article I of the United Nation's 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 ring loud indeed: "All human beings 
are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and 
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. "' 9 In this 
sentence the Declaration incorporates the notions of universality, autonomy and 
persons as rational and as ends in themselves. In such a spirit, article 3 follows quite 
,, 20 naturally: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. The 
European Convention of Human Rights, committed to the "universal and effective 
recognition 5,21 of the rights listed in the Declaration states (in article 2) that 
"[e]veryone's right to life shall be protected by law". 22 But as a statement of 
principle, such a pronouncement is not significantly clearer than the Kantian 
18 Ibid. See also Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) p. 447 
19 See Steiner, HT and Alston, P. International Human Rights in Context (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996) p. 1156 
20 Ibid., p. 115 7 
21 Ibid., p. 1191 
22 Ibid. 
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imperative. If treating a person as an end-in-itself in law entails protecting their 
right to life then there still arises the problem as to whether this is merely a negative 
duty, or whether it also includes a positive duty to assiSt. 
23 A question might also be 
24 
raised as to what ought to happen when, say, two lives are incompatible . The 
ECHR itself provides some assistance in article 2(2) when it states: "Deprivation of 
life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results 
from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: (a) in defence of 
any person from unlawful violence... " What is unclear from the text is the moral 
status of the person who is killed when 'absolutely necessary': Is the right to life 
suspended, or justifiably infringed? In Kantian language, the problem is one of 
whether such a killing is justified by a selective application of the categorical 
imperative or the imperative allows for differential treatment. The only assistance 
that Kant appears to provide in thinking about exceptions to this negative duty, is 
his assertion that coercion of another person is only justified when it is used to 
promote freedom and equality itself. 
25 
Another way to conceive the problem of permissibly bringing about a person's 
death when 'absolutely necessary' is through morally distinguishing the intended, 
23 Conflicting judgments have been reached by the ECtHR on this point. See McCann v UK 
(1996) 21 EHHR 97 contra Paton v UK. (1980) 3 EHRR 408 
24 For example, in the case of Re A (Conjoined Twins, Medical Treatment) [2000] 4 All ER 96 1, 
examined in Chapter Three, infra. 
25 Kant, 'On the Common Saying: 'That May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practise' 
in Reiss, H. (ed. ) Kant. - Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) pp. 73- 
6. See also Guyer (2000) supra, n. 5, p. 276 
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from merely foreseen effects of one's actions. The unfortunate circumstance may 
arise, for instance, that in striving towards some perfectly good or necessary end, 
we endanger a person's life. Thomas Aquinas's justification of self defence rests 
upon a moral act having two effects: since my intended effect is to save my own 
life, the foreseen side-effect of causing the death of my assailant (if necessary) is 
not unlawful . 
26 A difficulty with this idea - the doctrine of Double Effect - is the 
moral significance of the distinction between intended and foreseen harm. Without 
further constraints upon its use, 27 there seems to be an implication that harm may be 
committed with impunity as long as the actor does not directly intend that harm. 28 
A further difficulty is that of distinguishing between that which is intended and that 
which is foreseen. That injury may not be inflicted intentionally is clear enough on 
Kantian moral grounds, but stipulating when a merely foreseen injury is to be 
permitted, is far from obvious. Clearly, if the doctrine is to safeguard against using 
other people as mere means to our own ends then we cannot characterise as a mere 
6side effect' the death of A when that death is brought about as a means of saving B 
26 Acquinas, T. Summa Theologica 11-11, question 64, art. 7, 'Of Killing' in Baurngarth, W. P. and 
Regan, R. J. On Law, Morality and Politics, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1988) p. 226 
27 For example, the requirement of proportionality, outlined by Beauchamp, T. L., that "the good 
effect must outweigh the bad effect" in Principles of Biomedical Ethics (New York, N. Y. and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) p. 207. Also, the infliction of foreseen harm must be the 
only available course of action open to the actor - see Lichtenberg, J. 'War, Innocence, and the 
Doctrine of Double Effect' Philosophical Studies 74 (1994) pp. 347-68, p. 355 
28 Williams, G. The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (London: Faber & Faber, 1958) p. 286 
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as this is an instrumental killing and thus intended 29 . It seems that, 
for an injury to 
be permitted by Double Effect it must be neither end nor means to an end: a good 
end may not be achieved using a bad meanS30. In law, recent House of Lords 
decisions on intention for murder seems to further limit the doctrine's possible 
scope by including as 'intended' death or serious injury that was foreseen as "for all 
practical purposes inevitable". 31 
3. The Criminal as an End-in-Itself: The Principled Justification of 
Punishment 
There are many legal applications of Kantian liberalism other than the right to life 
that could be examined, especially since the Human Rights Act 1998. The 
particular strand picked up here is the treatment of persons judged to have 
transgressed the law. Hence, this section considers the question of justifying 
punishment from the principled bases discussed so far. The purpose here is to 
identify how the liberal notions of the End-in-Itself and rational autonomy can be 
understood to give rise to theories of punishment that assume as their moral basis 
the liberal notion of the person as a rational agent. As above, this chapter shall 
examine also how modern and contemporary formulations struggle with the 
29 McIntyre, A. 'Doing Away With Double Effect' Ethics (200 1) Vol. I 11, No. 2 pp. 219-255, p. 
249. For this reason, McIntyre argues that Acquinas's justification of Self Defence is not, in fact, 
an illustration of Double Effect. 
30 Ibid., p. 229 
31 See Rv Woollin [ 1999] 1 AC 82, p. 96 
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problem of classical liberal metaphysics in giving an account of why and how 
punishment is justified. 
3.1 The Resurgence of Retributivism 
Largely abandoned in favour of rehabilitative and welfarist justifications of 
punishment through much of the Twentieth Century, retributivism has staged 
something of a resurgence in recent years, due at least in part to a growing 
perception that the criminal justice system is ineffective in deterring or reforming 
criminals or preventing crime. 32 Although there is no single theory of retributivism 
as such, certain common elements may be identified which are here traced back to 
the canonical texts of Kant and Hegel. From a liberal perspective, retributivism can 
be said to represent the only 'principled' justification of punishment because unlike 
utilitarian justifications, it is founded on the idea that punishment is in itself a 
rightful response to an offender who we can regard as having been responsible for a 
crime. 33 The resulting justification for punishment is simply that a criminal wrong 
has been committed, and that that person responsible for it should suffer a 
32 See Duff, R. A. Punishment, Communication and Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001) p. 7 
33 Opinion is divided however as to the precise nature of 'responsibility' and its relationship to 
other moral philosophical concepts such as voluntariness, freewill and constraint - and also to 
criminal law concepts of intention and recklessness. 
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proportional degree of 'pain'. 34 Utilitarians have responded by claiming that 
retribution is a polite word for base and barbarous revenge which, inflicting 
gratuitous suffering, cannot be a good in itsel f. 35 For utilitarians punishment is only 
good if its consequences are good: e. g. the offender is reformed or others are 
deterred from offending. It is true that retributivists disagree as to why exactly a 
criminal wrong requires punishment. Reasons for punishing considered here are 
firstly the classical liberals' restoration of the metaphysical moral order, secondly 
the positivist legal requirement that only the guilty are punished, and thirdly the 
communication of public censure. It is argued here that in all its forms, retributivist 
theorisations fall short of providing a purely principled justification. Such 
shortcomings mean that, when confronted with the task of considering a 
proportional criminal sentence, consequential ist factors are not easily separated 
from deontological ones. As shall be seen in the next section, this characteristic of 
retributive theory, conceded by many modern retributivists, is crucial in 
understanding judicial strategies for deciding how much punishment is deserved. 
3.2 Classical Liberal Retributivism 
Kant's theory of just punishment follows from his liberal principle of Right - that it 
is a categorical imperative to exercise one's own freedom only to the extent that it 
31 See Williams, B. 'Moral Responsibility and Political Freedom', (1997) 56 (1) Cam U pp. 96- 
102 
35 Rashdall, H. The Theot3, of Good and Evil (Vol 1) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924) p. 
284, p. 304 
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does not interfere with the freedom of others. 36 Having unjustly interfered with the 
freedom of another, the offender must be punished in order to restore the 
metaphysical and universal rule of reason. Since punishment so conceived is not 
aimed at achieving any other purpose, the wrong should be regard as being righted 
through punishment in a conceptual rather than empirical way. 37 Like Kant, Hegel 
regards punishment as retribution not only as a state's right but also its duty in 
order to redress the injury to reason caused by a wrong. Hegel is explicit in his 
rejection of deterrence, reform, protection and other such purposes as justifications 
for meting out punishment. 38 For Hegel, a 'wrong' is a coercion of another's will, 
and since the will finds its existence in freedom the wrong threatens the will's very 
existence. 39 It therefore cannot be in harmony with reason and so cannot be allowed 
to continue to exist. 40 For Hegel, "coercion immediately destroys itself in its 
concept, since it is the expression of a will which cancels the expression or 
existence of a Will. 50 
1 Hence an act motivated by a criminal will "brings its own 
retribution with it". 42 In punishing simply because the individual is held to have 
been responsible for a crime, retributive punishment refuses, as a matter of 
36 Kant (199 1) supra, n. 7, p. 56 
37 Norrie, A. W. Law, Ideology and Punishment: Retrieval and Critique of the Liberal Ideal of 
Criminal Justice (Dordrecht and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 199 1) pp. 51-4 
38 Hegel, The Hegel Reader, Stephen Houlgate (ed. ) (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998) p. 125/s. 99 
39 Ibid., p. 123/s. 96 
40 lbid., p. 123/s. 97 
41 Ibid, p. 120/s. 92 
Ibid., p 129/s. 10 1 
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principle, to use an individual as a means to a crime-preventative or reformatory 
end. For Hegel, since the criminal will is a self-destructive one, the criminal brings 
his punishment upon himself. Committing a wrong temporarily divorces the 
criminal from Right and hence reason and punishment reunites him, reconciling his 
will with reason and thus the criminal is honoured as rational. The tears that 
Dostoyevsky's Raskalnikov sheds when he gives himself up for arrest are not tears 
of despair, but relief. 43 However, Kant and Hegel are both unable to find a 
metaphysical a priori principle for deciding the right amount of Punishment, except 
that it should bear some kind of equivalence with the wrong inflicted. Hegel admits 
that decisions in this respect are socially and historically contingent44 and "will 
always be arbitrary". 45 This is an embarrassing retreat for metaphysical 
retributivism after such confident statements as to the justification of punishment in 
general and suggests that supposedly external consequential ist considerations are 
required as a supplement. 
43 DostoYevsky, F. Crime and Punishment, McDuff, D. (trans. ) (London: Penguin Classics, 199 1). 
Dostoyevsky brilliantly evokes this reconciliation (p. 602): "He had suddenly recalled Sonia's 
words, 'Go up to the cross roads, bow to the people, kiss the earth, for you have sinned against it 
too, and say to the whole world out aloud, 'I am a murderer! " In remembering them, he had begun 
to tremble all over. And such a crushing weight did he now carry from the hopeless despair and 
anxiety of all this recent time, and especially of the last few hours, that he fairly leapt at the chance 
of this pure, new, complete sensation. It suddenly hit him like an epileptic seizure: a single spark 
began to glow within his soul, and suddenly it engulfed everything, like fire. Everything in him 
instantly grew soft and the tears came spurting out. He fell to the ground where he stood. .. ." 
44 Hegel (1998) supra, n. 3 8 at p 25 I/s 218 
45 Ibid., p. 246/s 214 
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3.3 Twentieth and Twenty-First Century Retributivism 
3.3.1 The Separation of Morality and Law 
Self-consciously unfashionable, theorists of the sixties and seventies attempt to 
uphold the notion that punishment of the guilty is right in itself, but retreat from 
moral metaphysics under fire from utilitarians. Hawkins finds that Kant's notion of 
equivalence does not provide a first principle of the right amount of punishment, 
and that Hegel's idea of punishment as negating a wrong without either reforming 
the criminal or reversing the evil committed is simply incomprehensible. 46 
Mabbot's defence of retributivism agrees with Kant and Hegel that a criminal 
brings the punishment on himself, but renders it purely a legal, rather than a moral 
47 justification of punishment . Mabbot's distinctly legal notion of retributivism is 
aimed at ensuring that, as a justification, it cannot be accused of promoting an 
offender's 'better side' (and thus of embracing any elements of consequential ism), 
and by shifting the discussion from morality to legal definition it addresses the 
accusation of barbarism. The problem with Mabbot's retributivism is that his 
argument seems to be little more than a description rather than a justification of 
46 Hawkins, D. J. B. "Punishment and Moral Responsibility" in Grupp, E. (ed. ) Theories of 
Punishment (Bloomington, London: Indiana University Press, 1971) pp. 13-18, p. 16 
47 Mabbot, J. D. "Punishment" in Acton, H. B. The Philosophy of Punishment: A Collection of 
Papers (London: Macmillan, 1969) p. 41 
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punishment . 
48 icient Mabbot offers no compelling reason why criminal desert is suff 
justification for punishment, apart from the fact that a person is responsible for the 
crime they commit and punishment is a "corollary... of law-breaking". 49 As 
Mundle points out, moral and legal justifications are surely two separate questions: 
punishing a person for breaking an unjust law may in itself be lawful, but it cannot 
be morally justified. 
50 
This separation of morality and law has far-reaching problems if we want to 
provide a principled justification of punishment. The difficulty is emphasised by 
Hart and Rawls. Despite agreeing that each individual instance of punishment is 
justly inflicted simply because the individual has broken a law (judicial sentencing), 
they contend that the general justification for punishing people at all is utilitarian 
(legislation) .51 Hart asserts firstly the retributivist claim that "when breach of the 
law involves moral guilt the application to the offender of the pain of punishment is 
itself a thing of value"52 before conceding that this can only succeed if limited to 
specific cases as opposed to the 'General Justifying Aim' of punishment. He argues 
that distinguishing these two concepts avoids the "shadow-fighting" between 
utilitarians and retributivists: each is given its own sphere of operation. 53 It seems 
48 Norrie (199 1) supra, n. 37, p. 131 
Mabbot, in Acton (1969) supra, n. 47, p. 49 
50 Mundle, C. W. K. "Punishment and Desert" in Grupp (197 1) supra, n. 46, pp. 71-2 
51 Hart, H. L. A. Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1978); Rawls, J. 'Two Concepts of Rules' in Acton, supra, n. 47, pp. 108-9 
52 Hart, supra, n. 5 1, p8 
53 Ibid., p. 9 
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as if, for these theorists, retributivism has retreated even further from being a moral 
justification for punishment. If Hart is correct that retributivists must give ground 
on the general justification of punishment it is difficult to regard 'just punishment' 
as a purely de-ontological principle, in the sense that classical liberal theory 
attempts to derive. To concede, as Rawls and Hart do, that the overarching 
justification for punishment is utilitarian, renders the remaining rationale for 
retributivism - that only the guilty are punished -a banal truism. Retaining the 
classical liberal notion of individual responsibility without its metaphysics, reduces 
retributivism to something like a positivistic description of why X rather than Y is 
punished but provides little as regards moral justification. 
3.3.2 Morality and Law Reunited 
Within the latest re-conceptions of justified punishment is a reintroduction of an 
underlying moral metaphysics in the attempt to reinstate retributivism, not simply 
as ensuring that only the guilty are punished, but as a general justifying discourse. 
'Communicative' conceptions of retributivism, for which Kant is cited as a distant 
forefather, are grounded in the imperative that the offender be respected as a 
rational agent. 54 Punishment as an infliction of 'pain' in response to a crime 
represents the communication of a censure that society owes to everyone whom it 
54 Duff, A. and Hirsch, A. von. 'Responsibility, Retribution and the 'Voluntary': A Response to 
Williams' (1997) 56 (1) Cam U pp. 103-113, p. 112 
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55 
recognises as free to be guided by good (lawful) and bad (unlawful) reasons . This 
is an explicitly moral form of retributivism, inasmuch as both Duff and von Hirsch 
state that this censure is an extension of the moral blame and criticism that we 
would direct at anyone who knowingly transgressed society's norms. However, it is 
perhaps a sign of retributivism's continuing inadequacy to provide a full 
justification that Duff and von Hirsch find it necessary to incorporate 
consequential ist considerations. For instance, both theorists direct their retibutivism 
towards effecting the repentance and self-reform of the criminal. 56 In Duff s case, 
there is a concerted effort to find a theory of punishment that can counter what he 
regards to be the vengeful rhetoric of 'law and order'. Duff s concern for the self- 
reform of the criminal is grounded in his insistence that, whilst the justification of 
punishment is chiefly retrospective, it also serves the purpose of re-integrating the 
criminal with the community from which his wrongdoing has cut himself 0 ff . 
57 
Duff argues further that criminal sentences should be proportional to the amount of 
time we would reasonably consider necessary to make a rational agent repent their 
actions. 58 Of course, reference to a community's values and a prisoner's reform and 
repentance risks offending against the liberal imperatives that the individual is not 
sacrificed to another cause, or treated merely as a means to an end. Careful not to 
55 Ibid., pp. I 10- 11 
56 See Duff, R. A. 'Penal Communications: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Punishment' (1996) 
20 Crime & Justice 1-97, pp. 41-5 
57 Duff (2001) supra, n. 32, pp. 40-1 
58 Duff, R. A. 'Punishment, Communication and Community' in Matravers, M. Punishment and 
Political Theoty (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 1999) pp. 48-68, p. 52 
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allow his communitarianism to undermine his liberalism, Duff insists that, 
conceived as a shared commitment to individual autonomy, privacy, freedom and 
diversity, community values enable punishment to be conceived as restoring the 
criminal to society whilst not sacrificing his individualism. 59 On this view a crime 
is a public wrong in the sense that the 'community' rightfully takes an interest in it 
by issuing a condemnation through criminal sentencing. 60 Furthermore, although 
communicative retributivism is aimed at bringing about reform, retrospective 
considerations of blameworthiness remain the primary concern. For instance, Duff 
states that only those responsible for committing serious criminal wrongs are 
punished. 61 Moreover, Andrew von Hirsch insists that sentences cannot be 
contingent upon a criminal's particular resistance to or acceptance of reform. 62 
Hence, the reformatory aim is coupled with the retributivist justification. 63 On 
justifying the punishment of juveniles, Weijers also mobilises an idea of 
community in this way by adopting the Hegelian idea that, in order that one is not 
eternally cut off from the social world, "it is better to be punished if you commit a 
59 Ibid, p. 47 
60 Ibid., p. 61 
1 Duff in Matravers (1999) supra, n. 58, pp. 48-86, pp. 58-9 
62 Hirsch, A. von. 'Punishment, Penance and the State: A Reply to Duff in Matravers (1999) 
supra, n. 58, pp. 69-82, p. 80 
153 lbid., p. 39 
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crime than not" . 
64 However, if the communication of censure issues from the 
community, and the communication itself is an effort to bring the criminal to 
understand and accept the moral failing of his act, the success of the process seems 
to rest upon a relativism: depending upon the community's moral compass and the 
criminal's supposed connection with the community that he has cut himself off 
from. For Matravers (who regards moral consensus to have given way to a 
fractured, diverse modem society), such a perspective loses "genuine critical 
engagement" with the problem of justifying punishment, and stands in need of 
further consideration of the content and moral status of the message 
communicate . 
65 
As abstract theories, none of the conceptions of retributivism considered 
here provide a full justification for punishment purified of utilitarian consideration 
of consequences. Maintaining a focus on this problem, the analysis of the legal 
cases given below seeks to locate retributivism within the wider context of the 
rhetoric of legal judgment. It is this linguistic context that provides an insight as to 
the way in which consequential ist considerations supplement retributivism in 
justifying punishment. 
64Weijers, 1. 'The Moral Dialogue: A Pedagogical Perspective on Juvenile Justice' in Weijers and 
Duff (ed. ) Punishing Juveniles. - Principle and Critique (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002) p. 143. 
We shall consider theories of juvenile punishment in more depth later. 
65 Matravers, M. ' "What to Say? ": The Communicative Element in Punishment and Moral 
Theory' in Matravers (1999) supt-a, n. 58, p. 108-123 
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4. Liberalism, Politics and Judgment: The Uses of Philosophy 
At this point it would perhaps be wise to address the possible objection that the 
focus so far maintained upon the theories of liberal principle as opposed to other 
influences upon legal judgment is a narrow and abstract approach to critique. At 
least it may be suggested, as Garland does, that philosophical critiques of aspects of 
law are potentially less fruitful and interesting than sociological ones. In his work 
on the criminal justice system, Garland stresses the importance of historical and 
66 
sociological analysis in accounting for contemporary legal trends and policies. He 
notes that, being a "social institution", 67 the criminal justice system is more 
profitably studied in terms of its "role in social life". 68 For Garland, moral 
philosophical perspectives without sociology are "misdirected" since the normative 
claims can only be made persuasively by referring to how a system actually 
operates. 69 In answer to such criticisms, I would like to make clear the role that I 
see for the philosophical perspectives discussed. Garland's comments on 
philosophical perspectives should be understood as a dismissal, not of all recourse 
to philosophy, but rather of dogmatic mobilisations of particular philosophical 
66 Garland, D. The Culture of Control. - Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (Oxford: 
University of Chicago Press and Oxford University Press, 2001) p. 13. See also Ryan, M. Penal 
Policy and Political Culture in England and Wales (Winchester: Waterside Press, 2003) 
Garland, D. Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1990) p. 9 
"' lbid. 
69 Ibid. 
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propositions in making an argument. I would agree with Garland that attempts to 
mount a critique of the law from the perspective of, say, the categorical imperative, 
original position or ideal speech community carry limited scholarly weight. 70 
Indeed, such an approach would be uncritical and unimaginative since it would 
involve a simplistic adoption of liberal theoretical premises in order to draw 
conclusions. Conclusions arrived at by simply adopting the logic of a given 
theoretical system are interesting or useful only as a way of providing a set of initial 
perspectives in a larger study. My interest in liberal theory (as will be seen in later 
chapters) lies in critically examining the implications of these perspectives through 
deconstruction, a theoretical form that is itself subjected to scrutiny in later 
chapters. 71 Of course, this is not to suggest that this thesis is any more free from 
metaphysical premises than the theorists that it examines. What is being 
emphasised here is that liberal theory forms an object of critique as much as the 
legal judgments that are introduced in Chapter Three. 
For Kant, if it cannot be assumed that individuals whom we judge are not 
morally autonomous then it is not possible to meaningfully hold them accountable 
to the moral law. In order for a person to be held accountable for their actions they 
70 My approach, then, is distinguished from that of William Rehg, quoted approvingly by 
Habermas as providing a means of deriving the dialogical universal principle in order to criticise 
empirical law from an idealised view of the liberal democratic nature of just legal system. See 
Rehg, W. (199 1) 'Discourse and the Moral Point of View: Deriving a Dialogical Principle of 
Universalisation' in Inquiry 34 pp. 27-48; quoted in Habermas Justification and Application 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993) p-32. 
71 See particularly Chapter Six, infra. 
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must have the requisite autonomy to have been able to make a proper decision. This 
study focuses upon the decisions of courts comprised of judges in whom it would 
be unwise to assume this autonomy. Kennedy describes the view of judges as 
objectively applying legislative rules to given facts as "implausible". 72 He points 
out that judges often do have to create new rules and in doing so political 
judgments necessarily guide judicial reasoning. As individuals it may be possible 
for us to regard them in the way that Kant thinks of morally autonomous persons: 
they have the mental and moral capacity to consider their judgments in the light of 
universal observance. However, in the contexts in which their decisions are 
examined in this thesis - 'ethical dilemmas' in the sense that fundamental liberal 
principles clash or are obscure - there are moral and practical constraints that 
renders such an assumption unsafe. As other critics have noted, judicial decision- 
making necessarily imposes such constraints upon moral autonomy, e. g. in 
requirement to consider precedents and future cases which may itself cite a present 
judgment as precedent, other ethical considerations and particular political 
purposes. Ackerman's thesis is that the policies that judges adopt as regards 
deference to legislation and their level of activism and reformism will depend upon 
73 
their own 'comprehensive view' of what a just decision should be like. He 
identifies utilitarianism and Kantianism as plausible examples of such views and he 
72 Kenndy, D. A Critique ofAdjudication (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998) 
p. 27-8 
73 Ackerman, B. Private Property and the Constitution (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University 
Press, 1977) p-42 
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suggests that a "typical contemporary judge" probably uses a mixture of these . 
74 1f 
cobjectivity' is to be understood in its Kantian sense of orientation by a morally 
autonomous agent towards universal observance, then judges cannot be assumed to 
be autonomous, and nor theirjudgements objective. 
My own view tries not to make any definite assumptions as to the moral or 
political powers or bias of judges. What I want to show is that engagement with 
philosophical ideas can provide an illuminating study of the rhetoric of legal 
judgment encompassing as it does principled and practical elements. As Garland 
admits, whether an understanding of legal practices is gained through sociology or 
philosophy, it is always 'political' in the sense that it requires interpretation in the 
light of certain other practices and norms - whether legal, social or moral. The 
thesis aims to examine the difficulties experienced in law (and the rhetorical 
strategies of resolving these difficulties) in mobilising the universalist, rational 
aspirations of that are inherited from Kant's legal and political thought. In the case 
of Rawls and Habermas, the thesis examines how the detachment of these 
aspirations from Kant's metaphysics contributes towards judicial strategies in 
interpreting incompatible or obscure liberal principles. 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to give an account of the way in which liberal moral 
theory provides grounding for questions of justification in law. Considered first was 
74 Ibid., p. 76 
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the practical application of Kant's notion of an End in Itself as a foundation for the 
right to life. It examined the difficulty presented for legal interpretation by the 
abstract Kantian imperative to treat humanity as an end in itself and the work of 
commentators such as Korsgaard, O'Neil and Brownsword in this regard. The 
chapter examined article 2 of the ECHR as an embodiment of the Kantian duty to 
respect each person's life, and discussed the problem of conflicting lives. Secondly, 
the chapter has considered theories of principled justification of punishment 
premised on the idea of the person as an End in Itself. Respect for the individual as 
a rational agent means holding them responsible for their actions, and hence 
punishment may be regarded as matter of retributive principle. The problem, 
persisting in retributive theory, of maintaining that such a principled justification of 
punishment can make sense independently of utilitarian or consequential ist factors, 
was discussed. The conclusion of this section noted that in all its formulations, 
retributivist justifications of punishment imply a good consequence in the 
criminal's reform The next stage is to introduce the legal judgments of the English 
appellate courts that will constitute the legal focus of later chapters. 
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Chapter 3 
Judicial Case Studies as a Scene for the Universal Viewpoint 
1. Introduction 
This chapter provides an account of the legal judgments that provide the empirical 
case-study for the question of the role of liberal principle in law. The cases involve 
certain principles of sentencing and criminal law, to which a critical eye is turned in 
following chapters. The chain of appeals by Myra Hindley against the Home Office 
imposition of her whole life tariff in the Court of Appeal' and House of LordS2 and 
also the judgments on the Bulger killers, Robert Thompson and Jon Venables 
concerning their release 3 and Tariff4 pose the problem of the justification of 
punishment as a matter of principle. Re A (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment) 5 
is a rather different kind of case, and our interest in it lies in its discussion of the 
meaning and scope of the right to life. In outlining the pertinent details of these 
cases, this chapter is intended to indicate the main points of contention for critical 
analysis in the next chapter. This chapter does not attempt to provide a 
IRv. Secretary of State For the Home Department, ex parte Hindley [2000] QB 152 
2Rv. Secretary of State For the Home Department, ex parte Hindley [2000] 2 Al I ER 385 
Re Thompson andAnother (Tariff Recommendations) [2001] 1 All ER 737 
R v. Secretary of State For the Home Department, ex parte Thompson [ 1998] AC 407; [ 1997] 3 
All ER 97 (HL) 
[2000] 4 All ER 961 
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comprehensive set of case notes. Nor does it give a general introduction to the law 
of criminal sentencing or the right to life. Rather, our interest in the case law lies in 
simply outlining certain problematics for our study of liberal principle in law. For 
reasons that the next chapter attempts to make clear, these cases show us something 
of the logical limitations of liberal critical approaches to law and are hence valuable 
sources for modem legal theory. 
2. Murder: The Punishment of Adults and Children 
2.1 A 'Uniquely Evil' Woman: Myra Hindley 
The judgments of the Court of Appeal and House of Lords in this case concern the 
issue of whether or not it was justified for the Home Secretary to uphold Myra 
Hindley's whole life tariff in 1997 6 for the sadistic child-murders for which she was 
convicted in 1966. As a general question of legality the issue has been made 
somewhat redundant by s. 269 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, which provides a 
clear legal basis for the whole life tariff. 7 The Hindley appeals, all heard prior to the 
6 Hansard H. C. Debates, I O'h Nov 1997 Col 420; upholding previous Home Office policy of 1990 
and 1994 despite a previous Home Office-imposed tariff of 30 years, and also recommendations by 
Lane LCI and the trial judge that she should serve 25 years. 
Note on language: the determination of the period of imprisonment is described in the appeal 
. udoments as a "tariff'; the 2003 legislation refers to the "minimum term" (s. 269(2)) that an 1 41 
offender will serve after being given a life sentence, and a "whole life order" that is imposed in the 
most serious murders (s. 269(4)). 
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passing of this legislation, involve both the very existence of the whole life tariff 
and its specific applicability to Myra Hindley. The history of judicial 
recommendations, executive decisions and appeals arising from these decisions has 
raised highly sensitive and controversial questions concerning the legitimate 
expectations of prisoners regarding their future release 8 and the respective roles of 
executive and judiciary in setting tariffs. 9 The case has also provided an opportunity 
for an invigoration of feminist perspectives on violence which largely focus either 
upon male violence against women (rape, marital abuse) or defences for battered 
women who kill. 10 The Divisional Court rejected Hindley's application for judicial 
See Foster, S. 'Preserving prisoners' expectations: the public law protection of prisoners' rights' 
(1998) 2 (2) J Civ Lib, pp. 73-94 
On the dangers of political motivation in setting tariffs, see Valier, C. 'Cruel Britannia' (2002) 
Counsel, pp. 14-15; also Block, B. 'Two Murdering Women' (1998) 162 (5) JP p. 90. See also 
Shute, S. 'The Place of Public Opinion in Sentencing Law' (1998) Crim LR pp. 465-77. See also 
Mills, B. 'Taking the politics out of sentencing' (2002) 152(7040) NLJ 1077 at p. 1081; For a 
defence of the Home Secretary's role in this regard see Coutts, J. A. 'Whole life tariff after 
mandatory life sentence' (2000) 64 (5) J Crim L pp. 491-4 
For contributions to the 'traditional' view of femininity and violence, see Edwards, S. S. M. The 
gender politics of homicide in Edwards, Sex and Gender in the Legal Process (London: 
Blackstone, 1996). See also Barnett, H. Introduction to Feminist Jurisprudence (London: 
Cavendish Publishing Ltd, 1998) pp. 251-64, pp. 265-73. Also Bell, C. and Fox, M. 'Telling 
Stories of Women Who Kill' (1996) 5 (4) S& LS pp. 471-94. A more radical perspective which 
accommodates the possibility of women being the perpetrators of crime committed for reasons 
other than intolerable circumstances can be found in Heidensohn, F. Women and Crime 
(Basinstoke: Macmillan, 1996); See also Birch, H. (ed. ) Moving Targets: Women, Murder and 
Repi-esentation (London: Virago, 1993) 
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review on the grounds that, in allowing for the consideration of the prisoner's 
reform, the 1997 Home Office policy was not unlawful. " The Court of Appeal 
dismissed Hindley's appeal against this decision 12 with leave to appeal to the House 
of Lords, 13 who came to the same decision. She died in prison aged 60 on 
November 15 2002. 
In her appeal to the House of Lords, Hindley contended four points - the 
fourth of which will be addressed in this paper. First, the House of Lords rejected 
Hindley's argument that according to the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 
1965, a sentence of 'life imprisonment' should be a finite period. For Lord Steyn 
the lifelong period of the licence on which 'lifers' may be released under the Prison 
Act 1952 s. 27 (now replaced by the Criminal Justice Act 1991 s. 35) indicates that 
'life' for the Murder Act is an "indeterminate period", to be brought to an end either 
by the death of the prisoner or upon the Secretary of State's discretion. 14 Lord 
Steyn refers with approval to Lord Bingham's statement in the Divisional Court 
that "in principle" 15 a very heinous crime may be punished with a whole life 
11 Rv Secretary of Statefor the Home Department ex parte Hindley [ 1998] QB 75 1; per Lord 
Bingham, p. 770: "Mr Howard did, in his Parliamentary statement of 7 December 1994, unlawftilly 
fetter his discretion [because his policy was] confined to the considerations of retribution and 
deterrence... The statement of Mr Straw on 10 November 1997 did, however, remedy this defect 
[by considering] exceptional progress by the prisoner whilst in custody. " 
12 Hindle_i ý, supra, n. I 
13 Hindley, supra, n-2 
14 Ibid., p. 389 
15 Hindley, supra, n 11, p. 769 
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tariff. 16 Second, Hindley's argument that the whole life tariff unlawfully excludes 
the discretion of the Parole Board was rejected, since the 1997 policy does not 
exclude matters of reform. 17 Third, the courts also rejected the argument that 
Hindley's finite tariff prior to 1990 gave her a legitimate expectation of release, 18 
because although the decision to set Hindley's tariff at 30 years had been made in 
1985, it was never communicated to her. 19 Counsel for Hindley claimed that the 
rule in Pierson should be broadened to include non-communicated tariffs, since 
Hindley could not have contemplated that hers would be much longer than 30 
years. Lord Steyn replied simply: "There is no principled basis for this argument 
and I would reject it. 9ý20 Fourth, counsel argued unsuccessfully that the whole life 
tariff is unreasonable in Hindley's case because it gives insufficient consideration 
to her young age (twenty-two) or Brady's influence in 1966.21 
16 Ibid. This interpretation of 'life imprisonment' is supported in McDiarmid, C. 'Children Who 
Murder: What is Her Majesty's PleasureT (2000) Crim LR pp. 547-563; For an opposing view, see 
Blom-Cooper, L. and Morris, T. 'Life Until Death: Interpretations of Section l(l) of the Murder 
(Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act 1965" (1999) Crim LR pp. 899-905 who argues that there is 
no indication that Parliament intended 'life imprisonment' to equate with a prisoner's natural life. 
17 Hindley, nI above, per Lord Woolf MR, p. 170, applying the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 
18 Counsel relied on Pierson v Secretary of Statefor the Home Department [1998] AC 539; All ER 
577 
19 Hindley, supra, n 2, p. 391 
20 lbid 
21 Ibid, p. 392 for Lord Steyn's rejection of this argument. 
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One might construe Hindley as part of a larger apparent resurgence of 
retributive ideology in recent years. 22 Commentators have pointed to recent 
political rhetoric in which talk of protecting civil liberties and punishment being for 
a rehabilitative purpose for the criminal has to a large extent been replaced with 
demands for tougher law enforcement policies and more punitive criminal 
sentences. 23 Shortly before Hindley's death, the Court of Appeal directed that in 
cases involving the sexual or sadistic murder of children, trial judges should 
recommend a minimum prison term that "offer[s] little or no hope of the offender's 
eventual release" or else decline to set a minimum term at all. 24 The Criminal 
Justice Act 2003 incorporates provisions to ensure that in cases of "the murder of a 
child if involving the abduction of the child or sexual or sadistic motivation" there 
is no minimum term of imprisonment (resulting in whole life imprisonment). 25 
2.2 'Two Little Animals': Robert Thompson and Jon Venables 
If Hindley demonstrates a resurgence of 'retributivist' and 'law and order' rhetoric, 
it seems that the judgments on Thompson and Venables represent a continuing 
significance of welfarist and rehabilitative thinking. Jon Venables and Robert 
Thompson were convicted of murder. Since they were both under 18 years old, they 
22 See Garland, D. The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society 
(Chicago, I. L. and Oxford: University of Chicago Press and Oxford University Press, 2001) pp. 8-9 
23 Ibid., pp. 12-13; also pp. 58-9 
2' Practice Direction (criminal: consolidated) [2002] 3 All ER 904 para 49.19 
25 s. 269(4) and (5) and Schedule 21(4) 
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were not sentenced to 'life' imprisonment. Instead, they were sentenced to serve a 
prison sentence at "Her Majesty's Pleasure" under the Children and Young Persons 
ACt. 26 Their subsequent release after serving eight years was considered highly 
controversial given the horrified public reaction to their murder of two-year-old 
Jamie Bulger when they were both eleven years old. 27 At their trial and while in 
prison, injunctions were granted which prohibited the publication of certain 
information about them. On expiry of these injunctions when they reached the age 
of 18 both applied for new injunctions prohibiting publication of information 
regarding their new identities, physical appearance and new residence upon release. 
This was granted by Dame Butler-Sloss in the High Court, Family Division. 28 In 
passing sentence the trial judge had recommended that Thompson and Venables 
serve eight years for their crime in 1993. Lord Taylor LCJ considered that ten years 
would be appropriate. However, on the basis of an earlier policy statement (to the 
effect that prisoners sentenced under the Children and Young Persons Act shall be 
treated in the same way as adults sentenced to 'life' imprisonment29), the Home 
Secretary decided to set the tariff at fifteen years. This decision was appealed and 
26 s. 53 (1); Now incorporated into the Powers of Criminal Courts (Services) Act 2000, s. 90. 
27 Re Thompson, supra, n. 3, p. 741. For commentary see Morton, J. 'Tbe End of the Matter? ' 
(2001)NLJ15 (6966) p. 5; also (editorial) 'Sauce for the Goslings' (2000) 150 (6958)NLJp. 1607 
2' Venables v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 WLR 1038 (Farn Div). For commentary see 
Mahendra, B. 'Property in Privacy and Confidentiality' (2001) NLJ 151 (6979) pp. 531-2. See also 
Conway, H. 'Anonymity for Venables and Thompson' (2001) L Ex pp. 24-25 
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eventually overturned in the Court of Appea130 in favour of periodic assessments of 
the boys in conformity with welfare considerations in s. 44(l) of the Children and 
Young Persons Act 1933. The Court of Appeal's judgment was upheld by the 
House of Lords. 31 Following a ruling in the European Court of Human Rights that 
tariffs should be set by an "independent and impartial tribunal 5532 , Lord Woolf 
CJ 
decided that, having served eight years in a young offenders institution, the 
prisoners should be released rather than transferred to an adult prison. The reasons 
given by Lord Woolf relate almost entirely to considerations of character reform. 
He accepted psychiatric evidence that strongly indicated an impressive reform of 
character on the part of both prisoners while in their separate secure units. 33 He 
praises them for having "done all that is open to them to redeem themselves". 34 
Since that judgment, the Criminal Justice Act 2003 has set the starting point for 
setting a minimum term for offenders between the ages of ten and seventeen at 12 
years. 35 In a case similar to that of Thompson and Venables, this figure would be 
29 Michael Howard, Hansard (H. C Debates), 27 July 1993, cols 861-864: Ruling, in effect, that 
both classes of prisoners must serve a tariff set by the Home Secretary in the interests of retribution 
and deterrence prior to considerations of risk and reform in recommending release. 
30 Rv Secretary of Statefor the Home Department exparte Thompson [1997] 1 All ER 327 (CA) 
31 ex parte Thompson, supra, n. 4 
32 Art. 6(l) ECHR, interpreted in Tv United Kingdom (2000) EHHR 121 at p. 200 as requiring 
decisions regarding tariffs to be made by a judicial rather than a political figure. 
33 Re Thompson and Another, supra, n. 3, p. 740 
ý4 Ibid., p. 742 
35 s. 269(5), Sched. 21(7) 
103 
Chapter 3 
subject to aggravating factors such as the victim's particular vulnerabi lity36 and 
mitigating factors such as the very young age of the offenders 37 . 
3. The Conjoined Twins 
3.1 The Dilemma 
The much debated case of Re A represents a profound challenge for liberal 
principled jurisprudence. The facts of that case, although well known, are not 
uncontroversial. Perspectives on the identification of the children's factual situation 
play an important part of our analysis, so introductory remarks are made with 
caution. The fundamental problem was that, while Kantian and human rights 
approaches to justice begin with the premise that all worthwhile beings are 
individuated, this case involved two beings that, although both explicitly deemed to 
be worthwhile. ) were conjoined in an apparently incompatible fashion. There were, 
however, significant differences between the two children. Crucially, the heart of 
the weaker twin, Mary, was so weak that she depended upon blood supplied from 
the heart located in the body of her much stronger sister, Jodie. It was estimated 
that if they remained conjoined the twins might live for up to a year before the 
strain on Jodie's heart would result in its failure and the subsequent death of both 
twins. However, if separated there was a good chance that Jodie would survive to 
36 s. '169(5), Sched. 21(10)(b) 
37 s. 269(5), Sched. 21 (1 1)(g) 
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live a full life. The problem, of course, was that in cutting off Mary's supply of 
oxygenated blood, this would almost certainly result in her death. A hospital 
applied for permission from the court to undertake the operation to separate the 
twins in order to allow Jodie to live a full life. Further differences were that, 
whereas Jodie was judged to be normal in respect of bodily organs, responses and 
brain development, Mary was deficient in all three respects. Her brain was 
described as "primitive", and having no functional lungs she could not cry or make 
any responses. The case traverses the borders of criminal, medical and family law 
for which it quickly provoked a wealth of commentary on its legal basis and 
implications. Sabine Michalowski38 criticises the Court of Appeal judges for 
applying precedent in a way that erodes the principle of sanctity of life. J. C. Smith 39 
and Fiona Leverick 40 address the compatibility of self defence and the right to life 
after Re A. Jenny McEwan 41 examines the possible change brought to the defence 
of necessity in murder cases. Huxtable 42 and Black-Branch 43 critique the role of 
38 Michalowski, S. 'Sanctity of Life: Are Some Lives More Sacred Than OthersT (2002) 22 (3) 
Legal Studies pp. 3 77-3 97 
39 Smith, J. C. "Use of Force in Public or Private Defence and Article 2" (2002) Criminal Law 
Review pp. 958-962 
40 Leverick, F. 'A Reply to Smith' (2002) Criminal Law Review pp. 963-967 
41 McEwan, J. "Murder By Design: The 'Feel Good Factor' and the Criminal Law" (2001) 9 (3) 
Medical Law Review pp. 246-58 
'2 Huxtable, R. "Separation of Conjoined Twins: Where Next for the Criminal Law? " (2002) 
Criminal Law Review pp. 459-470 
43 Black-Branch, J. L. 'Being Over Nothingness: The Right to Life under the Human Rights Act' 
(2001) 26 European Law Review pp. 22-41 
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human rights discourse in the Court of Appeal's judgment. Others have focussed on 
the philosophical questions raised. The problem of 'personhood' is addressed by 
John HarriS44 and Helen Waft45 ; David Wasserman 
46 
considers the question of 
ownership of the organs shared by the twins; Vanessa Munr047 suggests an 
alternative to the liberal rights basis as a theoretical approach to the dilernma. In 
later chapters, this thesis will draw together certain aspects of the legal and 
philosophical issues in Re A in developing its argument as to the linguistic 
construction of liberal principle in legal judgment and the implications of this 
construction. 
3.2 The Parents 
Although obliged to base their decision on the best interests of the children, rather 
than the parents, the parents' views were received with sympathy and arguably 
44 Harris, J. 'Human Being, Persons and Conjoined Twins: An Ethical Analysis of the Judgment in 
Re A' (2001) 9 (3) Medical Law Review pp. 221-236 
45 Watt, H. 'Conjoined Twins: Separation as Mutilation' (2001) 9 (3) Medical Law Review pp. 237- 
45 
46 Wasserman, D. 'Killing Mary to Save Jodie: Conjoined Twins and Individual Rights' (2001) 21 
(1) Philosophy & Public Policy Quarterly pp. 9-14 
47 Munro, V. 'Square Pegs in Round Holes: The Dilemma of Conjoined Twins and Individual 
Rights' (2001) 10 (4) Social and Legal Studies pp. 459-482 
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48 
played some part in the case in stressing the principle of sanctity of life . The 
parents of the conjoined twins were Roman Catholics and they lived on the island 
of Gozo, near Malta. These two facts presented two specific problems. On the basis 
of the sanctity of human life, the parents were opposed in principle to any measure 
that would bring about the death of either child. They were therefore opposed to 
any choice of lives between the two children after they were bom. A second 
problem, raised as a symptom of their living on a remote island, was that there 
would be insufficient medical facilities to care adequately for a disabled child. If 
Jodie were to survive, but be rendered disabled by the operation, life in her 
homeland would be very difficult. 
3.3 The Appeal 
Upholding the decision of the High Court (but for different reasons) the Court of 
Appeal held that the separation should be allowed and that the hospital would not 
be liable for the subsequent death of the weaker twin. The three Lord Justices gave 
different reasons for allowing the operation. Ward U held that the separation was 
justified on the basis that, given that both children had an equal, yet incompatible 
right to life, it was possible to make a choice between their lives. Robert Walker U, 
agreeing with the reasoning of the High Court Judge, relied on a controversial 
definition of 'best interests'. He found that, since Mary's life could only bring pain 
48 On the legal status of the wishes of the family of incompetent patients, see Re G (P VS) [ 1995] 2 
FCR 46, in which it was held that their views were "very important" but could not be a veto on 
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and discomfort to her, separation (and hence her death) was beneficial for both 
children. 49 Thirdly, Brooke U disagreed with Robert Walker's 'best interests' 
reasoning but decided that, applying the defence of necessity, Mary was identified 
for death by virtue of her relative inability to live separately, compared to her sister. 
Other possible bases for deciding the case were considered and rejected by the 
majority, notably the doctrine of Double Effect. 50 Ward U draws attention to the 
dilemma of the case by reiterating the importance that the right to life is 
independent of all contingencies: 
"[I]t is impermissible to deny that every life has an equal 
inherent value. Life is worthwhile in itself whatever the 
diminution in one's capacity to enjoy it and however gravely 
impaired one's vital functions of speech, deliberation and 
choice may be. 
How can it be then, that the physical and mental differences between Jodie and 
Mary can justify choosing between their lives? There are many other cases that 
medical treatment. 
49 For support for this position see Freeman, M. 'Whose Life is it AnywayT (2001) 9 (3) Medical 
Law Review 259-80. For a rejection of the same, see Watt (2001) supra, n. 45, p. 239 
50 For majority decision on Double Effect see Ward U, Re A, supra, n. 5, p. 10 12 and Brooke U, p. 
1030; Robert Walker LJ dissented on this point, p. 1063 
51 Re A, supra, n-5, p. 100 1 
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could be considered in order to study the various aspects of the court's reasoning. 52 
Two recent English cases warrant some discussion here. In Airedale NHS Trust v 
Bland53 the withdrawal of life-prolonging treatment and feeding of a young man in 
a permanent vegetative state, was held to be lawful by the Court of Appeal and 
House of Lords on the basis of a 'patient's best interests' test. A pivotal issue in 
Bland was, as in Re A, the relevance of a person's quality of life with respect to the 
ethical principle of the sanctity of life. Both Court of Appeal and House of Lords 
agreed that, in a case where a person has no awareness of his own life at all, it 
would not be unlawful to remove treatment, death resulting as a result of the 
patient's own inability to survive. As Hoffman U put it, although there can be no 
definite formula for deciding a clash of principles, it would show more respect to 
"allow him to die with dignity" rather than be kept "grotesquely alive". 54 This case 
is relevant in considering Re A for several reasons. Firstly, like Hoffman U, Brooke 
U relies upon a judgment that death might be inferred to be in a patient's best 
interests. Second is the question as to whether there is a moral distinction to be 
made between 'allowing' a patient to die by withdrawing treatment and actively 
killing him. Certainly, the court in Bland accepted this as a legal distinction, despite 
moral reservations. The legal position seems to be that, if there is a duty to keep a 
patient alive, then it is impermissible to bring about their death whether by 
52 For example, Rv Dudley and Stephens (1884) 14 QBD 273 per Lord Coleridge on the defence of 
Necessity, and Lord Donaldson MR in Re J[ 199 1] Fam LR 33 on the doctrine of Double Effect. 
53 (1993) 1 All ER 821 
54 Ibid., p. 854 
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omission or by act. 55 Whether such a duty exists depends upon whether the 
patient's 'best interests' involve being kept alive. Until a patient is judged to exist 
in a permanent vegetative state (PVS), it is generally assumed that their best 
interests involve continued life and it is therefore homicide to bring about that 
person's death either by act or omission 56 . Once a state of PVS is diagnosed, the 
patient is judged to no longer have any such best interests and his life may be 
brought to an end passively, that is, by withdrawal of treatment. In Re A the 
majority of the Court of Appeal judged Mary to have an interest in continued life 
since she was not in such a state, and so on the Bland 'best interests' test, her life 
could not be ended by either passive or active means. In this respect Re A and 
Bland are clearly distinguishable. A fourth aspect of Bland that is relevant to our 
study of Re A are views expressed as to the importance of a person's 'biographical' 
life (that which Harris calls 'personality') and his ability to live without external 
support. The next chapter considers the moral status of Mary's life with respect to 
her failure in this regard. 
The second recent case of general relevance is R (Pretty) v DPP (Secretary 
of State for Home Dept. intervening)57 in which the Court of Appeal dismissed 
Dianne Pretty's appeal against the refusal of the Director of Public Prosecution to 
sanction her assisted suicide. Involving a person fully conscious and competent 
who makes a specific claim about the meaning of the right to life, Pretty stands in 
stark contrast to Re A, and our interest lies in the relationship between Article I and 
55 See Bland, supra, n. 53, per Lord Lord Mustill, p. 890-1. 
56 Kennedy, 1. and Grubb., A. Medical Law (London: Butterworths, 2000) p. 2120 
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two principles that are often claimed to both underlie it and simultaneously conflict 
with each other: the 'sanctity of life' and 'autonomy'. The case was brought under 
Articles 2,3,6 and 7 of the European Convention of Human Rights, although I 
shall restrict these comments to the arguments as to the interpretation of the 
principle of the Right to Life, protected by Article 2. It was argued on behalf of the 
claimant that the right to life should be interpreted as an expression of autonomy, 
giving rise to the wider right of self-determination regarding one's own life and 
death: that article 2 confers a freedom for the individual to make the choice as to 
whether to continue or end life. The House of Lords unanimously dismissed this 
argument on the basis of the sanctity of human life. 58 Lord Hope expressed his 
opinion that the right to life must be narrowly construed. It creates neither a right to 
life, nor to death, but merely recognises the right to life "inherent in the human 
condition which we all share .,, 
59 The previous chapters examined the Kantian 
liberal notion that principles such as the right to life accrue to individuals in part by 
virtue of their autonomy and capacity for rational and reasonable thought. The next 
chapter examines how the identification or non -identification of such capacities 
provide a basis for interpreting the right to life in Re A. In Re A, although the 
conflicting lives were both judged by the Court of Appeal to be sacred in the liberal 
moral sense, the potential for autonomy in Jodie was significant in ensuring that her 
right of life was protected at the expense of Mary, who lacked such a potential. In 
Prettv, on the other hand, autonomy and sanctity of life are interpreted as 
51 [2001] 3 WLR 1598 
58 Ibid., per Lord Bingham, p. 1603. 
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antagonistic: the claimant's submission as to the meaning of the right to life - based 
on her own demand for autonomy - was rejected because it would offend the 
principle of the sanctity of life. Viewing this problem in the context of Bland allows 
us to link it to the distinction in law already discussed as between acts and 
omissions. The court in Bland decided that they had avoided offending the principle 
of sanctity of life because the consequences of the judgment would result from 
omitting to do what was not legally required anyway (since his 'best interests' did 
not involve continued life), and hence his own bodily failure rather than any 
positive action by another was the moral cause of death. In contrast, Re A and 
Pretty both involved the possibility of a death that would definitely result from the 
positive actions of others. Lord Bingham states that Pretty's case invited courts to 
effectively collapse the distinction between acts and omissions, and hence open the 
door to an acceptance of euthanasia generally. 60 Unlike Re A. there were no other 
reasons to allow the appeal. Based ultimately upon this argument from autonomy 
therefore, her appeal had to fail. Re A is particularly interesting because it illustrates 
how significant the existence of 'other reasons' can be for interpreting matters of 
principle. In Re A this means reasons from outside of the frame of liberal principle 
are incorporated within this interpretive process, resulting in a definition of the 
right to life that is different to the one found in Pretty. 
That the Court of Appeal in Re A approached the case from a liberal 
individualist perspective is not in doubt. Despite the dependency of Mary upon 
59 Ibid., p. 1635 
60 bid, P. 1603 
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Jodie for blood supply, the twins were agreed by all the justices to be two legally 
separate children. What is in doubt is the role of the corollary principle of the 
sanctity of life in deciding the case. If the principle is correctly expressed in the 
passage from Ward U's judgment cited above, then the fact that Mary was severely 
disabled and had nothing useful to offer either her sister or anyone else would not 
be relevant. Nor would the fact that Mary was "doomed for death in any event". 61 
In other words, if the Court of Appeal's decision was based on the principle of the 
right to life as it is understood in its Kantian cle-ontological sense, then questions of 
either child's capacity to enjoy its respective life and the length of those lives would 
surely not arise. But such questions did arise, and intuitively it seems right that they 
should. If both twins must die if no steps are taken, why not attempt to save one? 
Such utilitarian thinking is difficult to resist and it is clear that the intuitive 
arithmetic sense of killing one baby in order that one, rather than neither, should 
live played in the judges' minds. Ward U refers to his decision negatively when he 
remarks: "I can see no other way of dealing with it than by choosing the lesser of 
the two evils and so finding the least detrimental alternative. 62 Nevertheless the 
decision is considered to be "justified 5ý63 as opposed to merely 'excused'. In order 
that the killing would not amount to an unjustified infringement of a life 64 the 
reasoning had to embrace a complex mixture of principle and consequential ism. As 
Ward U has stated, a choice of lives simply on the basis of potential is 
1 Re A, supra, n. 5, p. 962 
62 Ibid., p. 1006 
63 Ibid., p. 963 
64 Formally prohibited by the Human Rights Act 1998 and the criminal law of murder. 
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unjustifiable. But if a choice of lives based on potential is unjustifiable, how can the 
decision nevertheless be justified? 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter has presented an account of the challenges and problems that are 
posed by the legal and legislative problems for the liberal approach outlined in the 
previous chapter. As the next chapter attempts to argue, the judgments given in Re 
A reinforce what I regard as the crucial moral difference between the cases 
involving Myra Hindley and Thompson and Venables. The difference relates to the 
moral standing of the parties in the case, which largely determines the kind of 
judgment that is possible from a liberal principled perspective. Of course, the cases 
singled out for analysis here represent only a fraction of English case-law that 
would be relevant and interesting for an analysis of the role of principle in 
situations of apparent ethical dilemma. I will not attempt to provide a fully 
developed and coherent justification for the decision to focus upon Re A, Re 
Thompson and Another and ex parte Hindley. All I can say is that the particular 
interplay between moral and legal principle in these judgments do appear to be in 
many ways unique. However, the general question of judicial interpretation of 
principles in profoundly challenging situations is raised in other cases also. I hope 
that the discussion of these cases at least provides an engaging study. To use a 
Derridean expression that will itself become an object of analysis in Chapter Seven, 
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the ultimate justification for the decision is a secret: its ultimate justification is 
mysterious. 
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Chapter 4 
The Compromise of Liberal Justice 
1. Introduction 
This chapter focuses upon the way in which the liberal principles considered in 
Chapters One and Two are constructed in legal language in the cases discussed in 
the previous chapter. Does the case of the conjoined twins, involving the problem 
of the justification of ending one person's life in order to save another, illustrate the 
by-passing of the right to life in order to achieve a utilitarian goal, or does it instead 
simply reinterpret the right in the light of that goal? Do the cases dealing with the 
punishment of Robert Thompson and Jon Venables indicate an eschewing of the 
liberal considerations of the retributivist principle demonstrated in Myra Hindley's 
appeals, or, again, merely a difference of interpretation between cases? This chapter 
puts an argument for the latter point in both instances. Examining the rhetoric used 
by the judges in describing and judging these cases, it is argued here that the 
interpretation of liberal principle contains both principled and supposedly external 
utilitarian logic. It is argued that judicial rhetoric reveals that judgment on matters 
of principle is impure: a negotiation between principled and non-principled 
considerations. 
In establishing the community, each individual is necessarily required to 
abide by the conditions of reasonableness and mutual moral regard. No norm or 
rule or judgment can be justified unless it were considered so by all such 
individuals. This is the liberal idealisation of the arena of principled justification as 
a community of morally autonomous individuals which, interpreted in the light of 
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the contingencies of the facts of the cases, provides a foundation for our initial 
critical engagement with legal judgment. 
2. The Conjoined Twins: A Problem of Incompatible Lives 
Agamben quotes Carl Schmitt as observing: "He who determines a value, eo ipso 
always fixes a non value. The sense of this determination of a non-value is the 
annihilation of the non value. "' It is the determination of the value (and 'non- 
value') of life with respect to the right to life in the case of Re A that interests us 
here. It is argued that, although the majority in the Court of Appeal refused to 
justify bringing about Mary's death as an unintended though inevitable 
consequence of life saving surgery, 2 the identification of a significant difference in 
value between the twins underpins the justification of all three judges' decisions. 
2.1 Ends and Means to Ends 
If there is a duty to hold that the weaker twin, Mary, is an end in herself and thus a 
full moral agent, then the separation is not justifiable according to Kantian 
principle, assuming that death is not in her interests. This implies that if the reverse 
is true - that Mary is not to be accorded this moral status - then her life could be 
rightly ended if this will bring a significant benefit. The rhetoric of the Court of 
1 Carl Schmitt, quoted by Agamben, G. in Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Heller- 
Roazen, D. (trans. ) (Stanford, C. A.: Stanford University Press, 1998) p. 137 
Re, 4 (Conjoined Twins Medical Treatment) [2000] 4 All ER 961, p. 975. On this point, the majority 
comprised of Ward LJ and Robert Walker LJ and the minority view was expressed by Brooke U. it 
should be noted, however, that all three judges agreed on the final decision. 
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Appeal suggests that the early death of Mary is justified by her failure to establish 
herself within the practical scope of the right to life, and this in turn because of the 
characterisation of her by the court as lacking the qualities of Kantian 'humanity 
This is not to say that the court deliberately adopted a Kantian approach. However, 
in the judges' emphasis upon her brutal egocentricity in threatening the life of her 
sister Jodie, her lack of autonomy and her lack of rationality, Mary is seen to lack 
the inherent value that Kant accords to the humanity of the Kingdom of Ends. One 
should exercise caution in applying theories of personhood, Kantian or otherwise, 
to legal reasoning. Legal human rights authorities do not provide an indication that 
a person's rights are contingent upon their own particular powers of rationality or 
autonomy. Apart from cases in which a person is in a permanent vegetative state3 or 
"doomed"4 , considerations of personhood are not open to a court of 
law. 5 However, 
Re A is a case that forces these very considerations to the surface. In their grappling 
with the dilemma, we witness the judges' decisions on the conjoined twins as a 
tracing of the outer limit of the right to life. Discussion of the right to life exposes a 
conception of personhood, both positively in the significance of Jodie's potential 
for moral and physical autonomy and negatively in the significance of Mary's in 
this regard. Acknowledgement should be made at this point to a certain moral 
assumption in characterising the difference between Jodie and Mary as being one of 
3A iredale NHS Trust v Bland [ 1993 ]I All ER 821 
4 Re C (a minor) (wardship: medical treatment) [ 1989] 2 All ER 782. In this case it was held by the 
Court of Appeal that a baby diagnosed with a very serious form of hydrocephalus, who was bom with 
irreparable and terminable brain damage, could be allowed to die on account of the hopelessness of her 
case. 
5 See Sheldon, S. and S. Wilkinson, S. 'On the Sharpest Homs of the Dilemma: Re A (Conjoined 
Twins)' (2001) 9 (3) Medical Law Review pp. 201-7, p. 6 
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potential. Other commentators on the moral justification of the decision in Re A 
have shunned this appeal to potentiality. For example, Harris argues that a more 
important observation is that both twins actually lack personhood on account of 
their equal inability to value their own existence. 6 Like the Court of Appeal, Hams 
wants to find an escape route from the dilemma. His view of personhood enables 
the operation to separate as lawful but not mandatory since the lives at risk are not 
those of 'persons' in the first place. For very different reasons, Watt also rejects 
potentiality, insisting that both children should be respected as equal "member[s] 
of the rational human species". 7 Watt's position is calculated to resist what she 
regards as an attitude of body-fascism towards the disabled and the worth of their 
lives. 8 However, it is difficult not to associate her appeal to the human species with 
what Dworkin describes as the 'conservative' view of the inherently sacred quality 
of all human life that provides a basis for arguing that all abortion, euthanasia 
(whether passive or active) and assisted suicide is wrong. 9 
In Kant's moral theory, autonomy - the capacity to consider the possibility 
of universalising one's decisions - is one of the key requirements for being treated 
as an end in itself If there is anyone who fails to qualify as autonomous it is Mary. 
Harris, J. 'Human Beings, Persons and Conjoined Twins: An Ethical Analysis of the Judgment in Re 
A' (2001) 9 (3) Medical Law Review pp. 221-236, pp. 233-5; See also J. Harris, The Concept of the 
Person and the Value of Life' (1999) 9 (4) Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal pp. 293 -3 08 
7 Watt, 'Conjoined Twins: Separation as Mutilation' (2001) 9 (3) Medical Law Review pp. 237-45 p. 
240 
Ibid, p. 239 
Dworkin, R. 'Dying and Living' in Dworkin, R. Life's Dominion (London: Harper-Collins, 1993) Z! 5 
Chapter Seven; also printed as Part 2 of Chapter Seven in Harris, J. (ed. ) Bioethics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 200 1) pp. 187-204 
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Her physical and mental condition meant that while she lived she would abvays 
only be egocentric - the very opposite of a Kantian moral agent. Not only was 
Mary physically dependent upon her sister Jodie to stay alive, she was also 
endangering Jodie's own life by putting her heart under huge strain. Secondly, 
having a poorly developed, even "primitive"10 brain, there was no question of Mary 
developing the capacity for understanding the requirements of others or (therefore) 
the idea of justice as universal. 
Ward LJ rejects the submission that Mary's death may be regarded as an 
unintended side-effect of the intended good purpose of saving Jodie's life and thus 
refuses to justify the operation through Double Effect reasoning. " Instead he 
focuses on the threat caused by Mary to Jodie, and in doing so states that a right to 
life is not necessarily a guarantee of life. "Mary may have a right to life, but she has 
little right to be alive". 12 Why? Because "she sucks the lifeblood out of Jodie". In 
identifying the 'facts' of the case, Ward LJ's language is full of violence. For 
instance, he compares the threat unwittingly posed by Mary to her sister with a boy 
under the age of criminal responsibility who fatally shoots his classmates. 13 He later 
says: "Mary is killing Jodie... as surely as a slow drip of poison. How can it be just 
that Jodie should be required to tolerate that state of affairs? " 14 These analogies 
10 Re A, supra, n. 2, p. 975 
11 Ibid, p. 10 12. Ward LJ argues that, since the good effect of saving Jodie can only be brought about 
by cutting Mary's oxygen supply, it cannot be said that the action would be in both twins' best 
interests. Recall that Double Effect cannot justify harming one person as a means to saving another 
(see Chapter Two, s. 1.3., supra. ) 
12 ReA supra, n. 2, p. 1010 
13 Ibid, p. 10 17 
" Ibid, pp. 10 16-17 
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have been criticised by some commentators for being overly dramatic, 15 but in 
ascribing Mary and Jodie the identities of aggressor and victim respectively, Ward 
LJ provides an invaluable insight as to judicial interpretation of principle. He insists 
that this situation of threat and aggression is "the reality" of the situation, 16 and that 
this is not a moral judgment, but a legal one. This appeal to 'reality' invites a little 
unpacking. That which we describe as 'real' is that which we regard as indubitably 
true. Is it indubitably true that Mary's role is as the aggressor and Jodie the victim? 
I regard that this very much depends on one's perspective on which aspects of the 
'facts' in this case are significant. As Munro points out, 17 we could look at the case 
equally well as one involving emotional and physical connection and 
interdependence between the children. Admittedly it could be retorted that the 
dependence between the children is purely one-way: based on the medical 
prognosis, Jodie has nothing to gain in terms of life expectancy or quality by being 
attached to Mary. But if one regards the children not as competing individuals but 
as a unique entity, then Mary cannot be said to be a threat simply by virtue of her 
existence. The twins are a unit, a bond, which however short its potential existence, 
is an existence nonetheless. ' 8 But without recourse to an argument of threat, the 
escape route sought by the court would not be possible. Having ruled out a simple 
choice of lives based on Jodie's potential and Mary's best interests, Ward LJ has no 
15 See Eliot, C. 'Murder and Necessity following the Siamese Twins Litigation' (2001) 65 (1) Journal 
of Criminal Law pp. 66-75, p. 75 
16 Re A, s upra, n. 2, p. 10 16 
17 Munro, V. 'Square Pegs in Round Holes: The Dilemma of Conjoined Twins and Individual Rights' 
(2001) 10 (4) Social and Legal Studies pp. 459-482, p. 466 
18 See Michalowski, 'Sanctity of Life: Are Some Lives More Sacred Than Others? ' (2002) 22 (3) 
Legal Studies pp. 377-397, p. 395 
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option but to construct the twins in this way. Thus, the identification of Mary as an 
aggressor may be necessary in reaching a satisfactory decision, but this is not the 
same as it being the reality. If one is convinced that Mary is, as Ward LJ insists, 
threatening Jodie's life then the judgment can still be interpreted as one of liberal 
principle. As we saw above, Kant's categorical imperative, although generally 
disapproving of violence, allows force to be used to defend against unwarranted 
violence as is necessary to maintain harmony within the community of rational 
agents. If the Kantian view of the dignified, rational person is of one who considers 
the compatibility of his own ends with that of all others, then characterising Mary 
as an aggressor allows a principled distinction to be made between her and Jodie. 
Robert Walker U also emphasises Mary's lack of physical independence, 
although his position is somewhat different to that of Ward U. He accepts Ward 
LJ's opinion that the doctrine of Double Effect cannot apply where the proposed 
action could not be of any conceivable benefit to Mary. 19 However, unlike the 
majority, Robert Walker U regards that the operation would, in fact, be in Mary's 
best interests, as her life can only bring her discomfort and pain. Conversely, the 
operation, although inevitably fatal, would give her the bodily integrity which 
nature denied her. 20 He argues that if the surgery went ahead, Mary's death would 
result "not because she was intentionally killed, but because her own body cannot 
21 
sustain life". If a person is reliant on something extra to her own body to sustain a 
life that that person has no chance of ever valuing in any way whatsoever, then 
19 ReA, supra, n. 2, p. 1063 
20 lbid, p. 1069-70 
21 lbid, p. 1070 
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there is no legal requirement to continue to preserve it. 22 Thus, Robert Walker LJ 
uses the liberal principle of autonomy to justify action which would inevitably lead 
to Mary's death. Robert Walker LJ's judgment is the only one of the three that can 
be compared to that of the House of Lords in Bland, in which the decision to allow 
Anthony Bland to die was justified on the basis that, given his medical condition, 
death would bring him more dignity than indefinitely continued life. It has been 
pointed out elsewhere that the problem with Robert-Walker LJ's reasoning is that 
whilst Mary's mental and physical functions were indeed severely impaired, she 
was certainly not in a permanent vegetative state. 23 
Against the background of such comments the right to life is interpreted, not 
as being departed from in the circumstances, but as drawing a moral distinction 
between the two children. Given their comments on the equal status of every life 
and Mary as a separate human being, the judges cannot explicitly say that she has 
no right to life in a theoretical sense. However, through their rhetoric of aggression, 
threat and dependence, they make it clear that she is beyond the right's practical 
limit. The incision of the surgeon's knife thus becomes a gruesome representation 
of the drawing of the moral limit of the right to life. As Agamben would put it, 
Mary is an example of "bare life" - with no claim to having value in herself by 
virtue of any of the liberal identifications of the worthwhile person - she is "a life 
that can be killed but not sacrificed". 24 Ward LJ concludes that the Human Rights 
Act 1998 2 (1) should be interpreted as allowing positive steps in defence of one 
22 This is despite the fact that all of the appeal judges agreed that the operation would be an act, rather 
than an omission such as switching off a life-support machine. 
23 'Jodie and Mary: The Medical Facts', BBC News Online, Thursday 7'ý December 2000, 
littp: //news. bbc. co. uk/ I ihi/health/920487. stm 
2' Agamben ( 1998) supra, n. 1, p. 13 3 
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person's "enjoyment of the right to life" to overrule the "negative obligation to 
refrain from the intentional deprivation of life" of another. 25 The difference 
between the theoretical and practical application of the right to life here is clear. In 
legal terms, the limitation placed on Mary's right to life under Article 2 is not 
universally accepted. For example, Black-Branch argues that such a move is ruled 
out by McCann v UK 26 in which it was held that the provisions of the Convention 
must be "strictly construed". 27 
In adopting a critical perspective on the judicial construction of principle, it 
is pertinent to examine why the judges should find it necessary to construct the 
identities of Jodie and Mary as so ftindamentally incompatible. Prior to the 
development of the technology required to perform the kind of operation required 
to allow Jodie to survive and lead a normal life, there would be nothing to motivate 
the rhetoric employed by Ward U. Modem surgical technology makes the picture 
of an opposition of violent competition between Jodie and Mary a meaningful way 
of describing the twins' physical predicament from a liberal individualistic 
perspective. I contend that this has nothing to do with being able to know the true 
facts of the twins' predicament (i. e. that Jodie's heart was pumping blood for both 
children alive and was suffering a potentially tenninal strain as a result), and 
everything to do with the facts of their relative life potential after separation. It is 
accepted here that allowing the twins to remain conjoined would have resulted in 
25Re A, supra, n. 2, p. 10 17, applying Paton v UK (1980) 3 EHRR 408 
26 (1996) 21 EHHR 97 
27 Ibid, p. 147; Quoted in Black-Branch, 'Being Over Nothingness: The Right to Life under the 
Human Rights Act' (2001) 26 European Law Review 22-41, p. 32. See also Michalowski (2002) 
1 
supi-a, n. 18, p. 383, who argues that, since the operation cannot be described as 'treatment' in Mary's 
case, a balancing of lives in not lawful. 
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both of their deaths within a few months, perhaps a year. It is also accepted that the 
results of separation were likely to be the death of Mary and the prospect of a full 
and normal life for Jodie. What is interesting for our examination of the principled 
aspect of this case is the relationship between these two facts. For it is because the 
Court of Appeal attaches significance to both Mary's hopelessness and Jodie's 
potential that the very close (perhaps inseparable) relationship between principle 
and non-principled consequentialism is exposed. The consideration of Jodie's 
potential benefit in the surgeons bringing about Mary's death provides the 
persuasive force needed to cast Mary as an aggressor - as effectively stealing 
Jodie's life away. This is to say that the moral condemnation of Mary follows both 
from a principled premise (i. e. who most closely resembles the liberal ideal of 
personhood) and also from the calculations of potential beneficial and detrimental 
consequences. Such calculations are excluded from consideration of Rawls's index 
of primary goods: despite referring to goods rather than Right, the index includes 
only the universal goods, not particular ones. 28 As is shown in the texts of the 
judgments, such calculations are necessary in forming a coherent narrative of the 
facts allowing a principled judgment to be made. 
The case for consequentialism or efficiency is not difficult to make out. The 
speeches of all the judges make the case very strongly that, if the operation is not 
allowed then an opportunity to save a life would be lost. Brooke LJ's focus upon 
the difference in supposed life expectancy and quality between the two children 
illustrates this point. Brooke LJ agrees with Ward LJ that the operation cannot be 
28 See Rawls, J. Political Liberalism (New York, N. Y. & Chichester: Columbia University Press, 
1996). Rawls states (p. 308) that the most important of these 'primary goods' is 'liberty' and also 
includes freedom of movement, powers of offices, wealth and self-respect 
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conceived as a case of good end justifying the means, as it can be of no possible 
benefit to Mary. 29 The first move Brooke LJ makes is to dismisses any 
straightforward 'quality of life' test, on the grounds that such tests are arbitrary and 
not of a moral character. However, he then goes on to state that it is enough that the 
circumstances of the case are such that Mary's life can be rightfully sacrificed in 
order to save that of Jodie. He distinguishes the case of Rv Dudley and Stephens, 30 
arguing that, instead of indicating that the defence of necessity could never be an 
answer to a charge of murder, it showed only that necessity could not be used as a 
defence where there was no reason for choosing one person over another to be 
killed. In that case, sailors stranded for days on the open sea in a lifeboat killed and 
ate the cabin boy in order to stay alive. Brooke LJ points out that in that case the 
defendants could not be justified because the choice of who to kill was "arbitrary" - 
there was no reason, apart from his weakness, why the boy should be selected. 31 In 
the case of the twins however, Mary is "self-designated for a very early death'. ) . 
32 
Hence there is no arbitrary selection of a victim and her death is justified. If this 
comment refers simply to Mary's life-expectancy, does it follow that the decision in 
Rv Dudley and Stephens would have been different if there was more certainty that 
the cabin boy (and not the defendants) were truly doomed? If so then this would 
suggest that the defendants in Rv Dudley and Stephens were convicted because the 
facts of the case simply did not amount to a situation of true necessity. What it 
means to be 'designated for death' is ethically problematic and it is not clear that 
29 Re. 4, supra, n. 2, p. 1030 
30 (1884) 14 QBD 273 
Re. 4, supra, n. 2, p. 1041 
32 Ibid, per Brooke U, p. 1051 
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Brooke U settles the matter. 33 In the long term the issue seems relatively clear: 
unlike Mary, Jodie has the capacity to exercise her right to life in the course of a 
normal life. Hence, the killing of Mary would be justified on the grounds that for 
her, unlike Jodie, there was nothing that could have been done to improve the 
quality of life. Since it would be possible to give Jodie the chance of a normal life 
and Mary was clearly designated for death, Brooke U opined that the doctrine of 
necessity could be used to lawfully prefer Jodie's interests to Mary's. Since it was 
only Mary's separation from Jodie that could realise this potential, no difficulty 
arose in identifying who should die. 
34 
One might argue, as Michalowski does, 35 that Brooke LJ's interpretation of 
Rv Dudley and Stephens is ruled out by the more recent case of Rv Howe 36 on the 
principle of the "special sanctity that the law attaches to human life and which 
denies to a man the right to take an innocent life even at the price of his own or 
another's life. 5537 Moreover, the notion of identification for death only makes sense 
on a certain interpretation of the facts of the twins' situation. In order for a 
comparison between Mary's and Jodie's life prospects to be justified, we are 
required to regard the children's conjoined lives as analogous to Brooke LJ's 
33 See Harris (200 1) supra, n. 6, pp. 222-3, who argues that life expectancy is not an appropriate 
consideration. 
34 Brooke U finds support for his interpretation of necessity in Ashworth, A. Principles of Criminal 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) pp. 153-4 (quoted by Brooke LJ, p. 1042-3) 
35 Michalowski (2002) supra, n. 18, p. 3 91 
36 [ 1987] AC 417 
3 37 Ibid, per Lord Griffith, p. 439 
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examples of imminent but avoidable disasters 38 in which an identifiable party is 
already marked for death. A problem with this logic is that Mary was not marked 
for immediate death. While her life expectancy was undeniably much shorter than 
4normal', some estimates suggested that she and Jodie might have lived for up to a 
year whilst remaining conjoined. If the test is not to apply also to the elderly and 
terminally ill, regarding Mary as nevertheless designated for death surely requires 
an assessment of her quality of life, which Brooke U had already ruled out. 39 
Applying the logic of disasters to this case as Brooke U does, requires that we 
construct Mary as depriving Jodie of resources which cannot save her, but might 
save another if she is removed. 40 On this view, Jodie is unnecessarily marked for 
death while she remains attached to Mary: the mark of death can be removed from 
her by separating her from Mary. The latter would herself continue to be marked 
for death no matter what was done. As was argued above in relation to Ward LJ's 
judgment, the dominance of human rights principles under the ECHR means that a 
judgment based simply on utilitarian grounds is not possible. Therefore the test of 
'designation for death' is a combination of both liberal and consequential i st 
reasoning. We are required firstly to accept that Jodie and Mary are two separate 
individuals whose interests conflict, one of whom must prevail at the expense of the 
other. Secondly we have to accept that taking the situation as a whole, the most 
beneficial course of action is to act to save Jodie even if this means causing the 
38 e. g. that of the Zeebrugge disaster, in which people were trapped on a rope ladder in water by a 
petrified man, at risk from drowning until the man was forcibly removed. Referred to by Brooke U, p. 
1041 
39 Re A, supra, n. 2, per Ward U, p. 100 1 
40 See Wasserman, D. 'Killing Mary to Save Jodie: Conjoined Twins and Individual Rights' (2001) 21 
(1) Philosophy & Public Policy Quarterly pp. 9-14 
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death of another. In the language of all of the judges we identify the rhetoric of 
disaster, threat and danger which can only be overcome through violence against 
Mary. This rhetoric of violence makes clear the boundaries identified as being those 
of principled liberalism. Theorisations of the 'moral community' of mutually 
respectful and rational agents, 41 institutionalised in law through human rights 
principles, all suggest that there is no claim to continued life enforceable on Mary's 
behalf If Mary does have an interest in continued life, it can be rightly ignored 
because her lack of personhood and the violence she commits simply existing 
locates her outside of the liberal moral universe. 42 
41 The universal community that Kant describes as the "Kingdom of Ends", see Kant, Groundwork of 
the Metaphysics ofMorals, Gregor, M. (ed. ) Intro. Korsgaard, C. M. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998) p. 41/s. 4: 433 
42 In a controversial argument, Agamben suggests that the determination of the value and non-value of 
life illustrates a certain contiguity between liberal and totalitarianism (Agamben (1998) supra, n. 1, p. 
120- 1 ). Posing the question as to why the Nazis found it necessary to implement a programme of 
extermination of the incurably ill in 1940-1 when it was not in their economic interests to do so, 
Agamben regards that the answer lies in the politicisation of human life, and its inscription into the 
state (ibid., pp. 140- 1). The determination of the value of lives - even according to a supposedly life- 
affirming right to life as is the case in Re A- demonstrates for Agamben the foundations for 
descending into totalitarianism, in which such determinations are political decisions and hence the site 
of sovereign power (ibid., p. 122, p. 140). 
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2.2 The Limits of Post-metaphysical Liberalism 
If modem discourse of human rights in law finds grounding in a Kantian idea of the 
person it should not be surprising that the Court of Appeal found the "medical 
treatment" to be consistent with the Human Rights Act 1998, despite the fact that it 
appears to involve bringing about death with Woollin intention. 43 As we have seen, 
the commitment to an idea of personhood in liberal theory determines that notions 
of justice involve certain conditions for inclusion. This section examines the 
attempts by modem liberals to preserve Kant's commitment to the universal by 
discarding his metaphysics of the person. In providing what they describe as a 
"political" (Rawls) or "discursive" (Habermas) basis for general principles, 44 post- 
metaphysical liberalism cannot escape the problem that principled justification is 
premised on presuppositions as to human identity and as such reveal its logical 
limits when it encounters a subject that does not share this identity. Picking up a 
thread from ss. 3.1.3,3.1.4 and 5 in Chapter One, the following sub-sections argue 
that the 'person' is both the foundation and the limitation in Rawls and Habermas, 
as in Kant, since it determines who is inside and who is outside moral reach. 
"Rv Woollin [ 1999] 1 AC 82 at 96: "Where a man realises that it is for all practical purposes 
inevitable that his actions will result in death or serious harm, the inference may be irresistible that he 
intended that result, however little he may have desired or wished it to happen. " 
44 Rawls (1996) supra, n. 28, p. 374 
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2.2.1 Rawls's Justice as Fairness - The Conditions for Inclusion Within the Two 
Principles of Justice 
Like Kant's metaphysics, 'justice as fairness' finds its limit in Rawls's conception 
of the person. The issue is his assertion that 'liberty' means the opportunity to 
express one's moral powers and it is on the basis that each person is assumed to 
have these moral powers that the primary goods are distributed. In the case of Re A, 
where the moral powers and all possibility of developing them are lacking in Mary, 
we seem to be in a similar situation to our analysis of Kant's end-in-itself. Mary's 
draining dependence upon her sister and primitive mental capacity means that she 
would always lack both reasonableness and rationality. There is little in the Theory 
that allows the Parties in the original position to consider those who have no 
potential for developing in a mental or ethical sense, since Rawlsian justice depends 
upon the assumption that people can take care of their own personal and moral 
lives. Rawls has stated that 'hard cases' involving parties lacking the two moral 
powers should be set aside in deciding questions of justice. In the Theory he 
remarks: 
"The only contingency which is decisive is that of having or not 
having the capacity for a sense of justice. By giving justice to 
those who can give justice in return, the principle of reciprocity 
is fulfilled at the highest level. 5545 
45 Rawls, J. .4 
Theotý' ofJustice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) p. 447 
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In a tacit acceptance that his conception of justice is not competent to do justice to 
parties such as Mary, Rawls argues further that "hard cases distract our moral 
perception by leading us to think of people distant from us whose fate arouses pity 
and anxiety". 46 The best he seems to offer is paternalism built into the conditions of 
the original position. Parties in the original position may "adopt principles 
stipulating when others are authorized to act in their behalf and to override their 
present wishes if necessary". 47 This, of course, is feeble in the sense that it does not 
offer any shift of perspective or attempt to incorporate the very problematic 
question of a necessarily inarticulable and fundamentally unreasonable demand to 
be allowed to live. Perhaps it would be asking too much of a theory such as 
Rawls's, which depends for its persuasive force upon an appeal to the idea of 
persons as morally developing beings, which Mary is not. The moral powers are 
necessary to Rawls's project since otherwise the parties in the original position 
would not have any way of deciding in favour of one principle over another. 
Consideration of the moral powers is necessary to morally distinguish humans 
from, say, animals. We cannot, then, modify the conditions of the original position 
in such a way that would allow someone like Mary to be adequately considered. In 
making the two moral powers the immovable foundation of reasoning from behind 
the veil of ignorance, Mary is effectively left without representation in the original 
position. Having no representative in this sense, she occupies a moral space exterior 
to the principles of justice. She is simply one of those 'hard cases' that can only be 
set aside when considering the larger picture. In giving nothing in terms of her 
inability to enter into contractarian. moral reasoning, she is likewise given nothing 
46 Rawls, J. 'A Kantian Conception of Equality' (1975) Cambridge Review, pp. 94 - 99, p. 96 
" Rawls (1999) supra, n. 45, p. 219 
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in return. This contrasts with Jodie's relative potential for developing the two moral 
powers once separated from Mary. 
Thinking of Re A in the context of Rawls's justice as fairness seems to allow 
that the parties in the original position do not consider Mary's claim to a continued 
life. If, as Rawls argues in Political Liberalism, the veil of ignorance is thick 
enough to allow knowledge of only the conception of the free and equal person, 
then she is morally invisible. One could say that the operation is justified in the 
negative sense that there is nothing perceptibly wrong in killing someone who has 
no moral standing anyway. If such reasoning does not completely satisfy then we 
must resort to emphasising, as the Court of Appeal did in Re A, the beneficial 
consequences of the operation. That is the effect of the comments of Brooke U, 
when he uses his analogy of the scales in defending his use of the defence of 
necessity. There are, of course, meaningful differences between Rawls and Kant, 
but as a theory of principled justification, Rawlsian reasonableness produces an 
effect similar to Kantian rationality. For Rawls, a beings that are incapable of 
considering anyone other than themselves are fundamentally unreasonable. Kant 
would describe such beings as irrational and heteronomous. They would fall short 
of what is expected from persons ftilly integrated into the moral community and 
worthy of the moral consideration of others. 
Other commentators have suggested ways in which Rawls can be read in 
order to bring the morally incompetent within the realm of justice. Martin argues 
that incorporation of the mentally handicapped into justice as fairness requires in 
the first place a reinterpretation of the maximin principle that the primary goods are 
to be distributed for the benefit of the least advantaged. If we accept that the most 
well-off do not 'deserve' their arbitrarily birth-given talents, we might also suppose 
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that the mentally disabled do not deserve their disadvantage. Looked at like this, the 
morally incompetent must be regarded, not as excluded altogether from justice as 
faimess, but as part of the 'least advantaged' class for whom an adequate scheme of 
liberties and social and economic goods must be provided. 48 Amartya Sen suggests 
that Rawls's scheme is made unnecessarily tunnel-visioned by focusing upon the 
least-advantaged simply having the primary goods. Since the veil of ignorance 
prevents the parties in the original position from taking particular disabilities into 
consideration, the mere fact of having a certain scheme of goods does not ensure 
that each person's basic needs are met. Sen therefore suggests a shift from a 
measure of equality in having the primary goods to equality of their effect. In other 
words, we ask not whether the worst-off have an adequate scheme of liberty and 
other goods, but whether these are sufficient to bring about a tolerable level of 
capability. 49Both Martin's and Sen's arguments must still deal with the problem 
that for Rawls 'liberty' is guaranteed because it is necessary to promote persons' 
essential moral powers, which the morally incompetent lack. Sen's proposal has the 
further problem that its focus on the effect of the primary goods runs counter to the 
purpose of the veil of ignorance. To encumber the parties of the original position 
with consideration of providing a substantive "basic capability"50 means that the 
veil would have to be at least partially removed to allow them to view the effects of 
48 Martin, R. Rawls and Rights (Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas: 1985) p. 189. For others, 
Rawls's attempt to mitigate inequalities contradicts his prioritisation of Kantian individualism over 
community: see Sandel, M. J. Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1982) p. 138, p. 147 
49 Sen, A. Choice, We4fare and Measurement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998) 
50 Ibid., p. 368 
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their distributive decisions. This would of course endanger the vital principle of 
objectivity. 
For political liberalism to be universally inclusive it must be assumed that all 
parties involved in a conflict have the capacity to consider the other's propositions 
in relation to their own self-conception as free and equal. Conceptions of justice are 
justified on the basis of reasons that are publicly and universally recognised by free 
and equal citizens. 51 It is possible that the fact that Mary has no such a self- 
conception (and no possibility of such in the future) could mean that the decision in 
Re A does not in fact need any justification. Mary need not be offered terms of 
cooperation because she is incapable of considering them or offering any in return. 
Even if she were mentally and verbally capable, the physical threat that her very 
existence causes for Jodie means she could never offer reasonable terms to her 
potentially rational and reasonable sister. 
2.2.2 The Conditions of Membership of Habermas's Ideal Speech Community 
Reintroducing Habermas to the discussion, the problems associated with rational 
justification derived from participation in discourse must be addressed. For 
Habermas, according others moral regard necessarily involves a communicative 
encounter in which subjective needs can be heard and understood. The implication 
of this is that, without the opportunity for a communicative exchange we cannot 
have moral regard for the other and the other has no reason to have such a regard 
for us. 
5' Rawls, J. 'The Idea of Public Reason Revisited' in Law of People (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1999a) p. 13 1, pp. 133-4, p. 155 
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Recall that Habermas argues that the language of rights embodies the ideals 
of freedom and equality in that they apply to everyone equally in promoting 
freedom to participate in public affairs. Habermas claims that through using the 
mediating language of rights, all people will be able to make themselves understood 
to a universal audience. Subjective claims, in all their diversity find harmony with 
universality through the common mediating language of rights. 52 But whose 
rationality is this and precisely whose self-conception does it represent? A 
distinctly modernist project, Habermas's Kantian-Hegelian-Kholbergian rationality 
does lay itself open to charges of Eurocentricism and gender/race bias which 
threatens to undermine his claims to objectivity and universality. 53 Such criticism 
does pose a serious challenge to Habermas's communicative rationality. However, 
my interest in Habermas focuses upon the less ambitious question of the 
applicability of communicative competence in a situation such as Re A, in which 
the possibility of any communication is problematic. 
52 Habermas, J. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1996) p. 56 
53 Adding to a wider critical debate, in which Habermas is derided for selling his particular 
communicative paradigm as a discovery of universal rational communicative presuppositions, feminist 
commentators have argued that communicative reason effectively excludes sexual difference. Dean, J. 
('Discouse in Different Voices' in Meehan, J. (ed) Feminists Read Habermas: Gendering the Subject 
of Discourse (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 205) for instance, points out that the model of moral 
consciousness that Habermas uses for his communicative action ignores the female experience. As far 
as Dean's critique is concerned, Habermas has failed to address the criticisms of liberal moral theory 
by feminists such as Gilligan that the notion of reasonableness and rationality in law is a male one. Of 
course, accusations of particularism are precisely the kind of criticism that Habermas has striven to 
avoid by detaching morality from all cultural and historical context and reliance upon communicative :D 
rationality. 
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Re A illustrates the two-fold problem suffered by Habermas in situations 
involving someone who does not fit easily into liberalism's conception of the 
person. Habermas wants to ensure that every person affected has an equal chance to 
have their say, and that this is translatable into the language of rights. What claim, 
therefore, is made by Mary, and how is it to be so translated into language that is 
true both to her self-conception and to liberal democratic ideals? Having no ability 
to communicate her desires, Mary's 'claim' is for others to decide. Jodie's claim 
must be similarly constructed from without. In the High Court, Mary's life was 
judged to involve only pain and suffering, and hence of no worth to her. In the 
Court of Appeal, only Robert Walker U agreed, stating that Mary's wishes (and 
hence best interests) were that she be put out of her misery. 54 This is a highly 
convenient view of her wishes, considering the beneficial consequences that Mary's 
death would have for Jodie's survival chances. The majority of the Court of Appeal 
rejected this reasoning as infringing a right to life, and reconstructed her as making 
a claim to live in competition with her sister. This step allows the court to then 
consider the arguments for and against the operation without infringing Mary's 
right to life. Thus Ward LJ and Robert Walker LJ used criminal defence reasoning 
and Brooke U used his version of an 'identification for death' test. Because of the 
threat that Mary poses to Jodie and because she represents an obstacle to Jodie's 
survival, her subjective claim to remain attached to her sister cannot be 
universalised. Mary's claim, so constructed, cannot find rational justification 
because it is in direct conflict with a stronger claim. My problem with this approach 
is that the analysis that Habermas would apply - that Re A is an example of a 
subjective claim being rationally unjustifiable - is a perverse reading of the 
5' Re A, supra, n. 2, per Robert-Walker U, p. 1069 
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situation. Neither Mary's nor Jodie's 'claims' come from their subjective 
viewpoints. They are imposed by a legal framework that can only regard its 
subjects as separate individuals with conflicting interests. Hence this is not a case of 
an attempt to harmonise subjective claims with objective rationality, but merely a 
weighing up of two conflicting liberal constructs. A decision can only be 
considered justified, therefore, if all of the parties involved can make their own 
claims and identify themselves with Habermas's conception of the individual 
language-user. Habermas's communicative rationality must individuate Jodie and 
Mary and be construed as having conflicting individual claims, because after a 
certain length of time they would be physically incompatible. Therefore they must 
be accorded equality to put their separate cases and being the only one with a 
chance of survival after that time, Jodie's case wins. But this is exactly where the 
problem lies. 'Equality' in a case like this has no normative force at all. There is 
simply no way in which Mary's and Jodie's claims, heard as separate demands to 
live, can be regarded equally. Given this impossibility in ensuring equality between 
Mary and Jodie, is rational justification of a decision on their separation possible 
using communicative action? 
Habermas has written little on such a situation, but in Justification and 
Application he does suggest a way that beings lacking the linguistic capacity for 
rational argumentation might nevertheless be incorporated into the communicative 
theory of justification. On the topic of animal welfare Habermas asks: how can a 
moral position towards animals be adopted? 55 Surely, since the adoption of a 'moral 
position' is based upon a communicative encounter, translatable into a commonly 
accessible language of rights, this is impossible. However, Habermas is determined 
5 51-labermas, J. Justification and Application (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993) p. 105-6 
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to see off this criticism. He insists that a moral position towards animals (and hence 
presumably other non-language-using sentient beings) is possible through "extra- 
linguistic" communication. When we encounter animals and adopt a "performative 
attitude" towards them, we take on a "quasi-moral" responsibility. 56 Apparently this 
responsibility arises from our recognition (through the encounter) that animals need 
our protection. It is not a symmetrical relationship since the same attitude cannot be 
required of the animal, but is nevertheless an appeal to inter- subjectivity - the 
touchstone of Habermas's moral theory. 
Clearly, this is a radical extension of the original discourse ethical theory 
and requires much further develoPment to reconcile it with the basic idea of the 
essential presuppositions of rational discourse as the basis for moral theory. I think 
that accepting this early development of the theory to include others may demand 
that a rather flexible attitude be taken towards the foundational aspects of 
communicative reason. If we are to accept that a moral position is taken on the 
basis of the kinds of basic communication we have with animals then what role is 
there after all for the hitherto essential premises of rational discourse necessary for 
validity? Indeed, what about the conditions of equality, sincerity, truthfulness, and 
shared linguistic meanings, which Habermas has hitherto insisted upon as being 
necessarily presupposed by all participants? Are these to be replaced with different 
presuppositions where the relationship is non- symmetrical, and does this imply that 
there may be several different sets of presuppositions to cater for the various 
degrees of communicative competence? In order to make use of it we need to know 
more about what Habermas means by terms such as 'extra-linguistic encounter' and 
what the precise difference is between this and an encounter which does not found a 
56 Ibid, p. I 10 
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basis for an inter-subjective moral position. Habermas is wise to describe these 
remarks on animal welfare as 'quasi' moral since, on his own definition, a moral 
position can only be adopted by accepting what he argues are the unavoidably and 
universally presupposed conditions of communication. 57 If nothing else, 
Habermas's concern with a question that cannot be moral in that sense is refreshing 
and suggests that his interest in normativity is more complex than the 
harmonisation of life-world and the universal in standardised language. Habermas 
seems to be indicating that there are legitimate questions of normativity that are 
beyond universal morality, and that these can only be addressed through the more 
modest strategies of ethics. This suggests that in cases such as Re A, whilst we 
cannot be 'moral' we still have a duty to be 'ethical'. The speeches of the three 
judges of the Court of Appeal can be read in this light: as recognising that Mary 
may be making a claim and yet being unable to respond to or protect it in a 
practical sense. 
We must remember that the principle of discourse ethics is that a moral 
position is achieved by transcending one's particular context. Through shared 
recourse to a communicative mediator, we recognise the other whom we encounter 
as having a claim that we should take seriously. It is the possibility of 
communication itself, then, which provides the stepping stone between Self and 
Other, between local and universal, between subjective and objective. Hence it is 
important that we understand exactly how extra-linguistic communication serves to 
found a 'quasi' moral position, and what place such a position has with regard to an 
'ethical' one and a 'moral' one. The information that Habermas gives us does not 
allow us to confidently make such assessments. This shift towards the 'extra- 
57 See Chapter One, s. 2.4., supra. 
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linguistic' in Habermas's work is interesting because it hints that Habermas might 
accept that justice and the moral viewpoint cannot be entirely rationalised in terms 
of universal communicative inter-action. Unlike Rawls's paternalism, these remarks 
of Habermas show a certain willingness to respond to the limitations of his larger 
rationalistic theory. Universal conceptions of equality and freedom can be 
liberating and emancipating, and liberal theorists strive to show how and why this is 
so. However, as I have sought to argue here, this is not necessarily the case. 
3. The Responsible Individual: Discourses of Justification in Punishment 
Judgments 
As seen in Chapter Two, the liberal principled justification of punishment is 
retrospective and retributivist: does the offender deserve to be punished and if so, 
how harshly? From this perspective, Hindley and Re Thompson and Another 
respectively represent opposite ends of the tariff spectrum. At one end there is the 
criminal whose responsibility for her crime is so fully accepted that the House of 
Lords feels justified in upholding a whole life tariff. At the other end are two 
criminals who are felt to have lacked the necessary level of moral maturity to be 
held fully responsible for their crime. In both cases, the prisoners claimed that they 
were not fully responsible for their crime, but only in Thompson and Venables' 
case was this claim taken seriously. Why should this be? The apparently obvious 
answer (which this chapter rejects) is that the principle of retributivism can apply to 
Hindley and not to Thompson and Venables because, as children in 1993, the latter 
can be regarded as having lacked the requisite responsibility. As an adult in 1966, 
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Hindley is held to have been fully responsible for her crime. In liberal theoretical 
terms we would therefore describe her as being held to account as a fully rational 
agent: capable of considering the interests of others and acting upon universal 
maxims. In Hegel's terms her harsh punishment reunites Hindley with Reason and 
gives to her what the rational part of her always wanted. From this perspective, 
justice is done to and for Myra Hindley, but on account of their young age in 1993, 
Thompson and Venables' case cannot be decided as a matter of retributivist justice. 
Zimring suggests that there are good reasons for taking such a view, contending 
that children are "accident-prone by design" and as such are properly treated as less 
culpable. 58 Although a child of ten years can be held to account for criminal acts, 
the idea that there is a principled distinction to be made between adult and child 
murderers finds plenty of legal authority. For example, in considering reasons for 
their release, Lord Woolf described Thompson and Venables being only ten years 
old in 1993 as an "overriding mitigating factor". 59 On the other hand, according to 
the House of Lords the twenty-two year old Myra Hindley "knew what she was 
doing". Her role in the murders and tortures was "pivotal" and without her 
involvement two of the victims "would still be alive today". 60 In accordance with 
retributivism's retrospective view, these comments all refer to the degree of 
responsibility and moral development at the time the crimes were committed. It 
might appear that the cases can be explained purely in a retrospective manner, and a 
doctrinal retributivist critique would seek to show this. On this view, such matters 
58 Zimring, F. E. 'Penal Proportionality for the Young Offender: Notes on Immaturity, Capacity and 
Diminished Responsibility' in Grisso, T. and Schwartz, R. G. Youth on Trial: A Developmental 
Perspective on Juvenile Justice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000) pp. 271-89 p. 283 
59 Re Thompson and Another (Tariff Recommendations) [2001] 1 All ER737, p. 740 
60Rv. Secretaty of State For the Home Department, exparteHindley [200012 All ER385, p. 392 
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as reform of the criminal whilst in prison do not constitute punishment itself or its 
justification but are simply its side-effects. 61 Indeed in Hindley's case, 
considerations of refonn were given very little attention by either Court of Appeal 
or House of Lords in deciding upon the reasonableness of the whole life tariff and 
this bolsters the idea that, unlike Thompson and Venables, her tariff is determined 
retributively. 
The case law also suggests that the correct considerations for measuring the 
requirements of retribution are different as between adults and children. In Hindley, 
the House of Lords uncritically and unanimously accepted that the requirements of 
retribution were not fulfilled prior to Myra Hindley's death. There is no question 
raised as to whether the Home Secretary was influenced by inappropriate factors. In 
ex parte Thompson on the other hand, the fact that the Home Secretary's tariff 
decision had been influenced by various petitions demanding that life sentence be 
imposed upon the juvenile criminals 62 was considered by the majority of the House 
of Lords (and also the Court of Appeal) to be inappropriate. 63 It is also possible to 
find legal authority for a distinction in the general purpose of punishing adults and 
children. For instance, the ruling by the House of Lords in Hindley that 'life 
imprisonment' can equate to a prisoner's whole life implies that sentencing under 
the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965 is Primarily punitive, rather than 
rehabilitative. In contrast to this, the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 states 
61 Mabbot, J. D. 'Punishment' in Acton, H. B. The Philosophy of Punishment: A Collection ofPapers 
(London: Macmillan, 1969) p. 40 
62 Including 2 1,000 coupons received by The Sun newspaper from its readers demanding that "Bulger 
killers must rot in jail" 
63 R v. Secretary of State For the Home Department, ex parte Thompson [ 1998] AC 407 per Lord 
Steyn, p. 525-6 
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that a person sentenced under this legislation 64 shall not be given life imprisonment 
or the death penalty 65 but instead shall be sentenced to remain in jail 'at her 
Majesty's pleasure'. 66 The majority of the House of Lords in ex parte Thompson 
considered that this distinction was an implied recognition of the special status of 
children as morally developing beings. Lord Browne- Wilkinson stated that Home 
Office policy towards a child murderer's tariff should take into account the fact that 
children have an ability to mature and develop with a rapidity and 
comprehensiveness that is very unlikely in an adult. 67 
The key to locating these legal observations within liberal moral theory is 
that it all rests upon an assumption that children are to be regarded as less 
responsible and therefore less culpable than adults. However, to attempt to explain 
the differential treatment of the two cases purely retrospectively is overly simplistic 
in my view. The House of Lords and Court of Appeal in ex parte Thompson both 
unanimously agreed that the sentencing under the 1933 Act combines elements of 
both punishment and welfare, retaining an element of "tension'568 as to the precise 
grounds for upholding or amending a tariff. On the issue of the correct method of 
measuring the requirements of retribution, Lord Steyn draws a distinction between 
"informed public interest" which can be taken into consideration by a Home 
Secretary and "public clamour" which cannot. 69 However, no such scrutiny was 
64 Applies to persons between the ages of ten and seventeen who are convicted of murder, per s 16. 
65 
s. 53(l) 
66 McDiarmid, C. 'Children Who Murder: What is Her Majesty's PleasureT (2000) Crim LR pp. 547- 
563 
67 ex parte Thompson, supra, n. 63, p. 500 
68 McDiarmid (2000) supra, n. 66, p. 555 
69 ex parte Thompson, supra, n. 63, per Lord Steyn, p. 525 
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made regarding the basis for the Home Secretary's decision as to Myra Hindley. 
Why not? The distinction that Lord Steyn draws would be understandable from a 
principled perspective if it were made on the basis of the moral difference between 
adults and children. But his remarks in Thompson and Venables' case are actually 
based on the broader foundation of the constitutional separation of powers - that in 
setting tariffs the Home Secretary must act as a judge and not as a politician. The 
implication seems to be that it is fine for the Home Secretary to act as a politician in 
Hindley's case. But the failure to support this distinction with reference to the types 
of offender suggests a more problematic relationship between an offender's age and 
the appropriate tariff than simply that she was a twenty-two year old woman rather 
than a ten year-old boy when she committed her crimes. 
On a different point, Lord Lloyd's dissenting judgment in ex parte 
Thompson rejects the ma ority view that legislation provides a distinction between i 
adult and child murderers. Lord Lloyd finds that s 43 (1) and (3) of the Criminal 
Justice Act 1991 applies the same conditions of release (detailed in s 33 and 35(l)) 
to both types of murderers. Thus, both adults and children forfeit their liberty for 
the rest of their lives insofar as a Home Secretary can recall both to prison once 
released . 
70 For Lord Lloyd, the use of the phrase 'at Her Majesty's Pleasure' in the 
Children and Young Persons Act 1933 does not signify a meaningful, principled 
distinction between adults and children, but merely an "unfortunate 
archai [SM]95.71 What is interesting here is that, like the majority of the House of 
Lords and Court of Appeal, Lord Lloyd could have interpreted the language of the 
1933 Act in accordance with the principle that a moral distinction should be made 
70 Ibid, per Lord Lloyd, p. 511 
71 bid, p. 514 
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between children and adults. That he chose not to do so indicates that this 
distinction is perhaps not so obvious and that there is indeed a degree of tension on 
this issue. In what seems to be at least in part a vindication of Lord Lloyd's 
position, the procedure for setting the minimum term of child offenders has recently 
been brought into line with the rules for adults sentenced to a discretionary and 
automatic life sentence by s 60 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 
and s 28(5) of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000.72 
What I hope these comments are drawing attention to is the inadequacy of a 
retrospective, retributivist explanation of tariff policy. This chapter will now 
develop the argument by identifying the contingency at the heart of the retributivist 
principle. The argument made here is that, as a moral narrative, the cases of 
Hindley and Re Thompson and Another display the importance of consequentialist 
reasons in supplementing (and thereby making meaningful) a judgment of 
retributivist principle. The judgments in Hindley and Re Thompson and Another 
read together suggest that given a different set of surrounding circumstances in the 
year 2000, the ages of criminals at the time at which they committed their crimes 
would have been regarded very differently. Like other fables in which moral 
lessons are learned or scores justly settled, the coherence of the narrative of 
criminal responsibility derives from its power to appeal to a certain moral sense. 
This means that from a purely retributive perspective the narrative is actually 
incoherent, apparently confusing retrospective with prospective judgments. But this 
is precisely the incoherence that is necessary for judgments of 'principle' to be 
made with any persuasive effect. Even if one were to adopt the quasi-religious 
liberal confidence (such as Kant's) in the power of deontological principle to stand 
72 Practice Direction (Criminal: Consolidated) [2002] 3 All ER 904, para 49.2 1. 
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alone, the current legal position in which children from the age of ten are accredited 
with an ill-defined level of moral autonomy presents us with the problem of 
deciding whether in fact we can find full culpability in a particular offender. In 
deciding this point, one's perspective on the cases necessarily ceases to be purely 
retrospective. 
In order to be satisfied that upholding the whole life tariff in Hindley's case 
is justified in principle, it is necessary to examine the reasons why the judges felt 
that she should be held to carry so high a responsibility as compared to Thompson 
and Venables. To the argument that Hindley's sentence is disproportionate given 
her age and influence by Brady in 1966, Lord Steyn replied that, to the contrary, the 
crimes committed by her and Brady were "uniquely evilg173 even compared to other 
murders. A crime that is not merely evil but uniquely so implies an exceptionally 
high degree of malice and wickedness on the part of the criminal herself, but in 
what sense can Hindley or her crime be described in these terms? Would such a 
description be appropriate no matter what the circumstances at the time of her 
possible release? It is unfortunate that Lord Steyn does not explain what he means 
by his characterisation of Hindley, although upon a little reflection this is clearly no 
mystery. He would find it difficult to do so without compromising his 'principled' 
position, because even a summary examination of other whole lifers reveals that the 
evilness of Hindley's crime is not, in fact, unique. There are many examples of 
gross and shocking cruelty amongst those serving life sentences for murder, against 
whom Hindley looks decidedly ordinary. The crimes with which she was eventually 
7' Hindley, supra, n. 60, per Lord Steyn, p. 392 
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found to have been involved 74 are not incomparable to other cases. Take for 
instance Dennis Nilsen, who was jailed in 1983 for six murders and two attempted 
murders, having killed and dismembered 15 gay men; or Colin Ireland who tortured 
and murdered five gay men in 1993 after making a new year's resolution to become 
a serial killer. Consider Victor Castigador, who in 1985 doused three bank workers 
with white spirit, locked them in a cage and threw in lit matches. 75 Apparently, 
Hindley's case is unique even compared to such murderers. But on what basis? 
That she is a woman who killed children? 76 That her crime happened to attract a 
more lasting anger and revulsion than these others listed? 77 These are possible 
explanations for the rhetorical turn and for the judgment as a whole. However, Lord 
Steyn allows his assertion that Myra Hindley is a unique case, to remain enigmatic. 
I do not wish to add my own speculation to the critical literature on these 
points specifically. However, there is one very major difference between Hindley 
on the one hand, and Thompson and Venables on the other, which illustrates the 
importance of consequentialism in decisions of retibutivist principle. The difference 
is that, unlike Thompson and Venables, there are no compelling reasons why 
74 Five murders, two for which Hindely was convicted in 1966, and the others she confessed to being 
involved with in later years (see Chapter Three, s. 2. I., supra). 
75 Upton, J. 'The prisoners who will never be released' The Guardian, January 312001, 
http: Hsociety. guardian. co. uk/crimeandpunishment/story/0,815 0,43 143 6,00. html 
76 For discussion on characterisations of female offenders, see Heidensohn, F. 'Women and Crime: 
Questions for Criminology' in Carlen, P. and Worrall, A. (ed. ) Gender, Crime andJustice (Milton 
Keynes and Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1987) pp. 16-27. For commentary on the differential 
treatment of men and women in the context of infanticide, see Wilczynski, A. 'Mad or Bad? Child- 
killers, Gender and the Courts' (1997) 37 (3) British Journal of Criminology pp. 419-436 
77 Shute, S. 'The Place of Public Opinion in Sentencing Law' (1998) Crim LR 465-77 
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Hindley's release would serve any practical purpose as regards living a useful, 
reformed life. Whether a shameful act can be construed as effectively bringing an 
end to the offender's freedom or serving as useful moral lesson for future 
contemplation is determined by such factors. Consider, for example the parable of 
the Prodigal Son. 78 This New Testament story demonstrates the moral force of the 
rhetoric of youth, which it shares with the narrative qualities of Hindley and Re 
Thompson and Another. The parable concerns two sons who make very different 
life choices. The older brother lives virtuously and works diligently for his father 
whilst the younger goes off to spend all of his inheritance on extravagant 
debauchery. When the young son has wasted all his money and is forced to return 
home destitute and utterly ashamed, the story delivers its moral message through 
the contrasting attitudes of the father and of the older son. "'Hurry! ' called out his 
father to the servants, 'fetch the best clothes and put them on him! Put a ring on his 
finger and shoes on his feet, and get that fatted calf and kill it, and we will have a 
feast and a celebration! "'. 79 The older son, naturally enough, feels aggrieved. In 
what can only be understood as an appeal to retributive justice, he furiously says to 
his father: 
"Look, how many years have I slaved for you and never 
disobeyed a single order of yours, and yet you have never given 
me so much as a young goat so that I could give my friends a 
" Luke 15: 11-31 
" Ibid, 15: 22-3 
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dinner. But when this son of yours arrives, who has spent all 
your money on prostitutes, for him you kill the fatted calf" 5ý80 
Aside from the moral messages that sincere repentance and forgiveness are 
more important than righteousness and punishment, what is significant here is the 
rhetorical force of the identities of the protagonists with respect to the repentance. 
Why is it the younger rather than the older son that experiences this dramatic 
change of heart? If the story is to succeed as a moral lesson it is important that its 
readers are not appalled at the father's decision. Surely the older son's indignation 
is understandable: a wrong has been committed and now stands in need of 
correction. The aggrieved older son might also wonder what reason there might 
now be to respect authority and obey the law when those that do not are simply 
forgiven? As the communicative retibutivists claim, it is right in itself to respond 
with condemnation and sanction to those to break the law, which the offender must 
be brought to accept. Punishment as retribution can only be justifiably avoided if, 
as argued above, the offender is retrospectively considered not to have been 
responsible for their crime. Surely if, as appears to be the case, the younger son is a 
responsible agent he should be treated as such by being held to account. However, 
the determination of such responsibility is not a purely retrospective matter: it 
necessarily involves the consideration of what use an offender could make of future 
freedom. Therefore, the reason why we can understand the father's decision to set 
aside his older son's indignation is the fact that the prodigal son has repented his 
wicked ways with plenty of time to live a useful, reformed life. It is more difficult 
to sympathise with one whose repentance or claim not to have been fully 
Ibid., 15: -')'0 
150 
Chapter 4 
responsible for a past shame, is made when the end is imminent. It is true that this 
is not the point of the story. The Prodigal Son teaches us that, as a matter of 
principle it is better to forgive than to punish the truly repentant. But the principle is 
not in fact pure: within it lurks an unprincipled calculation of consequences, 
represented by the boy's youth. A morally judging audience needs to be provided 
with a good reason to take repentance seriously. In the rhetoric of moral fable, 
4youth' is a good reason and 'old age' is not. Consider old Fagin's trial in Dickens's 
Oliver Twist: 
"... He was asked if he had anything to say why sentence of 
death should not be passed on him. ... He only muttered that he 
was an old man - an old man - an old man - and so, dropping 
into a whisper, was silent again. 9381 
Fagin knows that his plea is a feeble one, and predictably it fails to save him from 
the gallows. Retributivists who have turned their attention to the question of 
juvenile responsibility accept that youth is an important factor in determining the 
appropriate punishment, but not necessarily because the offender was in fact too r 
young to be held responsible for his act. Andrew von Hirsch argues that we feel 
more tolerant towards juveniles who offend because we accept that moral 
responsibility is learned from experience: by 'testing the limits' and making 
mistakes. 82 Juveniles are treated differently to adults, not because we believe them 
81 Dickens, C. Oliver Twist (London: Penguin World Classics, 1982) p. 340 
82 Hirsch, A von. 'Proportionate Sentences for Juveniles: How Different Than for Adults? ' (2001) 3 
(2) P&S pp. 221-236, p. 225 
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to lack responsibility for their actions, but because we wish to encourage rather than 
83 
stunt their growth as autonomous beings. The progress that a particular offender 
has made towards attaining this ideal is less significant than the possibility of 
demonstrating a practical use for it upon release. 
Consider the rhetoric of the judgments in Hindley and Re Thompson and 
Another in the light of these narratives. The facts of Hindley's case do not set her 
apart as unique amongst murderers. Rather, the fact that Lord Steyn's judgment acts 
as a test case for the other 'whole lifers', some of whom are mentioned above, 
indicates that the phrase 'uniquely evil' signifies similarity of type between Hindley 
and these others, as prisoners whose release, like Fagin's, would serve no practical 
purpose. This distinguishes all of these from those such as Thompson and 
Venables, for whom release would be practically useful. There are good reasons for 
wanting to keep certain 'whole lifers' in jail as long as possible, not only because of 
requirements of retribution, but also because of considerations of deterrence, lack 
of potential for future reform and protection of the innocent. Therefore we begin to 
recognise Lord Steyn's rhetoric, not as a retributive justification based on Hindley's 
own responsibility at the age of twenty-two, but as signifying a distinction from 
cases where release would bring practical benefits. As seen above, Lord Woolf is 
explicit that the young age of the boys in 1993 is a crucial factor in justifying their 
release. Following this logic, the importance attached by Lord Woolf to the boys' 
age in 1993 refers to a combination of conditions in which there are good reasons to 
retrospectively assume that they were not fully responsible for their crime. The 
possible counter-factuality of retributivism's compromise with consequentialism in 
judicial moral narrative is identified as an ethical necessity by Weijers, who 
83 Ibid, p. 232 
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contends conversely that, even though juveniles are probably not entirely 
responsible for their acts they ought to be treated as if they are, in order to help 
them to develop their sense of responsibility. 84 
If this analysis is correct, it would seem that the 'retributive' aspect of 
punishment is in many ways secondary to the practical aim that a criminal should, 
if possible, be eventually reintegrated with his community. The justification of 
Hindley's whole life tariff lies in the perceived hopelessness of any such 
reintegration, whilst Thompson and Venables' release is justified because this does 
seem possible, albeit with the help of protected identities. Of course, we should be 
wary of reading an equivalent narrative into legal judgment and biblical parable, 
being as they are two distinct discourses. It could be argued, for instance, that the 
parable has little to do with punishment as understand here: the shameful behaviour 
of the prodigal son is after all only a moral rather than a criminal wrong. Therefore, 
unlike our legal examples, there is no public significance in the boy's actions and 
thus no wrong can be committed in failing to punish him. However, there are 
comparisons to be drawn between the legal judgments and the biblical parable in 
terms of the considerations brought to the task of interpreting responsibility 
retrospectively. The returning son has nothing to prove except his sincere 
repentance in order for his father to construe his hitherto ignoble life as one worth 
redeeming. Similarly, Thompson and Venables have nothing further to prove to 
convince Lord Woolf that they should be regarded as too young in 1993 to be 
considered sufficiently responsible for their crime. It is the boys' youthfulness in 
2001 that allows Lord Woolf to regard their disgrace as a moral lesson, from which 
84 Weijers in Weijers, 1. and Duff, R. A. (ed. ), Punishing Juveniles. - Principle and Critique (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2002) p. 135-6 
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they have perhaps drawn in order to reform. Lord Woolf states that transferring 
Thompson and Venables to an adult prison would expose them to prison's 
"corrosive atmosphere" which "would be likely to undo much of the good work 
5 85 [reform] to which I have referred'. Given these dangers Lord Woolf is satisfied 
that "further detention would not serve any purpose". 86 Like the forgiving father 
keen not to waste what is left of a young man's life, Lord Woolf decides that the 
boys' detention has already served its purpose - that of preparing them for a law- 
abiding life outside of custody - and so construes them as being not fully 
responsible for their crime. In this light, other 'facts' take on a moral significance. 
The depths to which the errant son falls to before his return - having fallen into 
poverty he becomes so hungry that he even covets the food he is hired to give to 
pigs - can be retrospectively construed as being part of the punishment, reducing 
the necessity for further sanction. In Re Thompson and Another Lord Woolf refers 
to the guilt and shame clearly felt by the offenders as if it is itself part of their 
punishment. Similarly, on his return the prodigal son's genuine shame and 
repentance are made very clear to the father and even clearer to the reader. 87 On 
Duff s communicative perspective, in which proportionality of punishment is 
decided by considering the necessary amount for effectively bringing the offender 
to understand and repent his crime, 88 it can be argued that these young offenders 
have already been punished. Since this punishment has already achieved its aim, 
further hard treatment at the hands of the law/father would only have a deterrent 
85 Re Thompson andAnother, supra, n. 59, p. 741 
86 Ibid. 
87 The same repentant passage appears twice in the space of three verses ( 18-2 1 ). 
88 Duff, R. A. 'Punishment, Communication and Community' in Matravers, M. Punishment and 
Political Theory (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 1999) pp. 48-68, p. 52 
154 
Chapter 
effect and thus be regarded as a consequentialist supplement to thiS. 89 However, the 
older son's fury at his father's apparently easy forgiveness is as understandable on a 
principled perspective as the tabloids' own disgust at Lord Woolf s apparently soft 
approach. Theories of communicative retributivism conceive punishment as a 
means through which the community can publicly express their condemnation and 
give reasons for a particular sentence, but it is fanciful to suppose that the 
bloodthirsty tabloid press would be moved by any reasons that are delivered from a 
welfarist or rehabilitative perspective. Regarded retrospectively, the prodigal son's 
knowingly reprehensible behaviour has brought shame on the family and he thus 
deserves to be treated accordingly. In the interests of maintaining the vital 
patriarchal order and restoring the rule of reason, his actions bring punishment as a 
corollary. The older brother gives all the right reasons (from a retributive 
perspective) as to why punishment of his brother is deserved. It is interesting that in 
responding to this the father gives no reasons of his own except that "this brother of 
yours was dead and is alive again". 90 But the father's failure to give sound 
retrospective reasons for his forgiveness does not undermine the justifiability of his 
decision any more than Lord Steyn's failure to explain his 'uniquely evil' remark. 
The father's heart is set because he knows his son can still make a useful 
contribution. Lord Steyn feels similarly disinclined to elaborate on his reasons: he 
knows that Myra Hindley's life is all but finished. In both instances the crucial 
consideration is prospective rather than retrospective. 
89Hirsch, A. von. 'Punishment, Penance and the State: A Reply to Duff in Matravers, Ibid, pp. 69- 
82, p. 70 
90 Luke 15: 3 1 
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s in the parable, so in the courts, retributivist principle is constructed in the 
light of unprincipled, consequentialist factors, which provide reason for hope and 
forgiveness. In being spared the potentially destructive experience of adult prison, 
added to the granting of anonymity in the High Court, the fatted calf is surely killed 
for Thompson and Venables. In Hindley's case there is nothing to be gained from 
treating her own disgrace as an experience from which to draw a moral lesson. 
There is no possibility of a joyftil homecoming in her case. Deeming that Hindley 
was in fact fully responsible for her crimes allows the question of her reform to be 
effectively ignored despite her submissions. Lord Steyn referred to it only in the 
future tense: as something that the Home Secretary would have to consider from 
time to time. This is not to say that Hindley had not in fact undergone reform whilst 
in jail. Crowther points to the fact of her becoming a Christian, showing remorse 
and behaving as a model prisoner is jail. 91 However, care must be taken in adopting 
a critical attitude towards this dismissal of her progress towards reform. John Upton 
argues that the whole life tariff represents a "wilful refusal to look at the real person 
and willingness instead to scream at the hideous shadow that he casts on the wall 
behind him. , 92 Although critical of the whole life tariff on 'principle', Upton's 
comments actually support the idea that Hindley is a decision based on principle in 
the retributivist sense. It is precisely the 'hideous shadow' that that retributivism 
looks to in its retrospective view of criminal responsibility. Although the 'hideous 
shadow' of Myra Hindley the sadistic child-murderer looms large over the 
judgment of the House of Lords, it may not have done so if Hindley were still a 
young woman. Admittedly this does not accommodate what Upton might consider 
Crowther, E. 'A Matter For Consideration' (1998) 162 (39) JP 770-771 
92 Upton, supra, n-75 
156 
Chapter 4 
to be the 'real' Myra Hindley in 2000, but given her iconic, almost mythic image in 
the popular imagination, it would be naYve to suppose that such a pre-political 
concept could have much significance. 
If the identification of the 'responsible' criminal relies upon considerations 
external to those regarding moral capacity at the time of the crime, then where does 
this leave the idea of retributivism and its liberal individualistic foundation? The 
language of these judgments shows that it is wrong to regard the deontological and 
consequentialist discourses of justification as necessarily antagonistic. Likewise, 
the ground conceded by Rawls, Hart and Mabbot does not suggest that either 
discourse is more correct than the other. Rather, the justification of punishment is a 
more complex operation than either perspective can adequately accommodate on its 
own. The implication of this is that determining whether Thompson and Venables' 
release or Hindley's whole life tariff can be justified on principle is not a purely 
principled matter. If the argument that this chapter has tried to make is sound, then 
the choice as to which kind of reasoning to explicitly base a judgment upon is not 
necessarily indicative of the moral foundation of that judgment. To conclude on the 
basis of the differences in explicit reasoning in the courts that the difference 
between Hindley and Re Thomspon and Another is that the former is a case of 
retributivist principle and the latter is not, misunderstands the process of 
(principled' reasoning. In making decisions as to whom we regard as a responsible 
individual at the time that a crime was committed, we must incorporate external, 
non-moral factors. Where the responsibility of a criminal for his or her crime is in 
issue, there must be some prospective motivation for a judge to take seriously a 
claim that she was not. 
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4. Conclusion 
The liberal approaches to theorising a universally inclusive system of justice aims 
to derive justification for its principles on the basis of mutual regard, respect and 
understanding. Since these basic premises involve notions of personhood, liberal 
universality does find a limit in situations in which personhood is called into 
question. Thus in Re A we see how, in the interpretation of the right to life in cases 
involving a choice of lives, judges must decide who makes the greater appeal to 
justice. This interpretation requires the support of considerations of non-principled 
utility: reasoning traditionally regarded as antithetical to the deontological 
perspective. Mary's death is justified by a combination of the identification of her 
as a threat, and the practical difference between her and Jodie in terms of life 
chances. Rawls assumes that we agree that being reasonable entails a shared 
specific understanding of the essential notions of freedom and equality; that an 
overlapping consensus on a conception of justice can be established through inter- 
action on this level of reasonableness. But these assumptions do not and cannot 
ensure that everyone affected by notions of justice can participate in their 
construction. Whether this is a weakness that derives from the failure of liberalism 
to realise its own goals of universalism, or whether language is itself inadequate in 
providing the tools for conceiving a truly universal justice is a very deep and 
complex one that I will not attempt to answer here. Perhaps what our discussion is 
leading towards is the unearthing of a different way of talking about law and 
justice, and about the perceived gap between the universality of justice and the 
limitedness of law. The analysis so far suggests that liberal principle is engaged in a 
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constant negotiation and compromise with unprincipled consequential ism. 9' If it 
were necessary to think of liberal principle as being pure then one would be forced 
to conclude, falsely, that a judgment based on this mix of right to life and quality of 
life simply departs from principled parameters. My argument is not that judges are 
avoiding the principles, but that their mobilisation in law relies on reasoning 
traditionally regarded as antithetical to deontology. Criteria such as a subject's 
future prospects in interpreting the right to life or the retributive requirements of a 
prison tariff or minimum term are not criteria proper to liberal principle, and yet 
these are congealed together in judicial rhetoric. But now the question is this: once 
we move from liberal principles to calculations of benefit, are we still talking about 
justice at all? If we continue to dogmatically define justice in the liberal purely 
deontological sense then the answer must be in the negative. However, our analysis 
suggests that a decision as to a matter of principle is a negotiation between the 
deontological rights and contingent, consequential ist factors. 
The effect of this negotiation is that it is possible for certain entities to be 
excluded from liberalism's universality. Interpreted as falling short of the liberal 
idea of the reasonable, rational and responsible individual, Mary and Thompson 
and Venables are entities that occupy this moral no-man's land outside of 
liberalism's reach. If an injustice has been done to Mary in Re A, it is not an 
injustice that, from a liberal perspective, can be meaningfully spoken of, since 
justice is defined in terms of membership (or in Mary's case, non-membership) of 
93 See Cover, R. M. Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process (New Haven, Conn. and 
London: Yale University Press, 1975) where the author argues that the progress of the gradual 
tendency towards judicial interpretation in U. S. state courts that state declarations of rights effectively 
abolish slavery depended upon local practises as much as a principled factors. 
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the universal moral community. 94 The post-metaphysical writings of Rawls and 
Habermas leave intact metaphysical ideas of the person, very much in alignment 
with the Kantian end in itself Rather than leaving metaphysics behind, they have 
merely turned it to a more subtle use. Just as, for Kant, a morality that does not find 
its ultimate foundation in the categorical imperative is not morality at all, so for 
Rawls and Habermas, a conception of 'justice' is not justice at all if not founded on 
their respective a priori, non-negotiable first principles. There are alternative ways 
to articulate and manipulate metaphysical ideas, and it is to a reading of one such 
alternative - deconstruction - that I turn in the next chapter. 
94 See Fox, M. A. 'The Moral Community' in LaFollette, H. Ethics in Practice. - An Anthology (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1999) pp. 127 - 138, for whom moral status is defined by "mutual likeness" in terms of 
"certain salient characteristics" (p. 128) 
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Chapter 5 
Deconstruction and Legal Judgment 
1. Introduction 
Having attempted in the previous chapter to demonstrate the limitations of 
liberal principle within legal judgment, this chapter now locates these 
limitations in a wider theory of language. The sections below first rehearse the 
theoretical strategies of deconstruction as discussed by Derrida and outline some 
of the key markers of its uneasy relationship with philosophy and critical theory, 
and then attempt to apply them in the context of our specific legal case-studies. 
This chapter argues that the difficulty of conceptually separating pure principle 
from unprincipled consequentialism is indicative of a more general 
undecidability in language. It is within this act of reconstructing matters of 
principle in difficult legal contexts that the limits of principle are exposed. The 
liberal principled approach strives to stand alone as a discourse of justification, 
but it fails to do so because of the fundamental impurity of its foundational 
concepts. Our interest in Derrida and deconstruction lies in the problem of 
access to the pure, foundational principles which are supposed to provide the 
ultimate justification for our judgments. A deconstruction of legal judgment 
characterises the possibility of knowing the 'true' and 'original' nature of liberal 
principles, such as that of the responsible individual as closed off, forcing 
judicial interpretation to rely upon rhetorical and metaphorical manoeuvres. 
Being inaccessible in themselves, such liberal ideas are as myths of origin, and 
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the liberal attempts to define it, a vain nostalgia for the loss of a presence that 
was never there in the first place. This is why, from a deconstiructive 
perspective, the meaning of notions that depend upon the interpretation of this 
origin, such as the 'right to life', are elusive. Given the impossibility of knowing 
exactly how the pure deontology of liberalism's foundational principles are to 
apply in the instance of judgment, legal interpretation always requires the 
assistance of unpredictable, contingent factors. This chapter is an attempt to 
show how the legal interpretation of liberal principles in legal judgment as a 
sub-species of western thought might represent, as Derrida describes it, the vain 
search for the origin for true representation of justice, and the nature of this 
etemal loss. ' 
2. Opening Remarks on Deconstruction 
A liberal response to deconstruction would contend that it misses the mark 
because judgment in cases such as these does not pretend to arise purely out of 
considerations of principle; that to highlight the failure of principle to act in a 
self-sufficient manner is to criticise it for something that it never set out to 
achieve anyway. I am shooting at a target that is not there. It is no remarkable 
insight to suggest that there is more than the principles at work in the 
judgments. Philosophers are not unaware of the difficulties of meaning; to a 
1 We will use the expression 'western thought' here, as does Derrida, though unlike Derrida 
without capital letters. Although this thesis does not seek to explain Derrida's use of the 
expression in its capitalised form, we shall consider criticisms of what might amount to 
essentialising tendencies in Derrida's work. 
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large extent the history of Anglo-American analytic philosophy is a history of 
attempts to overcome the problems of uncertainty of meaning. The canonical 
23456 
works of say, Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein , Ayer and Austin all attempt the 
task that Derrida regards as impossible: how to distinguish that which is certain 
and reliable from that which is not, and specifically how can meaningful, 
reliable representation be possible? Similarly, the work of Rawls and Habermas 
can be seen as attempts to conceive the conditions for describing with certainty 
the conditions for meaningful discourse on justice. 
The thrust of deconstruction is that meaning depends upon context, itself 
an ever-changing set of conditions, and so all words and phrases are cut off 
from a stable centre or guarantor of meaning. Since there is no logical end to the 
number of different types of context that words or concepts could appear in, 
there is no logical end to meaning itself All meaning is hence 'textual' 
inasmuch as we are required to treat any exception as a literary text: interpreting 
it in the light of the context in which we find it. Interpretation will involve an 
infinite range of possible influences, all of which are themselves contextual. 
Frege, G. Logical Investigations, Geach, P. T. (ed. ), Geach, P. T. and Stoothoff , R. H. (trans. ) 
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977) 
3 Russell, B. An Enquiry into Meaning and Truth (London: Penguin, 1962); see also Russell, 
B. Foundations of Logic with assistance of Albert C. Lewis (London: Routledge, 1994) 
' Wittgenstein, L. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, (London: Routledge, 2000) 
5 Ayer, A. J. Language, Truth and Logic (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990) 
6 Austin, J. L. How to Do Things With Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975) 
163 
Chapter 5 
Since, as there is always the possibility of interpreting that context differently, 
'true' meaning is lost within context and inteipretation. 7 
Derrida's emphasis upon the impossibility of conquering context 
represents a rejection of the careful patience of analytic philosophers in 
identifying the conditions for certainty. From an analytical philosophical 
perspective, one might regard Derrida's remarks on truth and context as a theory 
of despair. However, it would be wrong to imagine that Derrida regards any 
discourse on meaning and certainty as redundant. As is explored in more detail 
in the next chapter, there is no uncontroversial way of surnmarising Derrida or 
cleconstruction. The broad range, style and purpose of writings by Derrida and 
others indicate that it is far from certain whether deconstruction offers an 
original critique of philosophy, a non-original philosophical critical method, a 
kind of pragmatism, moral relativism, negative dialectic, or nothing 
8 
philosophical at all. All I can do here is explore what I understand to be 
deconstruction's insistence that meaning does not have a polar opposite in 
meaninglessness. In deconstruction, both success and failure of meaning are the 
effects of the 'iterability' of words: that they are repeatable in, and affected by, 
contexts that cannot be pre-determined. For the analytic philosopher, the inquiry 
as to the meaning of a phrase would involve an identification of the conditions 
in which its meaning could be determined with certainty. A deconstructive 
perspective, however, would seek to show how such conditions, although 
' See Critchley, S. The Ethics of Deconstruction (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 
1992) p. 38-9 
8The bitter dispute over Derrida's legacy, particularly with reference to Rorty and Norris is 
discussed in chapter six, infra. 
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necessary, become overpowered by the infinity of context and consequently the 
possibilities for reinterpretation. Deconstruction involves a number of complex 
theoretical moves that attempt to illustrate how the search for certainty fails and 
true meanings ecome elusive. These are discussed below. 
2.1 The Conceptual Prioritisation of Speech over Writing 
An account of deconstruction might begin with Derrida's conception of western 
though? (i. e. western philosophy, literature, art, history, politics, media etc) and 
its representation of the world. For Derrida, western thought is characterised by 
a nostalgia for lost origins, and thus for lost 'presence'. The idea is that, by its 
nature, an origin is that which is first, unsullied, primary. If one had access to an 
origin, it would contain no secrets because it will not have been subjected to the 
distorting effects of modem culture. Its meaning is present to us. The problem is 
that developments of modem culture have obscured all origins; the world 
around us is known only through cultural signification, which, in western 
thought, stands in for the world itself This obfuscation has lead to a situation of 
absence: True meaning as unknown or unknowable. Therefore the only 
remaining option for authors, artists, historians etc of the west is, in Arthurian 
style, to try to regain its lost origins and thus regain knowledge of true 
meanings by identifying that which is pure, unspoiled, certain, etc. To this 
purpose, the world is conceptually ordered by contrasting, on the one hand, 
notions that offer a chance of regaining of this lost presence against their 
9 Or as Derrida has put it, "Westem Thought", see Derrida, J. Writing and Difference, Bass, A. 
(trans. ) (London: Routledge, 2002a) p. 2 
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opposites, which represent absence, on the other. Derrida describes as 
'metaphysical' any system of thought that is concerned in this fashion with 
presence. 
"The history of metaphysics, like the history of the West, is the 
history of these metaphors and metonymies. Its matrix... is the 
determination of being as presence in all the senses of this 
word. It would be possible to show that all the names related to 
fundamentals, to principles, or to the center have always 
designated the constant of a presence. " 10 
Hence we contrast 'self with 'other': we know (or think we know) our own 
thoughts, feelings and perceptions because they are immediately present to us. It 
is natural and rational to know oneself On the other hand we are physically 
separated from others: since we think of others as having their own mental 
world, we do not have the same privileged knowledge. The thoughts and 
feelings of others are absent from us. The difference between presence-o f- self 
and absence-of-other underpins a mode of thinking which divides the world into 
a set of conceptual binary oppositions which give rise to value judgments. In 
each binary opposition one tenn is always privileged over the other on the basis 
that in one we find present, identifiable meaning, which in the other is absent. 
According to Derrida, such binary logic has pervaded "Western Thought"" 
10 lbid, p. 353 
" Ibid, p. 2; The issue as to whether Derrida over-generalises the objects of his analyses is 
raised in chapter six, infra. 
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since its earliest beginnings. It has produced a discourse of 'natural' hierarchy 
which has given rise to an order of things that appears natural. The dominant 
discourses of philosophy and the arts have contributed to producing a certain 
representation of the world in which familiar characteristics are given priority 
over that which is unfarniliar. Given that 'presence' is attributed to that which is 
known and considered natural and absence to that which is not known and 
considered unnatural, the kinds of 'them and us' judgments become to seem 
pervasive. 
By standards of philosophical theory, even Derrida's supporters find his 
approach of conceiving western thought - especially in Derrida's bold 
capitalisation of the expression - in tenns of binary opposites as rather 
sweeping. Critics such as Eagleton 12 and Ellis' 3 find Derrida's strategy to be 
tantamount to crude strawman-building and an avoidance of real engagement 
with the subtleties of philosophy. Other commentators have been quick to point 
out the political implications of Derrida's view of thought. For these 
commentators, Derrida "decolonises" and "decentralises" 14 imperialist 
tendencies in western thinking. 15 Fitzpatrick, whose work is returned to later, 
" Eagleton, T. The Illusions ofPostmodernism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) 
13 Ellis, J. Against Deconstruction, Princeton N. J. & Guildford: Princeton University Press, 
1989) 
14 Young, R. White Mythologies: Writing History and the West (London and New York, N. Y.: 
Routledge, 1990) p. 18 
15 For instance, Douzinas regards it as "strangely immoral" that western thought operates 
through a systematic of assimilation to and exclusion from its own values (See Douzinas, C. 
The End of Human Rights. - Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2000) p. 347). Men Cixous reads deconstruction as a testament to the way in 
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argues that modem law seeks to distance itself and its values from civilisations 
founded on 'myth', whose characteristics of savagery, brutality, lawlessness, 
chaos and backwardness it holds out as 'other' to its own values of reason, 
civility and progress. 
16 
For Derrida the organisation of the represented world into binary 
oppositions, underpinned by the notion of presence in and of 'self , 
finds 
expression in the prioritisation of speech over writing. Representation is 
hierarchised according to the reliability of the medium in terms of its physical 
proximity to the original thought. Speech, as issuing from a person's mouth, is 
situated so close to original thought that it may be considered to be authentic. 
We will always know what meaning to attach to a speaker's words because the 
speaker is present to clarify. The meaning of spoken words is present to us 
which inequalities between man and woman are represented as natural: man traditionally 
represented as rational, cerebral, active, strong, etc - woman as emotional, passive and weak 
(See Cixous, H. and Clement, C. The Newly Born Woman, Wing, B. (trans. ) (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1986) p. 63). Similarly, Martin McQuillan points to the way in 
which West and East have "always" been represented in Western literature, film and media 
reporting: 'West' [as] "rational, progressive, recognisable, scientific, masculine and moral; 
'East' [as] irrational, backward, exotic, mystical, feminine [and] amoral. " McQuillan suggests 
that the very use of the term 'Middle-East' in news reports illustrates the problem, "since those 
who live there do not think of themselves as east of anywhere, let alone in the 'middle' of 
something" (See McQuillan, M. Deconstruction. - A Reader (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2000) pp-9-1 0). 
16 Fitzpatrick, P. Modernism and the Grounds of Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 200 1) pp. 164-70, p. 125, p. 192. See also Paliwala, A. 'Irresolutions of Modemity, Law, 
Nation and Empire: A Reading of Fitzpatrick's Modernism and the Grounds ofLaw in 
conjunction with Hardt and Negri's Empire' LGD 2003 (1) 
168 
Chapter 5 
because the gap between the speaker's original thoughts and words is so slight. 
Writing, on the other hand, signifies absence. Its formal and physical 
disconnection from the original thought means that the written text is vulnerable 
to being copied, interpreted, put into a different context and hence misread and 
misused. Hence the true meaning of the written text is 'absent' since it is open 
to dissemination, distortion, doubt, etc as it falls into the hands of different 
readers. 17 The difference between speech and writing represents the difference 
between the familiar and the unfamiliar. This is the binary hierarchy that 
Derrida regards as general to western thought. Thus, writing is relegated to the 
role of representing or standing in for speech, when the speaker is no longer 
present or out of earshot. Being vulnerable to the vices of misrepresentation and 
use in different context, writing is considered a poor stand-in for speech, but 
necessary in modern culture in which the distribution of information beyond 
local earshot is vital. Derrida identifies this privileging repeated throughout 
philosophical texts which attempt to guarantee the certainty or authenticity of 
the way they represent the world. 18 To illustrate the binary opposition between 
presence and absence in western thought, it is perhaps helpful to examine 
examples of the express prioritisation of speech over writing before considering 
more disputable cases that Derrida finds within modem analytic philosophy. 
Plato and Rousseau provide such an example. 
17 Wolfreys, J. Deconstruction: Derrida (Basingstoke: MacMillan Press, 1998) p. 68 
18 The special status of authenticity accorded to speech is identifiable in the legal process. For 
instance, a trial witness's testimony is regarded as more likely to be authentic if it is spoken in 
court, following a spoken oath. 
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In Phaedrus, Plato recounts a story in which the Egyption god Theuth 
presents his remedy for the fallibility of human memory to King Thamus. The 
remedy is writing - ideas and commands that are written down will outlive and 
hence remedy the fallibility of memory. The King however is not impressed and 
gives a damning judgment on the dangers of writing for the people of Egypt: 
"... it will implant forgetfulness in their souls... calling things to 
remembrance no longer from within themselves but by means of 
external marks... it is no true wisdom but only its 
semblance... " 
19 
Writing might appear to be an aid to memory, but in fact it merely masquerades 
as such, fostering forgetfulness and restoring not true thoughts themselves but 
only representations of them. Its potential for harming vivacious, living speech 
means that it is a dangerous thing which should be suppressed. Plato wants to 
emphasise the secondary and derivative nature of writing: a thing with no 
essence of its own: 
"When it is written down, the composition, whatever it may 
be, drifts all over the place;... it doesn't know how to address 
the right people, and not to address the wrong. , 20 
Plato, Phaedrus, Hackworth, R. (trans. ) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) 
157 
20 Jbid, p. 158 
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Plato's concern here is that once words are written down control over them is 
lost and so there is no way of preventing originally good words from falling into 
the wrong hands and being used for bad purposes. Writing is a "graceless 
resource". There "no insurance" against the dangers that it poses in its tendency 
of infinite and unpredictable dissemination. 21 
In a similarly pejorative manner, Rousseau describes writing as the 
"dangerous supplement", referring to the danger he perceives in allowing the 
subtleties and hindsight available to himself as a writer to distort his account of 
himself in the Confessions. Derrida points to passages in other texts, where 
Rousseau contrasts apparently 'natural' things with their 'cultured' or contrived 
modem development. Simple vocal melody is prioritised over instrumental 
music and painting because of the human presence in the voice: 
"Painting is often dead and inanimate. It can carry you to the 
depth of the desert; but as soon as vocal signs strike your ear, 
they announce to you a being like yourself They are, so to 
speak, the organs of the SOUI. 5ý22 
In imitating passionate voice, vocal song simultaneously represents proximity to 
full presence of the Self and also mark humanity as distinct from nature - since 
animals cannot imitate in this way. But Rousseau complains that the naturalness 
of melody is usurped by the complications of harmony. Rousseau recalls the 
21 Derrida (2002a) supra, n. 9, p. II 
22 Rousseau, quoted in Derrida, J. Of Grammatology Spivak, G. C. (trans. ) (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1998) p. 196 
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degeneration of language and music as a loss of energy caused by perfecting, 
generating new rules and complications. Melody began to be supplemented and 
usurped by harmony until singing had become cut off from its proper origin in 
passionate speech. 23 The danger posed to speech by writing contains the seeds 
of its deconstiruction. 
24 
Derrida identifies the hierarchy of speech over writing in the texts of 
western thought generally. This tendency reveals itself through authors' 
comments on the problems of meaning and certainty. As an illustration, this 
section shall rehearse Derrida's deconstructions of Austin's speech-act theory 
and also Marx's theory of commodification. Austin draws a distinction between 
'performative' speech-acts and 'constative' ones. Constative are regarded as 
better suited to philosophical propositions, as they pertain only to establishing 
truth or falsity. However, performatives - which perform an action such as 
getting married or making a promise - can also have definite meaning by 
qualifying as 'happy' performatives. In defining the conditions for happy 
performatives, Austin divides serious from non-serious speech, which Derrida 
claims represent, respectively 'speech' and 'writing' in order to ground a theory 
of meaning. For Austin, one can only successfully perform an action through the 
speaking of words (e. g. get married) if certain conditions are present. These 
conditions are that the words are spoken 'seriously', i. e. if there is an existing 
conventional code which is followed correctly and completely, by someone in a 
position make the statement in question, with sincerity in the right 
Derrida, Ibid, p. 199 
Derrida, J. Dissemination (London: Athlone, 1993) p. 102-3 
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circumstances. 25 If the words are spoken 'unseriously', i. e. if there is any failure 
in the above conditions or the words are "said by an actor on the stage, or if 
introduced in a poem or spoken in soliloquy', 26 then we cannot be sure of their 
meaning and the action cannot be said to have been performed. Austin states 
that words spoken in this fashion (stage, poem or soliloquy) are to be excluded 
,, 27 from consideration because they are "parasitic upon... normal use . For 
Austin, such exclusions and distinctions are necessary for delimiting the context 
in which the sentence is used. From this perspective it is simply a matter of 
practicality that words spoken in contexts which might have unusual or 
unpredictable effects upon the meaning of those words, are exclude from a 
general theory of meaning. However for Derrida such an opposition between the 
serious and non-serious is symptomatic of the characteristics found in the 
opposition between speech and writing in the sense that in 'serious' speech-acts, 
meaning is present within the words. In such a case we are led to think that we 
know the speakers intention, since their words are located within a determinate 
context. In 'non-serious' speech-acts meaning is absent: context is indeterminate 
or misunderstood, so the intention of the speaker and hence meaning of their 
words cannot be guaranteed. Austin's examples of non-serious, and hence 
excluded speech are examples of "citation" - the secondary representation of 
previously conceived thoughts. 28 The problems that Derrida locates in Austin's 
25 Austin, J. L. (1975) supra, n. 6, pp. 14-16 
26 Ibid, p. 22 
27 Ibid. 
28 Derrida, J. 'Signature, Event, Context' Glyph: John Hopkins Textual Studies (1977) vol. I 
pp. 172-197, p. 190 
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attempts to delimit the context of performative language use shall be returned to 
at a later stage. 
Derrida points to the writings of Karl Marx as another example of the 
speech/writing hierarchy. At the beginning of his analysis of capitalist society, 
Marx sets out to define the 'commodity' (the individual external object), and in 
particular the distinction between a commodity's use-value and exchange value. 
For Marx, objects have a natural, pre-capitalist value in terms of their practical 
use in the world, and this is determined purely by its physical qualities. 29 
However, once exposed to the world of abstract monetary exchange simple 
objects become valued according to an abstract third thing. Value is no longer 
identical with the physical object itself, in fact once all objects are reduced to an 
objective measure, "all sensuous characteristics are extinguished. iý30 Marx 
argues that the exchange value of a commodified object gives rise to a 
movement that is beyond its physical nature, thus turning it into a kind of 
spectre. At once, an ordinary table "transcends sensuousness... and evolves out 
of its wooden brain grotesque ideas, far more wonderful than if it were to begin 
dancing of its own free Will. ý5.31 Of course, they are not moving by themselves: 
the transformation from simple innocent object to commodity for exchange is 
achieved by 'labour-time' in production. 32 However, the role of labour is 
obscured by its own commodification, since the particular qualities of the type 
29 Marx, K. Capital. - A Critique of Political Economy Vol. 1, Ben Fowkes (trans. ) (London: 
Penguin Classics, 1990) p. 126 
30 Ibid, p. 12 8 
31 bid, p. 16-33-4 
" Jbid, p. 130 
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33 
of labour employed are likewise extinguished . 
What interests Derrida is 
Marx's implication that there is a realm of natural self-identity of objects and 
labour which is changed in a negative sense - devalued and denaturalised - by 
the moment in which it enters the realm of exchange. 34 Like the meaning of a 
person's 'serious speech' in a pre-determined context in Austin's theory, the 
value of an object prior to its commodification can be easily and naturally 
determined. Its spectral life in the realm of capitalist exchange renders 'value' a 
mysterious, indeterminate thing, as writing exposes the meaning of a sentence to 
indeterminacy. A formerly "obvious, trivial thing" turns out to "abound in 
metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties', 35 and heralds a movement 
between things that threatens, not just to evade our control, but actually to 
control us. In short, commodification carries the dangers that deconstruction 
identifies in writing. 
For liberals, deontological moral principle can be distinguished from 
consequentialism on the basis that where-as the former can always be known in 
advance, the latter is always given to doubt and uncertainty since its meaning or 
outcome is only determinable by the context in which it finds itself The 
meaning of a deontological principle is perceived as being present even before 
we know its context, which is not the case for a consequentialist consideration. 
Hence deontological principle accords to speech, and consequentialism accords 
to writing. Fitzpatrick identifies the modem denigration of myth in favour of the 
33 Ibid, p. 128 
" Derrida, J. Spectres of Marx. - The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New 
International, Kamuf, P. (trans. ) (London: Routledge, 1994) p. 160 
35 Marx ( 1990) supra, n. 29, p. 163 
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determinate origin of law as central in justifying the European colonisation of 
foreign lands. In Hobbes's account of the original covenant, positive law is 
guaranteed a "mythic persistence" by virtue of the unconditional authority of the 
legislator. 36 As Austin contends, law must have a determinate source if it is to 
be authoritative. Uncivilised peoples are characterised by such jurisprudence as 
those for whom no such determinate source is evident. European settlers of 
America in Seventeenth Century found those already living there to lack fixity 
in terms of law, property relations or commercial practises -a fact that justified 
the assumption of sovereignty of them in eliminating savagery. 37 In identifying 
this understanding of law's dominance over that chaos which it extends its 
civilising jurisdiction, Fitzpatrick's analysis of Hobbes and Austin is 
recognisably 'deconstructive' because it locates the foundation of law as the 
very thing that it seeks to distance itself from. He writes: "Austin's 
consolidation of the idea of sovereignty replicates within modernity the mythic 
symbolism of the ordering centre of creation. , 38 From this centre are derived the 
definable property laws and rights necessary for an ordered, civilised state. 
Outside of this is the indeterminacy of disorder and savagery from which no 
security or peace is possible. 
Like most aspects of Derrida's analysis, the association of western 
thought with the binary opposition of speech and writing remains controversial 
and calls for a certain degree of imagination which many critics, especially 
36 Fitzpatrick, P. The Mythology of Modern Law (London and New York, N. Y.: Routledge, 
1992) p. 73 
37 bid, p. 82 
38 lbid, p. 86 
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philosophers, have taken as a basic lack of academic rigour on Derrida's part. 
39 
Of course one needs a certain guarantee of certainty that the words one hears are 
true if one is to rely upon them to make decisions. It should not be surprising 
that, characterised as a search for such guarantees in order to make reliable and 
meaningful remarks about ethics, aesthetics, mathematics etc western texts 
might show a tendency towards such a division. 
2.2 The Ubiquity of Writing 
The picture of western thinkers striving to secure their theories of meaning by 
prioritising the presence of speech over the absence of writing is one drawn by 
Derrida in order to show how it has consistently failed to. As Derrida points out, 
the speech/writing metaphor immediately fails to be identical with full presence. 
Speech is only proximate to original thought - from the beginning there is a gap 
separating the origin (presence) from speech. Hence rather than being a 
metaphor showing the achievement of full presence, it shows only nostalgia for 
presence that has always already evaded capture, even by the nearest human 
expression to it. Derrida's inversion of the priority of writing represents, for 
Gasche and Norris the transcendental philosophical core of Derrida's critique of 
western philosophy in that it rigorously demonstrates the "conditions of the 
possibility and impossibility of presence". 40 For others it represents the 
39This is a view that others, notably Gasch6 and Norris, have tried to resist. See chapter six, s. 
1, infra. 
40 GascM, R. The Tain of The Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy ofReflection (Cambridge, 
Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1986) p. 177 
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hopeless, despairing loss of all possibility that we might ever know the Truth 
about the world. To witness Derrida's technique for disrupting the hierarchy 
between speech and writing one must look again at his analysis of Plato, 
Rousseau and Austin. In each case it is because the philosopher is unable to 
guarantee speech with full presence and requires the active support of its binary 
other (writing) that the traditional western dichotomy of presence/absence is 
disrupted. 
If, as Plato wants to argue (and Derrida reads Austin and Marx to 
imply), writing were merely and purely external to speech - derivative of it and 
superficial - then it would have no other effect. King Thamus, who rejected 
Theuth's remedy for human forgetfulness in Plato's Phaedrus should have no 
fear about its effects upon the living spontaneity of speech. However, Derrida 
reads the anxieties expressed by western philosophers about its dangerous 
powers of usurpation and subterfuge as a concession that speech is not 
equivalent to full presence and that writing is not equivalent to full absence. 
Derrida finds that Plato allows his prioritisation of speech over writing to 
become undone through metaphor. Having established the subordination of 
speech to writing, Plato makes a statement that Derrida interprets as an 
admission that the moral hierarchy of speech over writing cannot be sustained. 
Plato refers to a type of speech that is "written in the soul of the leamer": a 
discourse of "unquestioned legitimacy", which "goes together with knowledge", 
". can defend itself, and knows to whom it should speak". 41 It is because Plato 
can express the notion of good speech only through the metaphor of the bad (a 
kind of writing) that convinces Derrida that, in the end, Plato's story does not 
41 Plato (1990) supra, n. 19, p. 159 
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present us with language as speech in its interior and writing derivative of and 
external to it, but simply two kinds of writing. 42 Writing assumes a role or status 
that is beyond Plato's control and Derrida finds this lack of control as a general 
mark of western thought also. The notion of the author losing control over the 
meaning of his subject is crucial to deconstruction and manifests itself in the 
notions of 'supplement', 'trace', 'undecidable' and 'diff6rance'. The 'ubiquity' 
of writing is perhaps most simply understood as the impossibility of sustaining 
the moral or theoretical priority and distinction of one concept over another. 
2.2.1 The Undecidable 
It is important to Derrida that the unravelling of binary opposites comes from 
within the very heart of their logic. Derrida argues that the language used in 
subordinating writing to speech is inscribed from the start with ambiguity. 
When Plato's Theuth presents writing to the King it is described in the Greek as 
a "Pharmakon", translatable both as a 'remedy' and also as a harmful 'drug' 
The correct meaning can only be gleaned from the context in which the word is 
used: before we understand its context it occupies an ambiguous position. 43 
Derrida thus uses Plato's own argument against the grain of the text's explicit 
meaning: where Plato intends his argument that writing lacks its own essence 
(and hence its own value, being derivative of speech), Derrida interprets as 
further evidence of its undecidable nature. 44 Writing unnaturally extends the 
42 Derrida (1993) supra, n. 24. p. 149 
41 Ibid, p. 98-100 
44 Ibid- p-139 
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existence of thoughts, but being cut off from their original source these thoughts 
become lifeless and unable to respond to interrogation . 
4' For Derrida, this does 
not mean that writing is absolutely lifeless and inanimate, but rather is zombie- 
like: neither living nor dead its status is undecidable. 46 Undecidability inscribes 
itself into the logic of every binary hierarchy of western thought. Returning to 
Marx's theory of commodification, Derrida argues that the distinction between 
use-value and exchange value cannot be sustained: spectrality and unreality 
cannot be confined to the realm of capitalist exchange because Marx contradicts 
himself as to when the simple, natural objects become commodities. Marx's 
explicit argument is, as noted above, that use-value precedes exchange value, 
the latter accruing through the application of labour in capitalist society. 
However, Marx also admits that as soon as one considers the value of an object, 
this value is already understood against a context of equivalences - the measure 
of exchange-value. 47 Hence, it appears that the commodity emerges both after 
and before the natural object itself: its status is undecidable and as in the case of 
writing as Phannakon, so is the distinction between the natural and unnatural. 
The significance of the commodity and its undecidability for legal theory 
requires a far more detailed discussion than is possible here; however it lies in 
45 Plato (1990) supra, n. 19, p. 158 
46 Derrida ( 1993) supra, 24, p. 143 -4 
47 Marx (1990) supra, n. 29, p. 179: "... their [the commodities'] exchange puts them in relation 
with each other as values and realizes them as values. Hence commodities must be realized as 
values before they can be realized as use-values. " 
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the operation of exchange in law's efforts to be just. For Balbus, 
48 the 
"commodity form" of exchange is "equivalent" to the "legal form" of abstract 
rights and subjectivity which replaces "the multiplicity of concrete needs". 49 In 
both cases, the singular, specific instance is replaced by the general measure 
against which all cases can be judged. Just as the exploitation of the worker is 
maintained by the commodification of both his own labour and that which he 
produces, an injustice is inflicted by law upon the singular instance that does not 
fit into this representational scheme whose moral landscape consists only of 
equivalent, abstract, individual bearers of rights. 50 For commentators such as 
Rose, Marx's distinction between singular use-value and exchange suggests the 
possibility of a notion of justice that is prior to the entry into the world of 
equivalences. 51 As discussed in Chapter Seven, Derrida's own approach to 
ethics is that which is oriented towards the singular Other. However, the 
undecidability of the use-value/exchange-value distinction means that a legal 
judgment can never guarantee 'justice' in the immediate, concrete sense that 
48 See Balbus, 1. Marxism and Domination: A Neo-Hegelian, Feminist, Psycholanalytic Theory 
of Sexual, Political and Technological Liberation (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 
1982) p. 10 1 
49 Ibid. 
50 See also Peter Gabel, who provides an existentialist account of the alienating effects of legal 
rights: Gabel, P. 'The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn 
Selves Tex L Rev (1984) 1563-1599 esp. pp. 1572-8. 
51 See Rose, G. Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996). See also Kellogg, C. 'Mourning Terminable and 
Interminable: Deconstruction, Law, Representation (Paper prepared for the Study of Law, 
Culture and the Humanities, Banjamin N. Cardozo School of Law and New York University, 
New York N. Y. March 7-9 2003). 
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Rose describes. 52 When we think of undecidability in the context of the 
possibility of justice in this way we can appreciate that ethical and political 
questions are discernible just beneath the surface of every discussion of 
undecidability. The next chapter will consider the implications of undecidability 
in terms of the practical consequences (that which is called 'political' in this 
thesis) that deconstruction engenders. 
2.2.2 Supplement and the Myth ofPresence 
The failure of speech to guarantee full presence of meaning provides the basis 
for another of Derrida's techniques. 'Supplement' signifies that which is added 
to and becomes part of something which should already be complete (e. g. 
53 
vitamin supplements added to a supposedly already healthy diet). Plato wants 
speech to be prior because he believes that it expresses true, living thought 
which writing does not. However, since lives and hence living memory are 
ultimately finite it cannot resist the invasion of writing; in fact it needs to be 
supplemented by writing because of its own shortcomings. 54 It is not presence 
(since presence is signified by presence of a self) but since it is required to 
supplement that which is assigned the position of presence then it is not absence 
either. It escapes the simple dichotomy of presence and absence. The notion of 
writing (or, more generally, the subordinate part of any binary hierarchy) as a 
52 Derrida, J. 'The Force of Law' from Comell, D. Deconstruction and the Possibility of 
Justice (New York, N. Y. & London: Routledge, 1992) chapter one. 
53 Collins, J. & Mayblin, B. Introducing Derrida (Cambridge: Icon, 2000) pp. 34-5 
54 Derrida ( 1993) supra, n. 24, p. 109 
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supplement to speech is developed in Derrida's engagement with Rosseau. 5 _5 
The paradox for western thought that Derrida identifies here is that, even 
although writing is acknowledged as a necessary supplement to speech, this is 
nevertheless regarded as an addition of nothing, since writing is considered to 
be exterior to the full presence of meaning. This is a contradiction that leads 
Derrida to make another generalisation about language: that there is always a 
difference between full presence and linguistic signs deployed to represent it. 56 
Accepting the fact of this difference entails accepting that since supplementation 
is always necessary, full presence of meaning is never achieved and is in fact a 
myth. For Derrida this signals that language itself is characterised by the 
inadequacy found by King Thamus in writing: that it has no essence of its own, 
that it "drifts all over the place". Whether spoken or written, language is 
doomed to be a kind of writing - never achieving full presence of meaning, 
always requiring supplementation. This leads us to the notions of iterability and 
also diff6rance, discussed below. 
55 In all of the cases in which Rousseau finds that originally natural and innocent practises are 
usurped by modem cultural ones, Rousseau eventually admits that the former are necessarily 
supplemented by the latter. For instance in the Essay, although vocal melody is prior to 
harmony in terms of proximity to original voice, the fact that its origin is as imitation of 
passionate voice, means that the degeneration of separation of song from voice has "always 
already begun" (Derrida (1998) supra, n. 22, p. 199). The presence of prioritised melody, then, 
is from the start infected with the imitative characteristic of its subordinate harmony. The 
biographical details of Rousseau's Confessions - for instance the loss of his mother and 
subsequent comfort found in his wife - Derrida reconfigures as an infinite chain of 
supplements. Everything significant to Rousseau is a supplement to make up for the lack of 
presence of something else in his life (ibid, p. 159). 
56 jbid, p. 167 
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2.2.3 Iterability, Context and Metaphor 
We have established Derrida's view that writing occupies a role in western 
thought that is of greater significance than is accorded by the philosophers that 
he deconstructs. But the role that Derrida has in mind for writing (or at least its 
characteristics) is more than a mysterious ambiguity or a more-than-absent 
supplement. For Derrida it is writing's characteristic quality of "iterability" - 
44repetition-with-a difference', 57 _ that is the condition both of possibility and 
impossibility of linguistic meaning. Intersubjective communication is made 
possible because words are repeatable in different contexts, but since changes of 
context alter meaning, this also makes final meaning impossible. This is the 
written character of all language, whether written or spoken. 
In Derrida's reading of Austin, there is a stark contrast between analytic 
philosophy and deconstruction regarding attitudes towards the implications of 
uncertainty and the possibility of certainty. It has been noted above that Austin's 
theory of meaning depends upon the possibility of fixing the context of 
performative language use as a set of determinate variables. However, Derrida 
points to a passage in Austin's text which seems to rule this possibility out. 58 
Austin regards that, unlike the simple true/false assertions of constatives, 
performatives are slightly more complex in that they consist of three different 
parts. The first part is the action achieved by the words (locutionary); the second 
51 Staten, H. Wittgenstein and Derrida (Lincoln, N. E.: University of Nebraska Press, 1985) 
p. 1 12 
58 Derrida, J. (1977) supra, n. 28, pp. 172-197; Austin, J (1975) supra, n. 6 
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includes anything not directly intended but nevertheless also present in the 
performance (illocutionary); the third part relates to the effects produced in the 
audience of the words (perlocutionary). 59 In discussing illocutionary acts, 
Austin makes an admission that, for Derrida, shows that Austin's entire 
argument that performatives can have definite meaning unravels. Austin 
remarks that failure to identify all unintended achievements of a performative is 
"always possible". 60 Clearly Austin does not consider that this weakness 
threatens his larger analysis, but Derrida remarks that if such a failure is always 
a possibility, then how can one ever be certain of having conquered the context 
of the words spoken at all? If the danger of the excluded non-serious 'citational' 
speech is always present then surely citationality is not the occasional accident 
of language, but a very governing law. 61 Serious and non-serious speech may 
have different rules in terms of their use and appropriateness, but neither one 
can rely on full presence of meaning and determinate context. They are both 
governed by the characteristic that Derrida regards as the writtenness of all 
language that he calls 'iterability'. 62 In the deconstruction of Austin, the 
prioritisation of 'speech' (serious speech-acts) over 'writing' (non-serious 
speech-acts) becomes subverted. 
59 For example in making a promise, the locutionary part would be constituted by my words 
being regarded as binding; the illocutionary part would involve say, checking on whether I 
could in fact honour the promise; the perlocutionary part would be the perception in my 
promisee of me owing whatever I promised to provide. 
60 Austin (1975) supra, n. 6, p. 106 
61 Derrida (1977) supra, n. 28, p. 190 
62 bid, p. 192 
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Searle and Habermas separately examine Derrida's comments on Austin 
and reach similar conclusions as to Derrida's misreading, his overgeneralising 
and his reduction and levelling of important concepts and distinctions within 
philosophy. Searle takes issue with two aspects of Derrida's interpretation of 
Austin. 63 Firstly, that Derrida is wrong to read Austin as distinguishing serious 
from non-serious speech-acts on the basis of the iterability of the latter. 64 
Secondly, Searle argues that Derrida accords Austin's exclusion of 'parasitic' 
types of speech from the realm of the 'serious' an unwarranted significance. 65 
Habermas' critique of the same text is somewhat more sympathetic to Derrida's 
contention that Austin is wrong to imagine that context can be determined by 
the rules of successful speech-acts, but insists that this need not lead to 
63 Searle, J. R. 'Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida' Glyph: John Hopkins Textual 
Studies (1977) Vol. I pp. 198-208 
64 Searle argues that Austin does not believe that successful speech-acts depend upon their not 
being iterable, since iterability is present in all language (ibid, p. 206). For a promise to be 
successfully made - whether in speech or writing - the same rules must be followed. So the 
speech/writing distinction fails since the actor's intention is not in any way undennined by its 
being repeatable. (ibid, pp. 207-8). 
65 For Searle, Austin's exclusion of them is neither a strong metaphysical claim nor a moral 
statement. Rather it is merely the ordinary fact that a promise or whatever simply cannot be 
performed unless such examples of speech are removed from consideration. (ibid, 204). For 
Austin to use the word 'parasite' may have been unduly dramatic - Searle insists that it merely 
expresses logical dependency. Searle may be misinterpreting Derrida somewhat here, since the 
moral order that Derrida locates in the texts of western thought is always only implied by fact 
of conventional meanings of words used being wider than the instance intended by the 
particular writer. Staten points out that, in ordinary language, the word "parasitic" does carry a 
moral implication, which Austin is not at liberty to exclude (Staten (1985) supra, n. 57, pp. 
124-5). 
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relativism. Whereas for Derrida, the indeterminacy of context indicates the 
ubiquity of writing and therefore the impossibility of determinate meaning, for 
Habermas, it calls into operation his own thesis of communicative rationality. 
Meaning and significance might operate differently from one context to the 
next, but for Habermas this leads to idealising presuppositions being made as to 
how different types of speech-act are validated, on the basis of what is "normal" 
in a local community. 66 If local meanings are understood in communication then 
serious speech-acts can be distinguished from non-serious on the basis of the 
different validity claims involved. 67 Habermas is keen to resist what he regards 
as Derrida's attempt to collapse the distinction between 'ordinary' (i. e. serious) 
and 'poetic' (non-serious) language, since only the former can transcend local 
contingencies and give rise to universal rationality. 
Habermas accepts that, even in ordinary serious speech there is always 
an element of narrative. In recalling, say, a true event, facts are ordered in a way 
that may resemble a story and may contain ambiguous elements. However, if 
the main purpose of the speech is to take on the responsibilities involved in 
making a speech-act (say, promising or betting or loaning, all of which involve 
making certain commitments) then the consequences make it distinct from 
68 
poetic language, where the fictive and poetic elements are primary. The 
problem with Habermas's argument is that if the difference relies on emphasis 
then it is a very narrow one indeed. To what extent must the narrative and poetic 
66 Haben-nas, J. The Philosophical Discourses of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990a) 
p. 197 
67 Ibid, pp. 198-9 
68 Ibid., p. 203 
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elements of a text be apparent before we say that an account is primarily literary 
and thus non-serious? Like Thamus' Phannakon in Plato, speech in which the 
narrative element is primary takes the truth out of its ordinary context and in 
philosophical terms, devalues it. What began as a 'true' story then becomes a 
mere representation of a lost original, obscured within the poetic and fictive 
language, the meaning of which tends to be ambiguous. 69 In order to be sure of 
what that truth really is, poetic language needs to be kept out, and Derrida's 
over-generali sing poeticising of all language ignores this basic need to know the 
truth about the objective world. 
70 
But whether or not Habernas - or any of the critics - is deconstructable 
is rather beside the point, since on this interpretation, all philosophy is 
69 bid. 
70 Ibid, p. 205, p. 207. If truth can only be told in a narrative form then the distinctions in terms 
of validity claims can not resist the suggestion that truth-telling is a type of story-telling - i. e. a 
type of writing. Fish gives a reply to Habermas that restates the doctrine that judgment 
independent of context is impossible. Fish agrees that the desire to discover first truths and 
undistorted reason may be a noble, one but every effort to do so - such as Habermas' 
communicative action or Austin's serious speech-acts - are "impossible abstractions". Why 
impossible? Because "every name [this desire] receives is intelligible only within the 
conditions it would escape. " (Fish, S. Doing What Comes Naturally: Change Rhetoric and the 
Practice qfL iterary and Legal Studies (Durham, N. C. & London: Duke University Press, 
1989) p. 454). So the conditions of possibility and impossibility of critique are reversed. Where 
Habermas and Austin respectively find the only possibility of rational critique and meaningful 
performative speech-acts in making distinctions between forms of language, Fish finds only 
impossibility. For Fish and Rorty, 'free' action, thought and critique always depend upon the 
background structures that we happen to inhabit. The emancipation and freedom that I 
Habermas believes is made possible by communicative action is merely the "passing from one 
structure of constraint for another. " (ibid, p. 459) 
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deconstructable by emphasising its metaphorical and rhetorical elements. Searle 
is correct to assert that the rules and foundations of philosophy are not supposed 
to be completely unassailable, but simply workable to a tolerable extent. They 
do a certain job - that of facilitating critical practises and so they should not be 
undermined unless there is a good reason to do so. Habermas fears that if the 
distinction between philosophy and poetry is effaced in the manner that 
Derrida's comments on Austin suggest, then philosophy loses its "productivity" 
in uncovering the different forces at work in modernity. 71 Philosophical rigour is 
not crucial in literature because the purpose of literature is different to that of 
philosophy: "world- creating", 72 44 innovation"73 and stimulation of creative 
imagination. But philosophy's role is more serious - conceptualising and 
understanding the truth about the "objective world", 74 about giving an account 
" Habermas (I 990a) supra, n. 66, p. 2 10; Haben-nas' writings - his engagements, for instance, 
with Adomo and Foucault - have striven to emphasise that modernity is full of ambivalences 
and contradictions. Capitalism, technology, human rights, democracy - modernity has both 
positive and negative effects and these cannot be appreciated by levelling and melting together, 
as deconstruction does, the separate discourses of reason, manipulation, truth and rhetoric. 
Only in 'serious' speech, with its ideal conditions of sincerity and truthfulness, does each 
person have an equal chance to have their needs and demands heard and considered. 'Non- 
serious' speech, with its playful use of rhetoric and metaphor, carries no such guarantee since 
individuals are at the mercy of whatever interpretation of justice or fairness their local 
community currently favours. The political implications of deconstruction will be considered 
in more depth in the next chapter. 
72 bid, p. 205 
73 Ibid, p. 201 
" Ibid, p. 205 
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of "the way things stand in reality". 75 Given such separate roles, what is the 
significance of Derrida's assertion that Plato's philosophical account of good 
writing can only be expressed through a metaphor of the bad? Is he suggesting 
that philosophy is dependant upon, and therefore secondary to metaphor? If so 
then this would imply that all of philosophy's carefully constructed 
theorisations on possible knowledge and ethics are no more compelling than any 
fiction, and would in fact exist only as a branch of fiction. However, as Derrida 
suggests in his White Mythology, to describe philosophy as essentially 
metaphorical commits the same type of error that deconstruction finds in 
western philosophy generally. It is this practise of 'essentialising' that 
deconstruction deems as unethical reading - claiming full knowledge of our 
object and denying that it has other facets. 76 Interpretations of Derrida's 
75 Norris, C. Deconstruction and the 'Unfinished Project of Modernity' (London: Athlone 
Press, 2000) p. 40; This point on the role of metaphor as foundational in philosophy is a crucial 
one, but it is also highly controversial in the interpretation of Derrida, as discussed below. It is 
important for philosophy that metaphor is subordinated to being delimited and deployed by 
philosophy rather than the source or foundation of philosophy itself. This is a necessary state 
of affairs since metaphor is essentially that which has no particular essence of its own. Unlike 
philosophy it has no definite or stable structure, and this is tolerable to philosophy so long as 
metaphor (and its relatives rhetoric etc) stays in its proper, subordinate place. Within its own 
separate sphere of literature it may operate as it pleases, and in philosophical spheres it may be 
(and is) used to provide interesting illustrations of arguments and concepts. However, it cannot 
play a more foundational role in philosophy because, being a literary device it does not respect 
the need for stability of knowledge, reason, critique, truth, etc. 
76 On this view, to characterise philosophy as metaphorical is simply to repeat the same 
structures of thought as philosophy. In reply, one might assert that deconstruction does not I 
reserve any special position for itself as regarding its own arguments. As a species of western 
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comments on metaphor and philosophy are bitterly disputed amongst critics 
because of the apparent consequences for legal and political theory. The dispute 
is discussed in more depth in the next chapter. 
2.2.4 Diffirance 
'Diff6rance', a word invented by Derrida that has no direct translation into 
English, is Derrida's way of expressing his view of linguistic meaning. 
Diff6rance inherits and adapts semiotic theory, usually attributed to Ferdinand 
de Saussure. Saussure's theory of linguistics is founded on the premise that, 
since there is no natural or logical connection between any thing in the world 
and the collection of letters that represents it in language (say between a real 
dog and the letters d-o-g in English or c-h-i-e-n in French etc)77 then meaning of 
78 
a word is known instead by virtue of its difference from all other words. The 
general structure of language is therefore characterised not by connection 
between signifiers (words) and the things in the world that they signify, but 
rather the differences between signifiers (words) themselves. Deconstruction 
adopts this synchronic view of language and adds to it its own insight: that 
meaning-as-difference has no logical end-point. No matter how many 
differences we identify there will always be others because of infinity of 
thought, deconstruction does not attempt to deny that it is itself subject to the very same 
logical, logocentric tendencies as philosophy. 
77 Saussure, F. de Course in General Linguistics (London: Duckworth, 2000) p. 67/s. 100 
78 Ibid, p. II 8/s. 166: "In the language itself there are only differences... and no positive 
terms. " 
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context. Hence diff6rance signifies not only to differ in meaning, but also to 
defer it - indefinitely. Since no sign carries 'natural' meaning within it, but 
relies instead on differentiation from other signs, each sign is itself only a trace 
of meaning. 79 Diff6rance therefore operates to undermine the myth of 'original' 
(i. e. true, pure and pre-cultural) meaning by emphasising the always already 
deferred final definition. An 'origin' is an effect produced when the lack of full 
presence within a prioiritised sign - that is, its separation from original thought 
- is suppressed. Diff6rance is the non-suppression of this separation and the 
recognition of the role of supplementation in eternally striving and yet not quite 
succeeding to achieve reunification with origin and presence. Diff6rance thus 
signifies the failure of linguistic signification to account fully for the meaning of 
words. The result is the interminable irreducibility of the world to a determinate 
set of names or labels, and 'final' meaning is always something other than our 
attempts to name it. 80 This insight leads once more to the conclusion that 
language is characterised by writing, rather than speech. 81 It should be clear by 
79 Critchley, S. (1992) supra, n. 7, p. 37 
80 Ibid, p. 4 1: This is the idea of 'otherness': an idea of some considerable importance for our 
discussion of deconstruction and ethics in chapter seven. 
81 e. g. see Derrida, 'The Violence of the Letter: From Levi Strauss to Rousseau' pp. 10 1- 164 
and '... That Dangerous Supplement.. .' pp. 141-164 in Derrida (1998) supra, n. 18; As an 
account of meaning, Derrida's adoption of Saussure's approach to language is not without its 
problematic implications for philosophy and critique. In adopting Saussure's linguistic system, 
Derrida attracts criticism. One is that Saussure's binary (signifier/signified) system, with no 
account of the relationship between the two elements, sets language up only in order to display 
the failure of presence that Derrida is seeking to establish. Since for Derrida the only 
significant relationship is that between signifiers there is the criticism that deconstruction is 1-: ) 
concerned only with signifiers and not the real world of their referents. There is always an 
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now that deconstruction resists any 'third' element which purports to stabilise 
meaning - such as Austin's "total context" - since all things are readable (and 
hence deconstructable) as texts. It appears that one is faced with the stark choice 
between the 'total', determinate context that Austin promises through his theory 
of serious speech on the one hand, and the 'infinite', indeterminate context that 
Derrida's own view suggests. 
3. The Rhetoric of Presence and its Unravelling in Legal Judgment 
In identifying the indeterminacy of liberal principle, rhetorically constructed 
within the indefinite context of consequential ist factors, the spadework of 
deconstruction has already been done in the previous chapter. That chapter 
presented principle and consequentialism as engaged in a symbiotic 
relationship, each depending upon the other for meaning and moral coherence. 
Although the judges did approach the cases as unique in many respects, their 
unexplained gap between signifier and signified (simply an 'arbitrary' relationship) ruling out 
any confident statement about the meaning of concepts such as justice or ethics. Any 
commentary based on Saussure's dualist linguistics is itself blind to the essentially endless 
deferral implied by it (See Sheriff, J. K. The Fate of Meaning: Charles Peirce, Structuralism 
and Literature (Princeton N. J. & Guildford: Princeton University Press, 1989) p. 47). This view 
of language will always allow cleconstruction of whatever meaning is posited, without ever 
giving a satisfactory account how any meaning comes to be present at all. Diffdrance accounts 
for failure of full presence through the failure of speech to hold back the "writtenness" or 
"iterability" of language, but not for the extent of communicative success experienced by users 
of language in their everyday lives. What is needed, argue some of his critics, is an element to tn 
supplement the binary system of signifier and signified, insufficient in itself to provide this 
account. 
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interpretation of the relevant principles were ostensibly an attempt to represent 
them in a way that is faithful to the liberal spirit of individual responsibility and 
rights. The judges' interpretations of ideas such as the individual as a morally 
responsible bearer of rights are thus readable as attempts to align contemporary 
legal problems with this original spirit or origin. If it were unproblematic to 
regard the judgments as in this way directly connected to pure a priori liberal 
principle, then it might be said that the individualist principles that feature in 
cases such as Hindley and Thompson and Venables are present to us in deciding 
on the right decision in the sense discussed above. If we can believe that the 
information we receive issues from its original source (or as close to its source 
as possible) rather than diluted and corrupted by interpretation in the light of 
indeterminate context, then we can feel more confident that we know its true 
nature. This is the case in legal language too. Someone who is persuaded that, 
say, the House of Lords gave the 'correct' decision in Hindley as a matter of 
principle, will believe that the meaning of the principle of retributivism can be 
known and applied in the instant case. Conversely, the critic who is persuaded 
to the contrary position is confident in their analysis because they believe the 
principle has been misunderstood and its proper meaning distorted. Either way 
the hierarchy of thought, in which an agent orients his or her judgment 
according to an original truth, remains the same. Judgment involves the 
representation and interpretation of a previously decided principle. The principle 
is the a priori; the steady bedrock which allows us to take our position. It is 
present to us inasmuch as we know what it means, and enables this crucial act of 
judgment. However, this view of the judges reaching back to an original 
principle as a moral guide is problematic, as seen in Chapter Four. The 
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symbiosis that we noted between principle and non-principle in deciding how a 
case ought to be interpreted indicates that such origins are obscured. There is 
too much 'text' between the task of contemporary judgment and the original 
spirit of liberal principle. Given the emphasis that Derrida places on the 
obscuring of the original, it almost seems to be a point of doctrine to assert that 
there never was any original liberal principle in the first place. By 'original' it 
should be remembered that this refers to a pure initial idea that exists prior to its 
dissemination and dilution in the world of uncertainty, contingency and 
accident. Alternatively one could suggest that there is no road between origin 
and contemporary judgment except that which is at all times infected with the 
latter - diluting the purity of principle and yet necessarily present in order to 
give those principles any practical meaning at all. If it is possible to talk in such 
terms at all, the judgments are 'grounded' in an undefined relationship between 
principle that is called a priori and the contingent conditions in which they are 
found. 
Not only is there a symbiosis of fact and principle, principle is actually 
practically meaningless prior to an interpretation of fact. This prior 
interpretation depends, as seen in Chapter Four, upon a variety of different 
factors. As foundations for decision-making, the liberal individualist principles 
are conspicuous only by their absence. This is how the relationship of the 
deontological principles to the array of contingent empirical facts can be 
regarded as a relationship of speech to writing. The former is held to be prior to 
the latter in terms of presence, stability and certainty, but since the latter is 
necessary to supplement the inadequacy of the former in living up to this 
demand, this priority turns out to be reversible, or deconstiructable. Recall also 
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the above discussion of Derrida's notion of 'diff6rance'. Full meaning is 
infinitely deferred because the requirements of supplementation can never be 
exhausted. Each new instance in which a matter of principle has to be 
interpreted in the light of a difficult fact situation will require a different reading 
of those principles and a different reading of the facts. The possible contexts in 
which principle might find itself are infinite: this is why we would regard, as 
Derrida does in the case of speech and writing, that there never was any original 
conception of principle. Every principle has to be conceived in a context that is 
itself infinitely variable and open to reinterpretation. The attempt to nevertheless 
continue to think of the liberal principles as deontolological or a priori is 
nostalgic: the continued hope, despite the vanity of it, for a return to a time 
when the truth was not obscured by politics. It is the nostalgia for an origin that 
is experienced as a loss, but was actually never present. 
3.1 Undecidability and the Right to Life 
The Court of Appeal's judgment in Re A that Jodie represented a closer 
approximation to the liberal ideal of the rational and reasonable individual 
ensured moral priority of her life over her sister Mary's. This section shall 
examine the undecidability of this hierarchy in terms of its moral coherence and 
justification. The principled justification for Re A is that it purports to represent 
a legitimate use of violence. The life saved is a viable person; the one violated is 
not. This claim to a rightful use of violence is a crucial aspect of liberal 
principle - enshrined in the defence of Self Defence - and will form the focal 
point of our deconstruction. Thus, our focus here is the moral distinction 
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between liberal legitimate violence and the savage, illegitimate violence that 
threatens the order of law from the outside. Referring to Fitzpatrick, it is argued 
here that this distinction is undermined (deconstructed) by law's reliance upon 
mythic foundations which it holds out as the characteristics of savage, 
uncivilised communities. 
As argued in Chapter Four, the case of Re A is a combination of 
universal and particular elements. The case arises from a set of almost unique 
facts, yet the decision is justified by the universal principle that the integrity of 
the individual bearer of rights must be protected. Therefore, despite rejecting 
pre-modem discourses of justification - religious, metaphysical, mythical, etc - 
modem law embraces a discourse that transcends the realms of the purely 
contingent and particular. In his exploration of the relationship between law and 
myth, Fitzpatrick argues that a bridge between law's transcendental 
universalism and its particularism can be found in the mythical account of the 
relationship between the law and the individual itself Borrowing from Foucault, 
Fitzpatrick presents a theory of subjectivity that combines both state power and 
individual freedom. Through its ordinary administrative functions, the state 
produces an idea of what it is to be normal: to be free, or morally responsible. 
Individual autonomy is a response to the effect of institutional power: "The 
subject acts positively in the cause of its own non-nalisation or self realisation as 
normal". 82 In this relationship the 'individual' and the law are mutually 
sustaining concepts. The state must assume that its citizens are morally 
autonomous individuals in order that it can justify holding offenders responsible 
for their actions. The law in turn provides the person with the model for his own 
82 Fitzpatrick (1992) supra, n. 36, p. 122 
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freedom; we can aspire to become the sort of person whom the state respects as 
morally autonomous. 83 As in Hobbes's account of the original agreement, 
4civilised' freedom under the law is the giving up of the natural situation of 
absolute freedom: a situation of war, anarchy and savagery). 84 
The convenient quality of the modem liberal notion of the 'individual' is 
that it allows modem law to provide its own account of how man-made laws can 
bind men,, while at the same time denying the mythic grounds of this. 85 Being 
grounded only in the human individual's capacity for self-creation rather than 
theology, the story appears to be a 'rational' justification for the possibility of 
universality. Law is concerned with particular instances of conflict or violence 
and at the same time remains rooted in timeless, universal fixity. 86 As Paliwala 
explains: "This is the trick of the law. It is timeless and yet changes, every 
change being consolidated in a mythic timelessness. , 87 The rational, reasonable 
individual links these aspects. However, as discussed above, when an either/or 
choice of lives must be made, the 'individual' as a collection of idealised liberal 
qualities is not unproblematically universal. In promising universality, non- 
rational elements are 'other' to it and unless they can efface their own otherness 
are excluded from moral consideration. Others "cannot speak or even seek the 
,, 88 truth without first shedding their otherness. Thus the principle of the 
'individual' that distinguishes Jodie from Mary is the mythical legitimisation of 
83 Ibid, p. 13 5 
84 Ibid, p. 126-7 
85 Ibid, p. 35-6 
86 Fitzpatrick (200 1) supra, n. 16, p. 76 
" Paliwala, (2003) supra, n. 16 
88 Fitzpatrick (200 1) supra, n. 16, p-42 
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maintaining the otherness of the latter. In the rhetoric of mortal danger and 
disaster in the judicial speeches in Re A, we witness the construction of moral 
difference that emphasises the dangerous disorder that threatens law from 
outside, signalling an imperative to act quickly in self preservation. 89 
The failure of the myth of the individual to perform its bridging function 
without inflicting this violence returns us once again to the question of 
legitimate and illegitimate violence. The threat posed by Mary to Jodie - and in 
being unwarranted might be regarded as the "unlawful aggression" that forms 
an exception to the right to life in the ECHR - motivates the law to close ranks, 
to protect its claim to universality from being undermined. For, as Fitzpatrick 
notes, the violence of that which is other to the realm of liberal law's 
universality is necessarily illegitimate. It is, to use Fitzpatrick's words, 
"savage". 90 Law's use of violence is reluctantly inflicted, proportionate in its 
measure and subject to pre-determined rules. The violence of the savage is the 
outside threat - other to the law in its uncivilised nature - that must always be 
guarded against to maintain law's integrity. Hence, characterised as an 
illegitimate threat of violence to her sister, Mary must be destroyed in the name 
of law as a universal civilising force. To use Fitzpatrick's analogy, the lack of 
positive laws and rights amongst the Seventeenth Century Native Americans 
meant that no existing rights could be infringed by the imposition of a European 
legal framework. Similarly Mary's lack of a determinate position vis-a-vis the 
individualist legal order ensures that she occupies no position at all that can be 
89 Fitzpatrick (1992) supra, n. 36, p. 81 
90 Ibid. The savage is "in the eruptions and disruptions of untamed nature or barely contained I 
human passion against which an ordering law is intrinsically set. " 
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legally 'noticed'. Individualizing Mary - the "bodily integrity" that Robert 
Walker U regarded the 'treatment' as giving to her 91 - at the same time civilises 
Mary by giving her such a position. The fact that Mary cannot physically 
survive within this civilisation is irrelevant to the justifiability of giving it to 
her. After all, where no legal order existed previously, the expansion of liberal 
law's universal borders infringes nothing, 92 irrespective of how much disorder 
and physical harm may be caused. Those that are 'other' to the new legal order 
must align or be eliminated. 
Fitzpatrick thus invites us to consider the binary opposition between law 
and savagery, into which it is all too tempting to read the violent rhetoric by 
which Jodie is contrasted to Mary. The deconstruction of the moral order 
presented in Re A is made possible by the construction of this opposition 
between Jodie and Mary as representing values associated with law and 
savagery respectively. Let us recall: On what basis are we invited to accept this 
interpretation of the facts of the case? Chapter Four noted that it would not be 
sufficient to simply prefer one child's 'rights' over the other: the 
consequentialist factors had to be imported in order to overcome the difficulty 
that Mary was, strictly speaking, a human being. On a principled perspective 
this is the wrong way around, since it appears that consequentialist factors are 
being deployed in order to make the competing interests fit into the moral 
hierarchy. Jodie and Mary take on the roles of, respectively, law and savage 
because of the supplementation of reasoning that carries all the characteristics of 
uncertainty and unruliness that law ascribes to its savage other. The desired 
91 Re ý4 
[2000] 4 All ER 96 1, p. 1069 
92 Fitzpatrick (1992) supra, n. 36, p. 82 
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meaning of law in terms of determinateness, rights and order is thus necessarily 
separated from what one is forced to accept that it means: indeterminate and 
disorderly. In this way, the decision of Re A gives us another example of the 
writtenness of meaning: diff6rance revealed in the uncovering of the separation 
between the purported true meaning of a principled foundation, and its 
representation in language. We are thus faced with moral uncertainty and are 
reminded of the always already yawning gap between perfect original presence 
and the closest representation of it, and hence that that which is prioritised is no 
less a repetition than that which is subordinated. The Right to Life is 
undecidable in purely principled terms. 
3.3 Undecidability and the Responsible Individual in Punishment Judgments 
If, as Chapter Four contends, criminal responsibility is determined by the 
construction of a moral narrative composed of both retrospective and 
prospective considerations, then the foundation of rightftil tariff judgment is not 
reasoned or rational, but poetic and rhetorical. Therefore, in the same way as the 
Right to Life in Re A, the criteria of judgment in this area is given to 
consequential uncertainty. Prospective considerations function as a supplement 
to retrospection, providing moral coherence for the eventual legal order in 
which Hindley stays in jail until her death and Thompson and Venables go free 
early. The problem, of course, is that, although the narrative is vital in providing 
moral coherence, since it is itself a rhetorical construct, this coherence is given 
to undecidability. This observation can be located within the language of 
deconstruction in the same way as Re A. Retrospectively determined criminal 
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responsibility cannot be adequately determined in absence of prospective 
factors. Thus, prospective factors are introduced but with caution. From a 
deconstructive perspective, what is interesting here is that, because the 
introduction of consequentialist factors is both necessary and threatening for the 
possibility of principled judgments, this is embedded within an overtly moral 
rhetoric. Thus the House of Lords' rejection of Hindley's contention that she 
should be given a finite tariff had to be contained within a retrospective 
argument that, in a retributivist sense, Hindley's crime deserved a particularly 
harsh punishment. Similarly the early release of Thompson and Venables on 
grounds of their reform and welfare is only introduced with the assertion that, as 
young children in 1993, they must escape the vicissitudes of retibutivism. This 
introduction of retributivrn's 'other' gives rise to precisely the kind of 
undecidability that Derrida identifies as the relationship between speech and 
writing. The 'other' is introduced as a mere supplement (e. g. writing as an aid to 
living memory, consequentialism as an aid to retributivism), implying that it 
occupies a subordinate position with respect to the primary concept. In the tariff 
judgments, the subordinate position of the consequentialism is maintained 
through reminders that it is only being allowed to enter the realm of principled 
judgment because retributivism as primary concept has already performed the 
initial task of identifying desert - and consequentialism would serve simply to 
bolster this assessment. Hence we learn that Hindley's crime was 'uniquely evil' 
and that Thompson and Venables' being children in 1993 was an 'overriding 
factor'. This is reminiscent of the master/servant hierarchy between principle 
and consequentialism (in which the latter serves to strengthen an already 
complete position) as between speech and writing. However, as seen in the 
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sections above, those who have attempted to wield 'writing' as a mere 
supplement have failed to confine it to this secondary role. As Austin fails to 
confine 'non-serious' speech-acts to a place that will not threaten his determinate 
context of serious (and hence meaningful) speech, the judges deployment of 
consequential ism within the rhetoric of retributivism cannot serve as an aid to 
judgment without also undermining the integrity of the principled foundation. 
As seen in Chapter Four, consequentialism can be regarded, less as a 
subordinate and a support to retributivism, and more as retributivism's primary 
determinative factor. 
The reason why this failure comes about is the same as the Court of 
Appeal's failure to secure the certainty of the principled foundation of their 
decision in Re A. Since prospective consequences cannot be determined a 
priori, and because the apparently principled part of the judgment (the 
identification of the qualities of the rational individual) are dependent upon 
these contingencies, then no part of a judgment of principle can be called de- 
ontological. No part of the judgment can be given its own determinate context. 
Since it is itself constructed through consequentialist factors, this context is 
always open to doubt, uncertainty, reconstruction and reinvention. In other 
words, the context of principled judgment is infinite, reflecting the infinity of 
possible consequences, and hence the judgment is ultimately undecidable. 
4. Conclusion 
Given that the principles of legal judgment are deconstructed through 
identifying their rhetorical and metaphorical determinations, we might wish to 
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view the principles of the individual, of the right to life and retributivism as just 
another 'kind of writing'. Like everything else, it is determined only by 
metaphor and rhetoric, not by purely pre-determined a priori foundations, and 
hence has no meaning outside of deployment in rhetoric. If nothing else, the 
discussion of this chapter should show that, considered as a collection of 
rhetorical turns and metaphorical devices, the language of legal judgment can be 
viewed as finding its principled foundations, not by deontological principle 
itself, but through whatever rhetoric is at hand to make up for the deficiencies of 
meaning in principled reasoning. However, such a position is far from 
uncontroversial. The next chapter argues that, while certain inheritors of 
deconstruction - including Rorty and Fish - celebrate this rhetoricising of 
principled concepts, others flatly condemn it, insisting that deconstruction so 
deployed can only be debilitating for political and ethical critique. 
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Chapter 6 
Interpretive and Critical Perspectives on Deconstruction and its 
Implications for Philosophical and Political Critique 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter I hope to address some key areas of debate concerning the 
interpretation and criticism of the strategies of deconstruction concerning its 
implications for political and legal scholarship. Owing to its uneasy 
juxtaposition to Philosophy and critical theory, deconstruction is subject to a 
vast range and depth of criticism, much of which is marked with a profound 
bewilderment and grievance. There is a feeling amongst certain critics that 
deconstruction's implications for meaning threaten the very possibility of 
radical thought and its proclaimed noble aims of emancipation, democracy and 
justice. This is fiercely contested, again on political grounds, ' because it relates 
to what deconstruction can usefully offer to debates on law and ethics. Certainly 
it would appear that, given Derrida's identification of the search for solid 
theoretical foundations as a nostalgia for a lost origin that never existed in the 
first place, deconstruction leaves itself a precarious position from which to make 
any strong assertions of its own. Although not providing any definitive 
' See Chapter One, s. 4, pp. 50- 1, supra, for a definition of 'political' critique. We are concerned 
here with deciding whether or not deconstruction facilitates or undermines such critique. A I 
specific concern here is whether our definition of the political can be sustained in the context 
of deconstruct ion's problernatising of the distinction between 'text' and the 'real'. 
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solutions, this chapter will attempt to demonstrate how the possible ethical and 
political significance of deconstruction depends upon whether one emphasises 
the philosophical or the more poetic aspects of Derrida's writings. 
A summary examination of the critical literature on Derrida and 
deconstruction suggests that writers engaging in this debate broadly fall into 
three camps, each of which also incorporates much divergence and difference. 
First, there are those,, including Habermas, 2 Eagleton 3 and Rose, 4 who associate 
deconstruction with Postmodernism and dismiss both for their tendency to lack 
careful analysis, to over-generalise and to conflate distinct discourses (most 
commonly cited examples being the conflation of 'science' and 'literature'; also 
of 'truth' and 'rhetoric'). These critics fear that deconstruction is an agent of 
nihilism and relativism,, and that it debilitates serious critical thought. Secondly, 
there are the pragmatist theorists such as Fish 5 and Rorty, 6 who accept and 
celebrate the supposed collapse of distinctions which philosophers are keen to 
preserve. For these critics, judgement and interpretation is not a matter of 
isolating the conditions for a meaningful decision, but of relativistic and poetic 
playfulness. The third camp is that which distinguishes deconstruction and 
Postmodernism, prioritising the former over the latter in terms of persuasiveness 
2 Habermas, J. The Philosophical Discourses of Modernity, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990a) 
3 Eagleton, T. The Illusions of Postmodernism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) 
4 Rose, G. Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996) 
5 See Fish, S. Doing What Comes Naturally: Change Rhetoric and the Practice of Literary and 
Legal Studies (Durham, N. C. & London: Duke University Press, 1989) 
6 See Rorty, R. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989) 
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and academic respectability. For these theorists, including Norris, 7 Gasch68 and 
Bernstein, 9 the comments made by the first two camps about deconstruction and 
postmodernism are redirected to point only at the latter. Deconstiruction is 
characterised, not as a nihilistic or relativising force, but as a serious 
philosophical perspective, upholding and maintaining many of the concepts of 
modem philosophy such as reason and truth. For these thinkers, deconstruction 
looks more like another philosophical approach, rather than the wholesale 
undermining of philosophy that the other groups regard it as. Critics that I 
identify as falling into one group or another are differentiated on a number of 
points that I do not want to ignore. The similarities drawn between them are 
very much a case of loose family resemblances rather than strong alliances. 
See Norris, C. What's Wrong With Postmodernism? Critical Theory and the Ends of 
Philosophy (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1990). See also Norris, C. 
Deconstruction and the Unfinished Project of Modernity (London: Athlone Press, 2000) 
GascM, R. The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy ofReflection (Cambridge, 
Mass. & London, 1986) 
9 Bemstein, R. J. The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernityl 
Postmodernity (Cambridge: Polity Press in Association with Basil Blackwell, 1991) 
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2. Philosophy, Politics, Critique 
2.1 Philosophical Criticisms 10 
Deconstruction, when interpreted as a species of Postmodernism that levels the 
distinction between philosophy and literature, has predictably prompted 
vehement opposition. Critics complain that deconstruction tends to vastly over- 
simplify the object of its own critique (namely 'western thought' - that it relies 
upon crude conceptions of rationality, essence, universality, truth, history, 
representation, morality, etc)' 1 and that it over-draws the instances of failure and 
limitation found there-in. The problem is exacerbated in two ways. First, in 
throwing away the modernist idea of rational critique, Postmodernism protects 
itself from counter-criticism; the very foundation from which criticism is made 
Postmodernism rejects and refuses to recognise. Secondly, freed from such 
constraints, Postmodern. writers feel free to adopt a style of delivery that is 
playful, literary, 'non-philosophical', making arguments at best difficult to 
follow and at worst simply unintelligible in the ordinary philosophical or critical 
10 The term 'Philosophical' is used here to identify critique that focuses upon the way in which 
certain concepts are defined, distinguished and manipulated - including the concept of 
'philosophy' itself and its relation to literature. Although philosophical critique is treated as 
different to political critique here, there are similarities. Just as some dismiss deconstruction 
for undermining the 'political' values of, say, social justice or human emancipation, others 
complain that dec on structi on's problematising the possibility of stating with certainty how 
things stand in reality undermines the values of philosophy (of clarity and certainty). 
'' Ellis, J. Against Deconstruction (New Haven, Conn.: Princeton University Press, 1989) 
p. 138 
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sense. 12 Critics regard the resistance to reductive simplifications of their own 
concepts of freeplay, diffiftance, differend etc as little more than intellectual 
cowardice. Deconstruction resists the simple identification of signifer with 
signified and hence the simple definition of its own concepts, because 'total' 
meaning always escapes into further signification. Ellis challenges the 
purveyors of Postmodemism and deconstruction to show exactly what is lost by 
such a clarification in terms that can be understood and appreciated on the level 
of traditional criticism. 13 If this cannot be done, argues Ellis, then 
deconstruction will remain impenetrable and productive debate will always be 
impossible; 14 any 'challenge' which resists lucid and brief statement is no 
challenge at all. 15 But showing 'exactly what is lost' is itself not a simple matter 
for deconstruction, since this would in itself require a limit to signification. 16 
This has led to an understandable feeling that Postmodernism and 
deconstruction shows a lack of sportsmanship, and in refusing to allow 
philosophy and criticism to engage it, lacks relevance and interest. However, as 
philosophers of deconstruction have pointed out, it is not always clear exactly 
who or what these critics are aiming their comments at. ' 7 
12 Ibid, p. 142 
13 Ibid, p. 150 
14 Ibid 
15 lbid, p. 149 
16 That which Derrida notes in western thought as the Trancendental Signifier, concepts like 
Heidegger's notion of Being, which calls a halt to difference in order that meaning can find a 
resting point. 
17 Deconstruction as a form of Postmodernism is a Rortyan interpretation, but this is not 
acknowledged in Ellis's writings. Ellis is wrong to suggest that Derrida tries to ensure that I 
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For Ellis and Eagleton, Derrida's writing tends to construct modernist 
notions such as essentialism and teleology as much more far-reaching and fixed 
than anyone really holds them to be. Essentialism is simply the "trivially, self- 
evidently true" 18 fact that things, including Postmodem theory, have certain 
essential qualities; indeterminacy at the borders and eternal doubt as to what is 
essential does not undermine this. 19 Essential qualities must be identifiable, 
argues Eagleton, otherwise words and concepts would have no meaning. 20 
Similarly, says Eagleton, no-one believes that 'teleology' is the inevitable 
onward march towards enlightenment and freedom that the Postmodems 
caricature it to be, but simply the notion that certain conditions are necessary for 
establishing certain other things. 21 Eagleton's point is that the only way in 
which Postmodem theory can attack modem philosophy's concepts is to read 
them in a way that is too far reaching and rigid to be of any use and hence 
ridiculously homogenising. The Postmoderns' own characterisation of the 
criticism can only be directed away from and never towards him. The characterisation of 
western thought as a set of binary oppositions, expressed in the speech/writing pair may in 
itself be simplistic, but the significance of this insight is not. The point is that meaning in the 
sense of full presence in part escapes binary oppositions. Therefore it is perhaps more accurate 
to say that criticism itseýf is made problematic, though of course this does not really assuage 
the critics' frustration. Eagleton argues that there is much less to Postmodernism and 
deconstruction than is first apparent from its difficult prose. Eagleton argues that Postmodem 
analyses of western thought grossly simplifies, thus contradicting its own rhetoric of plurality 
and heterogeneity. (See Eagleton (1996) supra, n. 3, p. 26). 
18 Ibid, p. 97 
19 lbid, p. 99 
20 Ibid, p. 102-3 3 
21 lbid, p. 106 
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history of western philosophy has this fault. It is "flatten[ed]" by the "same 
tedious saga" - all is homogenized into a universal story of metaphysics. 
22 In 
other words, Postmodernism essentialises its object in the pejorative sense. 
Eagleton complains that, whereas the philosophers that Derrida deconstructs 
have taken pains to carefully construct an argument with sensitivity towards 
doubt and other points of view, Derrida's characterisation of them as naYvely 
relying upon a false pedestal of speech and writing is a crude approach. 23 Ellis's 
diagnosis is more damning still. He regards Derrida's undermining of binary 
opposites as one crude simplification being replaced by another, and textuality 
being an "incoherent" notion. 24 
22 Ibid, p. 34 
23 Ibid., p. 26 
24 Ellis (1989) supra, n. 11, p. 140. For Ellis, this operation ignores a vast amount of important 
philosophical 'grey', and behind such obfuscatory notions as metaphysics of presence and 
diffdrance lie very mundane, primitive and simplistic ideas (ibid, p. 142) such as "look[ing] 
carefully"(ibid, p. 144) at a text and accepting that one reader's interpretation is not final - and 
who would be interested in a critical argument that simply said that? If it were not for 
Derrida's pretentious and "tortuous prose" this would be recognised immediately (ibid, p. 142- 
44). Ellis does not, however, engage with the specific details of Derrida's deconstruction of 
western philosophers. To a lesser extent this is arguably also true in Eagleton's case for, just as 
Derrida might be criticised for his general i sations, so Eagleton's criticisms are often directed at 
"Postmodemism" and "cleconstruction" without any serious effort to identity the relationship 
or differences between these labels. It is perhaps indicative of the uneasy (undecideable? ) 
critical distance between 'modem' and 'Postmodem' theory that, despite complaining that 
Derrida's characterisation of 'Western Thought' is too broad, blunt and simplified to have any 
real significance, their criticisms of deconstruction prefer to emphasise the problematic 
implications of textuality and diff6rance rather than engage with the concepts philosophically. 
Ellis "fail[s] to engage with Derrida's work beyond the most superficial, or second-hand level 
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2.2 Political Criticisms 
The arguments variously made by Habermas, Searle and Rose in criticising 
deconstruction as an aspect of Postmodemism aim to cut it down at the level of 
its implications for political critique. Rose agrees with Eagleton that Derrida's 
deconstruction of the canons of western thought reduces its many different 
aspects to a caricatured 'history of writing'. 25 In his claim that western 
philosophy all relates to a metaphoric conception of 'writing', Derrida glosses 
over important areas of debate and mutes a rich history of ideas. For example 
Rousseau's Confessions is a text relating to a wide spectrum of social theory, 
but Derrida reduces Rousseau to a nostalgic who dreams of a non-existent 
utopic age of ideal speech. 26 Rose argues that the championing of the 'other' 
merely ensures that "[i]t is the abused who become the abusers', 27 since he 
merely reverses structures of coercion without any hope of emancipation. Fiss 
raises related concerns when he argues that Derrida's strategy of reducing forms 
of language to rhetorical turns is a road to nihilism. 28 
of acquaintance. " (Norris (1990) supra, n. 7, p. 139) Similarly Habermas's and Searle's Derrida 
as relativist apparently has more to do with their own limited intellectual grasp of the range of 
Derrida's work than cleconstruction itself (ibid, p. 49). 
25 Rose, G. Dialectic of Nihilism: Poststructuralism and the Law (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987) 
p. 147-8 
26 Ibid, p. 141 
2' Rose ( 1996) supra, n. 4, p. 5 
2' Fiss, 0. 'Objectivity and Interpretation' (1982) 34 Stanford L. Rev, pp. 739-63 
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It is this concern for the possibility of political and ethical critique that 
motivates the fiercest criticisms. Eagleton contends that Postmodernism and 
deconstruction represent a fashionable retreat into irrelevance and a cutting off 
from the real concerns of the world . 
29 The undermining of universal foundations 
means evils such as fascism cannot be resisted with any argument stronger than 
"the feebly pragmatic plea that fascism is not the way we do things in Sussex or 
Sacramento .,, 
30 The crux of Eagleton's argument against Postmodernism is that 
it is a wrong-ended approach. Instead of seeing what are the urgent human 
problems of starvation, malnutrition, violations of human dignity, economic 
injustice and political oppression, Postmoderns simply turn the problems of 
29Eagleton (1996) supra, n. 3, p. 23. See also Edward Said, who argues that Derrida's concem 
with textuality exposes "an extremely pronounced self-limitation", since the idea that all is text 
shows no commitment to "knowledge" or "freedom, oppression or justice (Said, E. W. The 
World, The Text and the Critic, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983) p. 214. 
"[Deconstruction] is a pedagogy that gives the voice of teachers a kind of inverse and 
unlimited sovereignty allowing them to indefinitely rewrite the text. " ((1983: 213); quoting 
Foucault, M. (1972) Histoire de la Folie, p. 602). 
30 Eagleton (1996) supra, n. 3, p. 28; Similarly, Sheriff feels that Derrida's exclusive focus upon 
writing cannot achieve more than the negative lesson that all meaning is vulnerable to further 
deferment and difference (Sheriff, J. K. The Fate of Meaning: Charles Peirce, Structuralism 
and Literature, (Princeton N. J. & Guildford: Princeton University Press, 1989) p. 32) and 
needs to be supplemented by an account of who is interpreting in order to enable political 
critique. Like Derrida, Peirce's theory of meaning contends that no thought is original - one 
gives rise to another infinitely (ibid, pp. 127-9). However unlike Derrida, Peirce does not 
bracket the 'real world', but rather always takes account of who is interpreting (ibid, p. 32) and 
therefore can positively account for differences of perspective. 
21) 
Chapter 6 
moral fracture, relativism and dislocation into a virtue. 31 Therefore the 
Postmodern. rejection of concepts such as universalism and teleology is 
motivated by the wrong concerns. Even if these tools are merely the charred 
remains of long-dead Eighteenth Century enlightenment humanist rationalism, 
they are nevertheless a better basis for arguments for emancipation and political 
action than the relativism of deconstruction. 32 Norris agrees with Eagleton and 
the others that there is no significant critical mileage in postmodernism's 
undermining of philosophical concepts, describing this approach as "a 
wholesale collapse of moral and intellectual nerve". 33 
Rose's engagement with Derrida's deconstruction of Marx suggest a 
similar frustration with the politically debilitating effects of undecidability. Rose 
is furious with Derrida's undermining of Marx's politically significant 
theorisation of the commodity. Whereas Marx has distinguished between real 
use-value and spectral exchange-value, Derrida collapses the distinction to 
reveal a world of "dim and doubtfully real persons', 34 and detracts from 
engagement with questions of power and politics. 35 The concept of the 
1 Eagleton, ibid, p. 32. See also Swain, S. 'Postmodem Narratives and the Absurdity of Law' 
in Earnshaw, S. (ed. ) Just Postmodernism (Amsterdam-Atlanta, G. A.: Rodpi, 1997) pp. 1-28, 
pp. 6-7 
32 Eagleton, supra, n. 3, p. 104 
3 3Norris, C. (2000) supra, n. 7, p. 19 
34 Rose (1996) supra, n. 4, p. 67 
35 Ibid, p. 70. Rose's own project, to which we shall return in the next chapter, is to plot the 
course between the singular experience of justice and law as institutional representation. Rose 
regards that distinctions such as that between use value and exchange value show us that there I 
is possibility of conceiving such a course and hence a more just future. Prior to 
cornmodification there was a sensuous, singular object, free of corrupting exchange value, and 
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commodity as separate from the singular is important for this type of political 
critique. It provides a useful perspective on the modem bureaucratic state as the 
menacing result of the loss of control and alienation that commodification 
brings. 36 Since, for Derrida, the pre-commodified object was always missing - 
always commodified - we can never experience that singularity itself Justice as 
a singular moment is experienced as the loss of singularity, since it can only be 
represented to us in law -a form that, in functioning through exchange and 
equivalence, will always be an injustice in the singular instance. Rose argues 
that this conception of justice engenders a situation of eternal despair. In later 
writings, Derrida's view of the work of mourning seems to accept Rose's vision 
of despair as a judgment of the international political landscape. In his response 
to the September II th attacks, Derrida argues that the war on terror bears all the 
hallmarks of a trauma that can never be overcome: a mourning over a tragedy 
37 
that has no definite end . In a war on an enemy that has no particular 
nationality or power base the worst tragedy will always be to come: the spectres 
hence an experience of that which we might, without cynicism, call 'justice'. Thus there is the 
residual hope that, given enough time and hard work, the institutions of modem law can 
overcome the loss of this experience of singularity within law. When Derrida suggests that 
there probably never was an innocent, purely sensuous object prior to commodification, he 
cuts off all hope of overcoming the loss and thus of reconciling law as a system of 
representation with an ethics of singularity. 
36Buchman, A. E. Marx andJustice: The Radical Critique ofLiberalism (London: Methuen, 
1982). See also Avineri, S. The Social and Political Thought ofKarl Marx (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1968) pp. 17-24 1 
37 Borradori, G. Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jurgen Habermas and 
Jacques Derrida (Chicago, I. L. and London: University of Chicago Press, 2003) p. 198 
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of chemical, biological and nuclear attack launched by an unseen foe uPon the 
cities of America and its allies prevent mourning completing its work. 38 
3. Rorty, Pragmatism and Literary Deconstruction 
The 'literary', or 'poetic' interpretation of deconstruction represented here 
primarily by the writings of Rorty, is one that prioritises literary notions of 
metaphor, narrative and rhetoric over philosophical truth, reason and critique. 
The distinction between the literary critic and the philosopher is broken down in 
the sense that all discourse, whether serious or non-serious, fact or fiction, is 
marked by the indeterminacy that Derrida describes as 'writing. In the place of 
serious philosophy, Rorty enthrones playful and stimulating uses of language 
that highlight the contingency of our language. At its best, claims Rorty, 
deconstruction allows us to appreciate the contingency of the rhetoric that we 
use, although it is highly problematic as a basis for political or ethical critique. 
3.1 Rorty ys Theoretical Perspective 
Rorty's interpretation of Derrida is a starting point for his own anti- 
foundational, anti -metaphysical, anti-essentialist, pragmatic perspective. He 
asserts that Derrida shows that all philosophy leads, not to rational foundation 
38 Ibid, p. 197 
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and principle, but simply to more and more philosophy. 
39 Since philosophy so 
conceived has no logical end point it should be regarded in the same way as the 
endless sprawl of poetry and literature - as just another "kind of writing". 
40 
Rorty reiterates this point in Deconstruction and Circumvention where he 
dismisses philosophers who strive for truth as "loveable old-fashioned prigs". 41 
For Rorty, philosophy endlessly adds to what is already there - an infinite chain 
of supplements which cannot tell us the truth about the world any more than 
poetry. All that we know of the world is the way in which we speak about it for 
our own understanding and action. It is thus pointless to strive to understand the 
'truth' or 'essence' of the questions that tax us, as any such truths can only exist 
as effects of linguistic ordering. 42 A Darwinian account of how leopards came to 
have spots on their fur is no more 'correct' than Rudyard Kipling's 43 because 
there is no transcendental third position from which to make an objective 
comparison. Darwin and Kipling simply present different narratives, producing 
different effects with different applications. Rorty's idea of pragmatic 
deconstruction is philosophically and morally relativist; no judgment between 
Rorty, R. 'Philosophy as a kind of writing: An Essay on Derrida' in New Literary History 
(1978) Vo. 10 pp. 141-5; also printed in McQuillan, M. Deconstruction: A Reader (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2000) p. 125 
40 McQuillan, Ibid, p. 123. Gaschd regards Rorty to have misinterpreted Derrida's idea of 
4writing' to mean 'literature'. Gaschd insists that, rather than having any such essence of its 
own, writing merely "accounts for the necessary corruption of the idealities, or transcendentals 
of all sorts... " (Gasch6 (1986) supra, n. 8, p. 274) 
" Rorty, R. 'Deconstruction and Circumvention' in Rorty, R. Essays on Heidegger and 
Others. - Philosophical Papers Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 199 1) p. 85 
42 Rorty (1989) supra, n. 6, p. 5 
See Kipling, R. How the Leopard Got His Spots (London: MacMillan, 1972) C) 
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language's metaphors is possible except insofar as what we happen to prefer at 
any given time. 
Despite finding his pragmatic perspective in Derrida's prioritisation of 
writing over speech, Rorty disconnects this rather more philosophical aspect of 
Derrida from his own pragmatism. 44 Rorty's own concem, which he claims is 
different both to Derrida's early metaphysical philosophy and to his later, more 
4 45 poetic' work , 
is to increase the reach of American liberal democracy through 
"public rhetoric". 46 For Rorty, this involves working to realize the hopes of 
liberal societies and combat human cruelty, through pragmatic, poetic re- 
descriptions of ourselves. What is important, insists Rorty, is not the accuracy or 
truth of any of these descriptions, but the interest and usefulness that they have 
for us in this task. 47 Rorty uses Derrida (and also Nietzsche and Foucault) as an 
48 
example of the kind of person that understands the value of contingency. For 
such people 'discoveries' and 'insights' of science or philosophy are actually 
just "metaphoric re-descriptions 11 . 
49 The change of perspective is effected not 
44 For Rorty, the implication that diffdrance dictates a law of language shows a dangerous 
tendency for Derrida to "imitate the thing he hates" (Rorty (1991) supra, n. 41, p. 93) rather 
like Orwell's Napoleon and the other pigs when they begin to walk on two legs at the end of 
Animal Farm in imitation of their deposed former master, Fanner Jones. 
45 Rorty, R. 'From Ironist Theory to Private Allusions: Derrida' in Rorty (199 1) supra, n. 4 1, 
p. 125. See also Rorty (1989) supra, n. 6, p. 65, pp. 94-5 
46 Rorty (1989) ibid., p. 85 
47 lbid, pp. 85-6 
48 Ibid, p. 46 
49 lbid, p. 16 
218 
Chapter 6 
because the former description was wrong, but because people find a new 
50 description more interesting or useful . 
The extent to which Derrida's own works support a pragmatic or 
relativistic perspective is debatable. The previous chapter interpreted Derrida's 
deconstruction of Plato as prioritising metaphor over philosophy. In his essay on 
Levi-Strauss, Derrida provides ammunition for Rorty's interpretation of 
deconstruction as creating an infinite expanse of writing, in which play of 
meaning is infinite. Here, Derrida describes the rupture of western philosophy's 
centeredness: 
"This was the moment when language invaded the universal 
problematic, the moment when, in the absence of a center or 
origin, everything became discourse - provided we can agree on 
this word - that is to say, a system in which the central signified, 
the original or transcendental signified, is never absolutely 
present outside a system of differences. The absence of the 
50 Ibid, p. 17. The very basic deconstructive notion of meaning as excessive of attempts to 
understand it fully has spawned many disciples. Bruns adopts Bakhtin's idea of language as a 
stratification of intermingling, heterogeneous discourses to argue that "understanding" the law 
entails understanding it in its contingency Bruns, G. L. Tragic Thoughts at the End of 
Philosophy: Language, Literature and Ethical Theory (Illinois: North-Western University 
Press, 1999) p. 65. It makes sense, he argues, to think of language anarchically because this 
allows one to create a space for radical questioning and escape the limitations of the "prison- 
house" of analytic philosophy (1999: 67). 
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transcendental signified extends the domain and the play of 
signification infinitely. " [emphasis added] 51 
Derrida seems to be describing something akin to the biblical Fall of Man: the 
mythic origin of Man's first vain attempt to grasp at the root of true knowledge. 
and his subsequent eternal separation from it. 52 Support for this reading is 
arguably to be found in Derrida's essay on the "white mythology") of western 
philosophy - the myth that first there was philosophy, which masters and uses 
metaphor to deliver its argument. It is the myth that philosophers may use 
metaphorical language to illustrate their concepts, but simultaneously keep 
metaphor at arm's length; that despite playing a central role in philosophical 
argument and reflection, metaphor remains exterior to philosophy. Such a belief 
in the exteriority of metaphor and originality of philosophy is a myth, because, 
as Derrida argues, there can be no access to concepts without "figurative 
representation, ý. 53 Each time the philosopher gives an explanation of anything he 
must rely upon figurative representation. So philosophical concepts find their 
own origin in metaphor - an origin that is forgotten because the language is 
51 Derrida, J. Writing and Difference, Bass, A. (trans. ) (London and New York, N. Y.: 
Routledge, 2002a) p. 354 
52 See Genesis 3 
5' Derrida, J. 'White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy' in Derrida, J. Margins of 
Philosophy, Bass, A. (trans. ) (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1982) p. 207. Derrida suggests, 
for instance, that as a movement from one signified meaning to another, philosophical 'insight' 
shows itself to be founded on a metaphor of "darkness and light" (Derrida (2002a) supra, n. 5 1, 
p. 3) I ). The grasping of philosophical truth is expressed as a repetition of the emergence from 
Plato's cave. 
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adopted and put into use by philosophy. 54 Derrida argues that even if one were 
to investigate and expose all philosophical uses of metaphor, this will imply a 
philosophical system which will have a metaphorical origin that is not itself 
accounted for. One metaphor always escapes, because being contained within 
the grounds upon which a given critique is built, it cannot itself be subject to 
critique. 55 The implication of this is that it is impossible for philosophy to 
dominate metaphor or to sustain an essential distinction between truth and 
metaphor or philosophy and poetry. 'Truth', then, is the product of metaphor 
and so is a shifting, indeterminate notion. As Nietzsche famously put it, 'truth' 
is nothing but... 
64 a mobile army of metaphors... a sum of human relations 
which became poetically and rhetorically intensified,... and after 
long usage seemed to a nation fixed, canonic and binding; truths 
are illusions of which one has forgotten that they are 
illusions. )956 
Derrida's proximity to Nietzsche's position is also a contested question, 
and Rorty's interpretation has many opponents. However, Rorty's idea that 
Derrida's interrogation of binary oppositions breaks down the distinctions 
between philosophy and metaphor, truth and rhetoric, fact and value - leaving 
Derrida ( 19 82) supra, n. 5 3, p. 21 I 
15 Ibid. p. 219-20 
56 From Nietzsche, F. 'On Truth and Falsity in Their Ultramoral Sense' quoted by Derrida 
(1982) supra, n. 53, p-217 
221 
Chapter 6 
political and moral action without any foundation except as simply that which 
we do, believe or think in a certain community at a given point in history - is 
enthusiastically adopted by theorists such as Stanley Fish. For these theorists, 
the anti -foundational 'pragmatic' approach has positive implications for 
political and ethical thinking. Fish's argument is that no philosophical 
explanation can be prior to rhetorical language, but that this 'fact' has not 
persuaded scholars to give up the dream of establishing philosophical truth. As 
for Rorty, so for Fish there is nothing self-evidently true; all knowledge is 
produced by rhetoric and interpretation which could change to produce new and 
different truths when required. 57 
3.2 Political Significance of Pragmatism and Literary Deconstruction 
What are the ethical or political implications of interpreting Derrida as inverting 
the philosophy/metaphor and truth/rhetoric oppositions? If deconstruction 
brings all discourse down to the level of more or less edifying rhetoric, then 
what kind of political, legal or ethical system remains? The problem of 
prioritising rhetoric over literal (or 'true') meaning is acknowledged by other 
theorists who attempt to head off the accusations from philosophers that 
57 Fish characterises "the history of western thought" as the eternal battle between the "serious 
man" of philosophy and "rhetorical man" (Fish (1989) supra, n. 5, pp. 482-4). Fish contrasts 
Derrida with Habermas, Austin and Searle who believe (wrongly, Fish asserts) that philosophy 
promises the discovery of truth (ibid, p. 498). "Whatever is invoked as a constraint on 
interpretation will turn out, upon further examination, to have been the product of 
interpretations" (ibid, p. 5 12). 
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deconstruction's notions of textuality and diff6rance make it nihilistic. 58 
Deconstruction as the leveller of truth and metaphor cannot work for a political 
or ethical theory because, as the critics below argue, political struggle and 
ethical demands require a stronger foundation than the infinitely indefinite play 
of metaphor that this reading of deconstruction offers. For Derrida there is no 
possibility of invulnerability to the failure of definite meaning, but as Sheriff 
argues, this is not an insight of any political significance unless the particular 
strategies involved in the interpretation of a text or an event can be investigated. 
Rorty's political impetus is that the construction of metaphysical 
foundations of morality and human nature are not useful for actually achieving 
the freedom that they promise. Rorty insists that the reduction of discourses 
about ourselves and the world to poetic imaginings makes possible an infinite 
58 Bill Readings admits that converting deconstruction into any political theory would require 
it to definitively ground a particular interpretation of the world and its needs, thus immediately 
contradicting its own foundation that there can be no halt to the play of diffdrance (Readings, 
B. 'The Deconstruction of Politics' in Waters, L. and Godzick, W. (ed. ) Reading de Man 
Reading (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989) pp. 223-44. See also McQuillan 
(2000) supra, n. 39, pp. 388-396, pp. 389-90). Similarly, Spivak regards that cleconstruction 
cannot directly ground any political programme except for a "wishy-washy pluralism on the 
one hand or a kind of irresponsible hedonism on the other. " (Spivak, G. C. 'Practical Politics 
of the Open End' in McQuillan (2000) pp. 397-404, p. 398. See also Spivak, G. C. 
'Revolutions that as Yet Have no Model' in Diacritics (1980) vol. 10 pp. 24-49). Critchley 
remarks that, whilst Derrida's deconstruction provides tools for criticism and undermining 
legitimacy, it provides no basis for positive, decisive political decision. Derrida can only 
conceive the "instant of decision [as] madness" (Quote from Derrida (2002a) supra, n. 5 1, 
p. 3 6) and as such reaches an impasse (Critchley, S. The Ethics of Deconstruction (Oxford and 
Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992) pp. 199-200). 
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range of potentially fruitful political and ethical debate that 'serious' philosophy 
only serves to obstruct. Rorty believes that what is left after this insight is 
accepted is the liberal hopeful ideal of 'freedom', which he refers to with 
Fukuyaman fatalism: "... westem social and political thought may have had the 
last conceptual revolution it needs". 59 Rorty states that liberalism's core value is 
freedom for people to create their own self-identities, and whatever discourse 
helps to encourage this should be itself encouraged. Freedom can only be 
promoted effectively by adopting an attitude of "ironism" - that all forms of 
culture that may be appropriated dialectically to create new forms of self-image, 
ethics and politics. 60 No foundational ground for achieving this goal is any more 
valid than any other (including human rights), except insofar as the usefulness 
and interest they bring for people exercising their freedom of self-creation. 61 
Rorty is certain that different communities of people will adopt whatever 
metaphorical descriptions suit their needs on all forms of organisation. On this 
account, there is no need for philosophical theories of ethics and morality. Such 
matters are entirely contextual, historical, contingent. 62 Political and moral 
philosophies can give us images of a possible future - say of all people living 
together in peace and security - but their theorisations on human nature should 
only be adopted if we find them useful for actually achieving this future. 63 
59 Rorty (1989) supra, n. 6, p. 63 
60 Ibid, p. 83 
61 Ibid., p. 84-5 
62 Rorty ( 199 1) supra, n. 4 1, p. 192 
63 Rorty, R. 'Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality' in Shute, S. and Hurley, S. On 
Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures (New York, N. Y: Basic Books, 1993) p. 118 
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As well as the concern to realise individuals' freedom, a second concern 
central to Rorty's project is the problem of human suffering. His arguments on 
the political impetus of liberal ironism accept that humiliation and hurt are 
wrongs which must be alleviated. For Rorty it is the foundationalist questions 
such as 'how do you know thatT and " 'why should I not hurt anotherT ý64 and 
what is "the nature of man"? 65 that are irrelevant to politics because they simply 
get in the way of creating better worlds. Relevant questions are " 'why do you 
talk that wayT ", 66 since liberal ironists are concerned about what causes 
suffering and how to avoid this. 67 He identifies "our" western liberal culture of 
human rights as "morally superior', 68 to other cultures, but not because 'we' in 
the west have any special knowledge about human nature that others fail to 
grasp, but because the discourse of liberal democracy is more effective than 
other discourses for realising freedom and reducing suffering. Kantian moral 
philosophy is itself deemed to be implicated in the dehumanising violence 
against those considered as mere "pseudohumans , 69 since, as Rorty points out, 
the identification of one's enemy as something less than human is often used by 
aggressors to justify cruelty. Simply on practical terms, it does no good "to get 
such people to read Kant, and agree that one should not treat rational agents 
simply as means" because what it means to be human is relative to a particular 
64 Rorty (1989) supra, n. 6, p. 91 
65 Ibid, p. 8 
66 bid, p. 51 
67 bid, P. 91 
68 Ibid, p. 116 
69 Ibld, p. 112 
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community. 70 Since most people, insists Rorty, define themselves, not as human 
beings per se, but as "a certain good sort of human being", universal 
declarations on human nature cannot convince. 71 However, it is not clear that 
what one might describe as Rorty's strategic, ironic, culturally relative 
liberalism provides any greater hope of convincing such people. 72 If, as Rorty 
contends, what is right and wrong is entirely contingent upon local practises, 
then on what grounds can anyone complain about, say, institutional sexism and 
racism? Bernstein asserts that Rorty's ethnocentricity provides no answer to 
such questions. 73 One answer that Rorty does give, with which he threatens to 
undermine his own ironism, is that if there is a call for political or ethical action 
"well will recognise it. He writes: "It is part of the tradition of our community 
that the human stranger from whom all dignity has been stripped is to be taken 
in, to be re-clothed with dignity. 9ý74 Rorty's assertion is conftising because it 
appears to rely on accepting what can only be described as a matter of fact - that 
this is an accurate description of our community. Furthermore, precisely which 
community is Rorty referring to here, and which traditions? On this point Rorty 
is vague. 
75 
70 Ibid p. 124 
71 Ibid p. 126 
72 pool, S. Review article in Review p. 3 1, The Guardian, 12/4/03 
73 Bemstein (199 1) supra, n. 9, p. 242-3 
74 Rorty (199 1) supra, n. 4 1, p. 202 
75 Bernstein notes that this could refer to any number of communities, none of which Rorty 
defines or differentiates - "we liberals", "we pragmatists", "we inheritors of European 
civilisation". It is naYve because it assumes that 'our' traditions are predominantly benevolent. 
For Bernstein, the traditions associated with these communities might involve elements of 
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It seems that Rorty's reply defeats his own insistence that the old 
metaphysical shackles can be kicked away (and hence his reading of 
deconstruction as doing so), because he gives no indication as to how he can be 
sure that we would recognise the need for ethical or political action without 
access to certain metaphysical idealisations about what is right and wrong. In an 
effort to confirm his anti-metaphysical credentials, Rorty draws a distinction 
between a theoretical "foundation" and a "summary". Rorty characterizes the 
former as metaphysical claims to truth; the latter he regards as our "culturally 
influenced intuitions about the right thing to do". 76 He argues that the tendency 
to summarize rather than build foundations is indicative of a 'Darwinian' desire 
to look to building a better future rather than dwell, vainly on our true nature as 
humans. This desire, coupled with increased wealth and security, has apparently 
"made possible an unprecedented acceleration in the rate of moral progress" 
since the French Revolution. 77 What is most startling about Rorty is the grand 
sweep of his style. Despite locating the force of his claim within the 
contingency of history rather than eternal or universal truths, his lack of 
attention to contingent detail is breathtaking. If we are to refuse all 
transcendental idealities, by what measure are we to judge Rorty correct on his 
assertion of 'unprecedented' moral development in recent years? If this 
judgement is to be made without metaphysics, where is the historical 
kindness and hospitality, but they also involve cruelty and violence towards outsiders. Despite 
being deployed uncritically as a fact in an argument in which there are supposedly no facts, 
this 'we' is not problernatised at all (Bernstein (199 1) supra, n. 9, p. 247), and there is no 
suggestion in Rorty that it is anything other than a grander "me". I 
76 Rorty in Shute and Hurley (1993) supra, n-63, p. 117 
77 Ibid, P. 12 1 
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scholarship to support his claim? Unfortunately, there is none: Rorty wants to 
convince his audience by the sheer pace and common-sense appeal of his 
rhetoric. He reminds us that slavery is wrong and now western liberal societies 
do not deal in slaves; similarly that genocide and torture are bad things and now 
we accordingly have the Geneva Convention. Written into the crucial ideas of 
4cruelty' and the ways of addressing it, is a foundational, metaphysical claim 
because, like A. J. Ayer's verification principle, it is something that itself 
escapes the kind of totality that the author's logic requires. As Critchley points 
out, this would suggest that Rorty is closer to the philosophical Derrida, whose 
later work is dominated by a concern for transcendental responsibility and 
otherness,, than he imagines. 78 
Other pragmatists fall into the same trap of falling back upon 
transcendental norms while at the same time insisting that such norms are 
unecessary. For instance Pitkin takes great care to construct an argument that 
one's understanding of justice is always detennined by the linguistic context in 
which one lives. Objects are created by, rather than simply labelled by, language 
and notions such as Iairness% 'justice' and 'God' do not exist for a person until 
they have learned how they are spoken about in their community. 79 Hannah 
Pitkin shows this in operation in Plato's Republic, in which, she argues, the 
differing definitions of justice given by Socrates and Thrasymachus result from 
playing different language games. Socrates, playing the 'ought' game, describes 
78 Critchley Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity (London and New York, N. Y.: Verso, 1999) p. 97 
79 Pitkin, H. Wittgenstein andJustice (Berkeley, C. A.: University of California Press, 1972) p. 
109; hence the many different words in Inuit languages for distinguishing types of 
precipitation that in English is simply known as 'snow'. 
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justice as a situation in which everyone does that which is appropriate to him. 80 
Thrasymachus, playing the 'is' game, looks around him and sees that actions 
done in the name of 'justice' display only self-interest and pursuit of power. 81 Is 
the dispute between the two figures in Plato's text just a matter of linguistic 
difference? If the answer were to remain consistent with the rest of her 
argument then this would be the case, but like Rorty, Pitkin recognises that this 
would close down the possibility of political judgment and therefore raising the 
risk of making her book irrelevant to critical thinking. She writes: "We are 
always potentially able to pry the idea loose from some particular example 
82 
the possibility for critical thought and remedial action is always there" . If this 
disconnection from linguistic context is always possible, then at some undefined 
point, meaning surely becomes transcendental. Meaning loses its mundane, 
pragmatic source (particular use of language) and once again becomes a 
mysterious and metaphysical ideal which 'we' somehow come to understand 
independently of our context. Diamond's pragmatism further illustrates the 
difficulty of maintaining a critical perspective without metaphysical 
assumptions. Why, asks Diamond, is it generally considered wrong to eat 
people? Diamond explains that what makes it 'wrong' is simply that people are 
not generally regarded as things one eats. Anyone living in a modem western 
society who thought and acted differently would be committing a violation of 
deeply ingrained western norms, but this does not mean that eating people is a 
80 lbid, p. 169 
81 Ibid, p. 178 
82 lbid, p. 191 --' 
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universal wrong. 83 Would Diamond be equally enthusiastic about applying this 
relativism to, say, genocide, rape and torture? If so then surely pragmatism has 
no critical bite at all. If not, we must yet again allow an uncontested 
metaphysical assumption as to the special position of human beings as 
compared to animals to enter our framework. I would suggest, therefore, that 
Critchley is correct to argue that pragmatism and relativism do not allow us to 
actually throw away our metaphysical assumptions. 
There remains a case to be made for the deconstructive levelling of the 
distinction between truth and rhetoric on political and grounds which can be 
distinguished from Rorty's attempts to tackle the practical issues of suffering 
and freedom. For all his radical rejection of the hallowed notions of truth and 
serious critique, Rorty's writings are characteristically 'political' in the 
traditional sense of attempting to move beyond 'pure' theory in order to 
influence practical or real change in the world. There is in Rorty, therefore, a 
crucial distinction between pure theory (or 'text') and practical action which is 
ripe for deconstruction. It is exactly this limitlessness of deconstruction - the 
unending collapsing of conceptual hierarchies - that Derrida's critics condemn 
as the enemy of political discourse (or 'action' as opposed to endless 'talk' ). 84 
However, I am trying to suggest that this very limitlessness itself has a political 
edge. To describe it requires a certain shift in our understanding of the idea of 
the political. If the political can itself be textual, then political theory must be 
83 Diamond, C. 'Eating Meat and Eating People' in Diamond, C. The Realist Spirit: ID 
Wittgenstein, Philosophy and the Mind (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995) p. 322 
81 Or as Dickens describes the interminable proceeding of the Court of Chancery in Bleak 
House, "the sickness of hope deferred" (London and New York, N. Y.: Penguin Books, 1985) 
p. 399. 
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understood, not so much as a direct employment of 'theory' to bring about 'real' 
change, but instead as an indeterminate questioning and reopening of our 
perspectives and attitudes. This is not to say that such a process does not have 
any application to the 'real', but the relationship between the 'real' world and 
our interpretations of it also becomes a matter for interpretation and 
reinterpretation. To regard such an understanding of political theory as making 
any sense, we are required to reconsider our expectations of it. What political 
theory as a deconstruction of the text/real distinction can achieve is clearly 
different from what, say, Eagleton regards as the duty of theory to provide a 
platform for condemning and outlining solutions to material deprivations. 
However, although clearly different to Eagleton, it may be a mistake to assume 
that a 'deconstructive' notion of the political is radically so. It really depends 
upon what one regards as making a difference in the realm of discussion of such 
matters. It is perhaps trite to point out that the controversy in matters that might 
be described as political - e. g. the Israel-Palestine question - lie in the linguistic 
categorisation and interpretation of events. Such interpretations may lead in turn 
to further interpretations and further events. But that which we call an 'event' 
and that which we call an 'interpretation' of an event itself suggests a 
conceptual ordering of things. The concern with the textuality of both sides of 
this order - the concem that Edward Said criticises as deconstruction's 
unfortunate limitation - prevents any one given interpretation to claim supreme 
status by moving outside of or above textuality. Political 'action' traditionally 
gains its force by distancing itself from the play of textuality; political action 
moves outside of textuality inasmuch as it deals with the real world of referents 
rather than the textual world of signifiers. On this view language is regarded 
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merely as a vehicle for finding the truth about the world and its needs. 
Arguments are made and interpretations given, but only insofar as these 
apparently give us the true picture of the world at the end of the day. Once 
research has revealed, say, the material conditions of the poor or the state of the 
environment, then the real action of alleviating poverty or limiting global 
warming can begin. So rhetoric is deployed in order to uncover the literally true 
and objective properties of things. 85 But Bill Readings points out that, if rhetoric 
is necessary to secure literality then 'literal meaning' as a movement outside the 
text is itself a process of rhetoric and metaphor. 86 Euben regards the refusal of 
political activists, scientists, logical positivists, etc to recognise the necessary 
interconnectedness between the 'real' and 'textual' worlds as "the American 
,, 87 metaphysics. Readings regards this insight not as signalling deconstruction's 
descent into nihilistic irrelevance, but as taking responsibility for the effects of 
interpretations of the world and for the possibility that our 'texts' might reveal 
meanings that we did not anticipate. 88 It implies, not a movement purely inside 
endless signification and textuality and thus inaction, but to an "interdependence 
and mutual contamination" of signifier and signified. Deconstruction's 
contribution to political and ethical debate will therefore always be 
controversial, since it operates to re-open questions that may otherwise be 
considered closed. It is in this constant re-opening that the transcendental aspect 
85Readings in McQuillan (2000) supra, n. 58, p. 393 
86 bid., p. 394 
87 Euban, J. P. 'Political Science and Political Science' in Green, P. and Levinson, S. Power 
and Community Dissenting Essays in Political Science (New York, N. Y.: Vintage Books, 
1970) pp. 3 -5 8, p. 19. 
88 See Critchley, S. (1992) supra, n. 58, p. 44-5 
232 
Chapter 6 
of deconstruction becomes apparent, since it points towards an infinite 
responsibility to risk moral censure by questioning accepted norms. In the 
context of recent political debates, one thinks of the controversy created by 
Thabo Mbeki in 2003 when he voiced doubts that HIV necessarily leads to 
AIDS, or the controversial advocation by Barry Groves and others of a fatty, 
carbohydrate- free diet for losing weight. 89 Of course it is possible that such 
critique is motivated not by a feeling of responsibility but rather a desire to 
escape it. However, in exposing accepted 'facts' (HIV leads to aids; 
carbohydrates are healthier than fat) to the suggestion that they are produced 
through political, cynical rhetoric, it is possible to appreciate an anti-cynical 
attitude in deconstruction. Critics of deconstruction may reasonably suggest that 
such questioning only further illustrates how unhelpful the idea of textuality of 
meaning is for the real world of decisions and action. The unceasing operation 
of indeterminacy of textuality has no moral compass except for the refusal to let 
one discourse claim natural dominance, so it cannot choose which voices to 
deconstruct and which to leave alone. The observations of Ward and Levinson 
on the positive political consequences of the levelling of distinctions are 
relevant here. For Levinson, blurring the distinction between fact and value is a 
necessary first step towards political responsibility. 90 As Ward argues, when the 
89 http: //www. second-opinions. co. uk/eatfat. htmi 
90 His political comments start from the same base as those of Stanley Fish: that there can be 
no judgment that is free of rhetorical and historical contingencies, so the simple distinction 
between fact and value is not meaningful (Levinson, S. 'On Teaching Political Science' in 
Green and Levinson (1970) supra, n. 87, pp. 59-84, p. 68). Any judgment, no matter how 
apparently objective and impartial, will be produced through a value-laden, rhetorical 
deployment of language. Levinson dismisses as "naYve" the belief that principles can be 
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distinctions that philosophers regard as important are broken down, questions of 
ethics and politics can be seen as textual; as such there is a greater opportunity 
to address questions and discourses that are 'buried' by dominant western 
discourse. In this sense of calling into question dominant voices, deconstruction 
is "innately political", 91 and a "positive and creative force"92 in drawing 
attention to the presence of the silenced, subordinated 'other' in all conceptions 
of justice. 93 The concern here is for a functioning definition of the political. In 
our examination of Rorty's pragmatism, political discourse is that which 
employs certain arguments and rhetoric to achieve a particular end. The 
unceasing 'textualisation' of the 'real' that Ward has in mind appears to have 
turned the notion of the political back upon itself. No longer a simple directing 
of text towards a chosen goal, the undermining of hierarchisation as a political 
understood objectively, independently of their consequences in the context of their use. 
Political responsibility always demands awareness of the consequences of action, not just of a 
set of deontological principles (ibid, p. 7 1). 
91 Ward, 1. Kantianism, Postmodernism and Critical Legal Thought (Dordretcht and London: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997) p. 74 
92 Ibid, p. 72 
93 Ward is particularly interested in the potential that deconstruction has in rupturing the 
homogenising "us" of western thought has been brought into question by the atrocities of the 
Twentieth Century (namely, for Ward, the holocaust). Douzinas echoes this optimism in his 
Postmodern theorisation of Human Rights. For Douzinas, the "continuous flight of meaning" 
identified by deconstruction actually encourages the development of new ways to assert 
oneself politically: the resulting "groundless" ethics allows for the creation of new rights 
(Douzinas, C. The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000) p. 347). 
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practise in itself seems to undermine our understanding of politics as a 
movement out of text towards the real. 
4. Deconstruction as Philosophy 
The version of deconstruction found in Derrida's texts by critics such as Norris 
and Staten could not be more different to the one found by Habermas or 
Eagleton discussed above. Where the latter find levelling, relativism, 
obfuscation, philosophical disabling, poeticisation, over generalisation and 
simplification, Norris and others find specificity, careful reading, attention to 
detail, preservation of theoretical distinctions, commitment to modernist notions 
of truth and philosophical argument. In an apparently amazing feat of 
reinterpretation, critics of this camp have produced a version of deconstruction 
that bears almost no relation to that dismissed by Ellis as a lazy substitute for 
critical thinking or celebrated by Rorty as ironic, private fantasy. However, 
although he interprets deconstruction as a serious philosophy, Norris refuses to 
reduce deconstruction to a systematic philosophical method. Achieving this 
balance has involved dissociating Derrida's deconstruction from anything too 
antithetical to the values of modem philosophy while preserving some of its 
enigma. Hence Norris takes great care to establish the difference between 
deconstruction on the one hand and Postmodernism and literary theory on the 
other, and attention is drawn towards passages in which Derrida himself admits 
to the importance of the concepts and trancendental signifieds of Philosophy 
and criticism. As shall be maintained here, the extent to which such attempts to 
I philosophicate 1) deconstruction and give it a respectable philosophical 
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makeover are successful is very much a question of emphasis. Just as Ellis and 
Eagleton in their attacks, Norris presents his defence of deconstruction in a 
polemic fashion. For Norris, the critics who think of deconstruction as leading 
to relativism are simply reading Derrida wrong. There is no suggestion that 
Derrida's more far-reaching comments - on undecidability, differance, writing 
or supplement - give weight to the idea of cleconstruction as a kind of 
relativism. In responding to the fierce criticisms outlined above, it would seem 
that Norris has a Herculean task in reinterpreting deconstruction as 
philosophically acceptable. 
4.1 Prising Deconstruction Awayftom Pragmatism 
The philosophical defence of deconstruction against its critics has tended to 
involve showing that Rorty's pragmatic deconstruction is a misinterpretation of 
Derrida and his significance. Amongst the philosophers of deconstruction there 
is a broad agreement that any theoretical position that leads to relativism and 
freeplay is unhelpful for political and legal theory. However, contra Rorty, there 
is a determination to show that it is not cleconstruction, but the less rigorous 
Postmodernism and literary theory that are to be criticised on this account. 94 
Therefore theorists of philosophical deconstruction try to distance 
deconstruction from the appropriation of it by Rorty, Fish and literary critics 
and hence redirect criticism onto them. 95 
94 See Norris ( 1990) supra, n. 7, p. 13 9 
95 As philosophers, they do not allow deconstruction to follow the path forged by Fish and 
Rorty towards relativism. While Rorty emphasises Derrida's discarding of philosophical 
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It is of this double-bind that the more 'philosophical' Derrida warns: that 
even anti- foundational thought is metaphysical by virtue of its own blindspot - 
its own uncritically assumed foundation. 96 Philosophers of deconstruction such 
as Gasche, Norris and Critchley regard that Derrida's more metaphysical 
tendencies are his saving grace. For example, Derrida's distinctly Levinasian 
perspective on justice and otherness 97 leads Critchely to find public critical 
significance in his later transcendental metaphysics. Critchley thus rejects 
Rorty's reduction of Derrida to a pragmatist with dispensable metaphysical 
leanings on the grounds that, without these leanings, Derrida's work would not 
have the ethical or political significance that it does. 98 Likewise, Gasche and 
Norris insist that deconstruction cannot be reduced to labels such as 'freeplay' 
and 'textuality'. 99 These have been "promiscuously" used, not by Derrida, but 
structures, others argue that Derrida remains faithful to them (albeit in an anti-foundationalist 
way). Critchley observes that Derrida, like Habermas, suggests that speech-acts are 
presupposed by a universal, a priori 'promise', even if this promise is (and it is) broken 
(Critchley (1999) supra, n. 78, p. 107) 
96 Jbid, p. 117 
97 Like Levinas, Derrida identifies 'justice' with the infinite demand of the other, which can 
never be fully satisfied or systernatised in law. See Derrida, 'The Force of Law' in Cornell, D. 
Deconstruction and the Possibility ofJustice (New York, N. Y. and London: Routledge, 1992) 
Chapter One. 
98 Critchley (1999) supra, n. 78, Chapter Five: 'Metaphysics in the Dark: A Response to 
Richard Rorty'; We discuss Levinas in more depth in the next chapter. 
99 Gaschd, supra, n. 8, p. 123: "Deconstruction is not a non-method; an invitation to wild and 
private lucubrations. " 
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by those who interpret deconstruction as primarily literary-100 Philosophers 
interested in deconstruction complain that, in the hands of literary critics, 
deconstruction becomes too easy; its suggestion that meaning and significance 
are metaphorical and rhetorical surrenders too much of what is important in 
philosophy and renders deconstruction too easy a target for accusations of over- 
generality. 101 Gasche is adamant that deconstruction must be rescued from its 
abuse by "naYve"' 02 literary critics and brought into its rightful home of 
philosophy. If, as Derrida contends there is "nothing outside the text" 103 then 
this means that the critic is herself part of the ongoing process of textuality. It is 
100 Ibid., p. 255. In this regard, Norris regards that Ellis "mistakes his target" (Norris (1990) 
supra, n. 7, p. 139). Contra Habermas, Norris contends that Derrida wants to show, not that 
either serious speech acts are entirely self-sufficient or else they entirely fail, but that they do 
both, demonstrating the condition of meaning as never quite saturated (ibid, p. 144). Searle and 
Habermas are correct to assert that 'parasitic' and 'serious' speech acts have different effects, 
but at the same time the serious speech-acts demonstrate failure as well in being shot through 
with "accidence" and iterability (ibid, p. 66). What deconstruction teaches us, on this more 
philosophical reading, is definitely not that philosophy becomes a kind of poetry, but that there 
is an interchange between the discourses that makes the strict separation of them unviable 
(ibid, pp. 73-4). The worrying political and ethical implications that Habermas and Eagleton 
identify with deconstruction are thus misdirected. 
'01 If Derrida's own texts were properly read, then it would be clear that the traditional western 
idea of good theory - rigorous, painstaiking, specific and consistent - is also true of Derrida's 
idea of deconstruction (ibid, p. 139). Again, Norris simply redirects the criticisms, this time 
onto the critics themselves. 
102 Gasch6, R., 'Deconstruction as Criticism' Glyph: John Hopkins Textual Studies (1979) Vol. 
6, pp. 177-215, also printed in McQuillan (2000) supra, n. 39, pp. 129 - 13 1, p. 129 
103 Derrida, J. Of Grammatology, Spivak, G. C. (trans. ) (Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1998) p. 158 
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a misunderstanding to think that one can accept this notion and then directly 
apply deconstruction's techniques to approach the meaning of a text. 
104 If one 
were to accept Norris's view that deconstruction has been abused by relativists 
and literary theorists then it would seem that Sheriffs criticism that 
deconstruction merely shows infinite deconstructability is misplaced. 105 
Norris's redirection of criticisms onto Postmodernism and literary 
criticism is open to doubt. In terms of academic rigour, I agree with Rorty that 
the belief amongst philosophers such as Gasche and Norris that the tools of 
deconstruction function in a recognisably philosophical manner in determining 
the conditions of meaning 106 requires a belief, along with Austin, in a "Right 
Context" and hence a halt to the play of differences. 107 While Gasch6's 
insistence that Derrida's concepts provide an original insight as to the 
conditions for linguistic meaning may be credible, it is not difficult to appreciate 
the worry that diff6rance engenders an arena of infinite textuality, and hence an 
interminable loss of meaning. Derrida's texts 'deconstruct' a great number of 
western authors with no indication that deconstructability is limited to them. 108 
104 Gaschd (1979) in McQuillan (2000) supra, n. 102, p. 131 
'05 See Sheriff (1989) supra, n. 30, p. 47 
106 See Gasch6, (1986) supra, n. 8, Chapter Eight: 'Deconstructive Methodolody', pp. 121-176, 
esp. p. 124: "... nothing prevents our formalizing to some extent the different theoretical 
movements that make up one rigorous notion of deconstruction. " (emphasis added) 
107 Rorty, R. in Mouffe, C. (ed. ) Deconstruction and Pragmatism, (London: Routledge, 1996) 
Chapter Four. 
'0' Saussure's theory of language as difference, which Derrida adopts, is undeniably general. In 
defining, his target, Derrida uses generalising labels such as "western thought" (Derrida 
(2002a) supra, n. 5 1, p. 2), "western science" and "western philosophy" (ibid, p. 3 5 1). His 
comments on the accidence and unlimited context of writing as a law of language in, say, his 
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Norris might respond by pointing out that this analysis misrepresents and 
oversimplifies both his attitude and the philosophical implications of 
deconstruction. The differences between Norris and Rorty on the notions of 
truth and falsity in interpretation mean that, unlike Rorty, Norris leaves himself 
the necessary critical space for characterising certain readings of Derrida as 
misrepresentations as opposed to merely different representations. 109 
Although Derrida does not withdraw his comment in 'White Mythology' 
that the priority of philosophy over metaphor is a myth, he qualifies it by 
maintaining that nevertheless, philosophical distinctions are not effaced. Norris 
takes up this thread in regarding Derrida's philosophy as not one of 'either/or' 
but rather 'both/and'. Just as Habermas and Searle misread Derrida's 
deconstruction of Austin, so Derrida should not be read as arguing that either 
philosophy is prior to and dominant over metaphor or else it is entirely 
engagement with Austin, suggests a general rather than a discreet notion. Norris complains that 
literary critics have, in effect, usurped these concepts and used them outside of Derrida's 
intended purpose. But what lesson are we to draw from cleconstruction if it is not that the 
authors own intentions do not exhaust the meaning of concepts or the limits of 'proper' 
context, since an original, authoritative meaning was always absent anyway? 
109 The difference between Norris and Habermas (and also between Norris and Rorty) lies in 
the range of possible positions on the phi losophy/I iterature distinction. In their own separate 
ways, both Habermas and Rorty regard that one must prioritise one or the other. Norris, on the 
other hand, suggests that this perspective results from Habermas's and Rorty's own styles as 
respectively too serious and too frivolous. There is a third way, says Norris (1990) supra, n. 7, 
pp. 73-4), which preserves the distinction between philosophy and literature and accommodates 
both. Norris insists that Derrida's idea of deconstruction is as a "critical discourse" and hence 
not a leveller. (Norris (2000) supra, n. 7, p. 73) 
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irrelevant. 110 This logic is also identifiable in Gasche, who reads White 
Mythology as an ambiguous "quasitranscendental". 111 
5. Conclusion 
'Philosophical' criticisms and interpretations of deconstruction suggest that 
deconstruction as it is conceived by Rorty, Fish and others is deeply problematic 
in terms of political implications. Deciding whether such comments are 
Derrida recommends a new articulation of metaphor which accounts both for the continuity 
between philosophy and metaphor (both supplement each other) and also the difference 
between them in terms of effect in language (Derrida (1982) supra, n. 53, p. 263). As Habermas 
himself argued (against Derrida), Derrida accepts that the effect of scientific and philosophical 
language is different to poetry and literary criticism. Redefinition can bring scientific progress: 
through scientific critique of metaphorical expressions, inaccuracies of language can be 
rectified (ibid, p. 264). However it must always be borne in mind that this rectification is itself 
metaphorical and so the process of redefinition is continuous (ibid, p. 266-7). Consequently, 
western thought does not fall; it simply loses its natural self-assurance. The metaphysics and 
logocentricism that characterises western philosophy cannot be escaped or rejected as such, 
because there is no language that can do without them (Derrida (2002a) supra, n. 5 1, p. 354). 
111 Gasch6 (1986) supra, n. 8, p. 295. Metaphor as neither straightforwardly philosophical nor 
literary, although, for Gasch6, "Derrida has never left the slightest doubt that metaphor is by 
nature a metaphysical concept. " (ibid, p. 293); The 'both/and' logic of deconstruction that 
Norris refers to is perhaps most easily identifiable in Derrida's comments on justice, discussed 
is Chapter Seven. As mentioned briefly above, it is here that we most clearly see the 
transcendental, metaphysical side of Derrida, which Rorty most detests. In his essay, 'The 
Force of Law', Derrida finds that, rather than a surface of complete freeplay, discourses on 
justice are guided by the "ethical injunction to infinite responsibility"(Critchely (1999) supra, 
n. 78, p. 112) 
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ccorrect' is made problematic by the very nature of deconstruction and its 
emphasis upon the ambiguity of meaning. To say that one interpretation is 
'better' than the other suffers from the problem that, what it means for Rorty to 
make such a value judgment, is different to what it means for Norris. As 
discussed above, a better interpretation is, for Rorty, simply a different way of 
poetically describing something for which we happen to have a preference, 
despite his assertion that modem western liberalism is a superior political 
culture. For Norris, the judgement is a serious affair involving the mobilisation 
of traditional concepts of philosophical academic rigour. This chapter has 
suggested ways in which Derrida's own writings can be read to support both 
'literary' and 'philosophical' views. In focussing more closely upon the problem 
of ethical critique, the next chapter will move on from Rorty's pragmatism in 
order to examine the Levinasian, transcendental aspects of deconstruction. The 
chapter will focus primarily on the transcendental metaphors of death and 
mourning which recent deconstructive writings have referred to in addressing 
the self/other distinction in western thought generally, and legal language 
specifically. 
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Chapter 7 
The Otherness of the Dead and the Search for Justice: Antigone, Narcissus 
and the Sly Fox 
1. Introduction 
It is not only from a liberal perspective that deconstruction is criticised for its 
troubling implications for the search for justice. Supporters of particular identity 
ethics have long protested that the destabilising of foundational notions of 
community and commonality can only be a disempowerment, degradation and 
humiliation to vulnerable people for whom identification with a common body 
act as a defence against political and legal injustice. It is important that as a 
human being a prisoner of war can rely upon the support from the human rights 
provisions of the Geneva Convention. Similarly it is important that as a member 
of a trade union, a worker has a larger structure of support in a dispute with an 
employer. It is not difficult to appreciate the feeling that deconstructing such 
identities takes something vitally important in promoting peoples' self-respect 
and integrity and renders it impotent through linguistic trickery. I Indeed, 
Rorty's 'literary' deconstruction provides nothing more to guide ethical and 
political judgment other than contingent preference. Just as we might prefer, 
say, Philip Roth to Salman Rushdie, so we might prefer liberal democracy to 
Islamic law. It is to this underwhelming conclusion that critical philosophers 
' See Heknian, S. J. A foral Voices, Moral Selves: Carol Gilligan and Feminist Moral Theory 
(CambridLye: Polity Press, 1995) p. 140-1 
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point in complaining that deconstruction. is politically lame, superficial and 
nihilistic. We saw also that the Postmodern abandonment of systematic 
philosophical theory in favour of a concern for the 'other' is criticised for being 
a manifesto of despair, as it is a concern that constructs a scenario of injustice 
2 
without end. The injustice inflicted on the singular Other through assimilation 
to or exclusion from the generalising categories of law is an effect of the very 
efforts to be just, since all these efforts can only be articulate through the means 
that cause injustice. The religious fundamentalist set aside by Rawls's justice as 
fairness; the hermaphrodite deciding whether to tick M or F on a job application 
form; the conjoined twins whose lives are not compatible; the asylum seeker 
whose stories of abuse and terror are not believed because of a lack of 
recognised verification: these are all 'others' in the sense that they resist 
systematic and logical representation and categorisation. 
Although deconstruction resists such reductions of the other, it cannot 
promise that the injustices it suffers can be overcome. For deconstruction, the 
only way of being ethical towards the Other is to escape the generalising 
representations of justice in law, and it is precisely this that deconstruction 
renders impossible. Requiring a singular response within a system of 
generalising legal principles, this response is always a moment of 
undecidability. Necessarily articulated through law's language of rights and 
duties, a legal decision is both an attempt to answer to demand and also a 
betrayal. Responding to Rose's critique of Spectres of Marx, Catherine Kellogg 
2 See GiII ian Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation (Cambridge 
University Press, 1996). See also Eagleton, T. The Illusions of Postmodernism (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1996) 
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argues that whilst undecidability might lead to unending grief, it nonetheless 
politicises discourse on justice. Attempting to steer a position between Derrida 
and Rose, Kellogg accepts Derrida's view that the singular (object, event, 
injustice) is not directly accessible to law: it must be made intelligible to law 
through representation and hence through a system of exchange. Therefore 
representation (that Rose conceives as the 'mourning' of the loss of the singular) 
"may well be necessary for the function of law, [but] not only does it not 
guarantee justice, it covers over the very moment of political contestation. ý13 
Hence the commodification of the subject of justice is both the possibility of 
judgment and the impossibility of justice. 
The only approach it leaves open to itself in its ethical preoccupation are 
the "small scale" tactics of theory: "provincial, open stories", attention to 
"repressed" and "oppressed dialects and idioms". 4 None of these can wholly 
grasp the Other and make it fully understood, but they do sustain a constant 
movement towards the Other and its otherness by imagining new idealities, new 
utopias and new ways to understand. This chapter will attempt to show how the 
apparent relativism of poeticising law's rationality can be seen as a first step 
towards developing an ethics of otherness. The argument developed in this 
chapter is that the possibilities opened up by deconstruction for fluidity in 
interpreting the demands of justicel, allow for a creative orientation towards 
addressing the binary logic of law as an ethical problem. Through an 
3 Kellogg, C. 'Mourning Terminable and Interminable: Deconstruction, Law, Representation' 
Paper prepared for the Study of Law, Culture and the Humanities, Banjamin N. Cardozo 
School of Law and New York University, New York NY, March 7-9 2003 p. 10 
Douzinas, C. & Warrington, R. with McVeigh, S. Postmodern Jurisprudence: The Law o the )f 
Text in the Texts of the Lmv (London: Routiedge. 199 1) Introduction, p. x 
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examination of differing deployments of loss and mourning as transcendental 
metaphors, this chapter argues that, although Rose is correct to regard 
deconstruction as an interminable mourning of the lost experience of the 
singular instance of justice, this state of affairs is not without positive 
significance for legal scholarship. For writers such as Derrida, Goodrich, 
Levinas and Douzinas, whose theoretical perspectives we shall begin by briefly 
rehearsing below, this insight is expressed by metaphors of death and mouming. 
Otherness is represented by that which is lost, mourning the unending process 
by which the mourner attempts to regain it. I situate my own viewpoint through 
an interpretation of the stories of 'Echo and Narcissus' 5 and also 'The Sly Fox 
and the Little Red Hen'. 6 Through a reading of these texts, an attempt is made to 
assert the ethical significance of conceiving the relationship between Self and 
Other as undecidable. The difficulty in approaching ethics deconstructively is 
the precise nature of the other's 'otherness'. Despite accepting the Levinasian 
notion of the Other as absolutely unique and irreducible, I argue that this 
uniqueness should not be understood as engendering two distinct spheres of 
'law' and 'ethics'. 
Of the many accounts of the myth told by Ovid, quotations are drawn from two English 
translations: Ovid, Metamorphoses, Innes, M. M. (trans. ) (London: Penguin Classics, 1955); 
also Huorhes, T. Tales From Ovid. - Twenty Four Passages From The Metamorphoses (London: 
Faber and Faber, 1997) 
6 Traditional, retold by Southgate, V. The Sly Fox and the Little Red Hen, Ladybird Books, 
1973)) 
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2. Goodrich and Derrida: The Ethics of Mourning and The Gift of Death 
Deconstructive perspectives on ethics compare the inadequacies of linguistic 
representation of 'justice' to the physical limitations of and attitudes involved in 
the act of mourning a lost loved one. Derrida's idea of 'true' mourning is that 
which remembers that the lost one - the Other - cannot be entirely appropriated 
for the comfort of the mourner - the Self - but is an infinite variety of 
memories, moments, stories, etc. in the minds of different people. 'Selfish' 
mourning, on the other hand, is an unethical attitude in which the dead one is 
remembered as identical to the mourner's own memories and impressions. 
Goodrich demonstrates his position on the idea of mourning as an ethical 
relationship between Self and Other through his metaphor of the widow and the 
broken mirror. Taking as his reference an Eighteenth Century manual of 
conduct, Goodrich imagines the relationship between law and its history as a 
widow who mourns the loss of her husband. Being forever lost to her in person, 
she recalls his memory to herself, and "as in a broken mirror the refraction 
multiplies the images ... , -). 
7 Rather than trying to actually bring the dead person 
back again, his image is recalled and repeated in many different ways. For 
Goodrich this is a convenient medium for challenging the hegemony of law's 
interpretation of its own history. The western philosophical approach to an 
ethical decision takes the position of Kantian morality: that which is right is that 
wNch can be assimilated to an ideal set of values. But the origins of the law are 
Allestree, R. The Ladies Calling (London: n. p., 1677) p. 69, quoted in Goodrich. P. Oedipus 
Lex. - Histoi-j% Psychoanaýysis, Hislorý,, Lmv (Berkeley, C. A. & London: University of 
California Press, 1995) p. 16 
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lost forever - we can never completely bring them back. Instead they are 
endlessly repeated to us, refracted in the cracked mirror of interpretation in 
"innumerable ,8 common-law cases. In this sense we see how Goodrich 
approaches the problem of presence and absence in ethics: there is "play" 
between the present and past in that neither history nor the contemporary are 
wholly present or absent in terms of the certainty of the narrative being 
constructed. 9 This 'play' is effected through the operation of simulation and 
representation for the mourner/law maker. The absence (otherness) of the past is 
made present through imaginings and memories. The presence of the mourner's 
identity is bound up with absence because it is composed of representations of 
the past. The mourner cannot be separated from this absence because it provides 
her with a connection to her roots-10 To insist that one particular representation 
of the past is correct or sufficient is to preclude the possibility of ethics which, 
in this conception, requires freedom to reinterpret the past in other ways. Of 
course, this could be read as the kind of freedom that critics such as Eagleton 
dismiss as merely the 'freedom' to be dragged into a hopeless, aimless world in 
which everything is 'interpretation' and all principles are up for grabs. The 
Goodrich, ibid, p. 22 
lbid p. 24 
Goodrich argues that as an evolving chain of precedent and supplement, the common law 
gains its identity in the same way. Only through a constant interpretation and reinterpretation I 
of its lost past do we see law's genealogy (ibid, p. 25). For Goodrich, then, the law is an endless 
collection of masks - behind xN'hich are an endless number of possible memories, 
interpretations, histories, which could be recalled and brought to presence through ZD 
representation. There appears to be a process of unmasking in conceiving law in this fashion - 
an unmasking of the otherwise assumed full presence and thus natural priority of the present. I 
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problem with Goodrich's account is that there is a temptation to read it as 
merely a description of what judges cannot help but do anyway. On this view. 
the metaphor of the widow and the mirror does not allow for any greater insight 
as to the relationship between law's past and its present than, say, Dworkin's 
notion of judicial 'integrity' in aligning past cases with present. " Fish argues 
that since the judges have to interpret present cases with decided ones, 
Dworkin's suggestion that they ought to do this is somewhat redundant. 12 If 
there is a value in Goodrich's metaphors (as I believe there is), then it is more 
likely to lie in the conceptualising of a symbiotic relationship between self and 
other, rather than in direct critique of legal judgment. 
The play of presence and absence as a relationship between the contemporary 
and history is not difficult to identify in legal judgment. In considering the 
interpretive labour of applying a legal principle in a case, we can only be certain 
that, as living foundations of the present judgment, such a principle can only be 
recalled through representation of its origins. As in mourning, they are thus 
made present for us in order that we can form what we can with some 
confidence regard as a principle suitable for our needs. It is in the recalling to 
presence of the various sources of the principle that we find the possibility of 
approaching the problem ethically. 13 Although there is no direct access to the 
'' See Dworkin, R. Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass,: Harvard University Press, 1986) 
Chapter 7 
12 See Fish, S. Doing What Comes Naturalýv. - Change Rhetoric and the Practice of Literary 
and Legal Studies (Durham, N. C. and London: Duke University Press, 1989) Chapter: 'Still 
Wrong After All These Years' pp. 356 - 71 especially p. 361 11 
111 Consider, for example, the various narratives that might be drawn upon as sources for the 
modern conception of the individual. The Judeo-Christian idea of the human being as the 
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singular Other, its reconstruction in mouming leaves open the constant 
possibility that the Other can exert an influence on, and even be partly 
constitutive of, the Self The implication of the eternal absence of the Other 
would be nihilism: ethics as always banished from the realm of law. It appears 
that what Goodrich's metaphor of mourning gives to us as legal theorists, is not 
a set of tools for critiquing particular legal judgments themselves, but a 
reminder that the possibility of reinterpretation remains indefinitely open. 
Reinterpretation in this case means the particular image or story that is 
constructed in recalling the origins of the principles determining the criteria of 
judgment. As Rorty and others have argued, we are asked to accept that the 
possibilities for difference and divergence in this task are endless. The broken 
mirror of legal history and legal interpretation refracts without end, rendering 
infinitely many images. 
Turning our angle very slightly allows us to glimpse the ethical 
significance of Derrida's own use of the metaphor of death. For Goodrich, the 
unethical is the attempt to dominate the memory of origin; 14 for Derrida,, it is the 
thought that one can overcome death, either one's own or another's. 'Death' is a 
sacred gift from some mysterious, unknowable source, given to each of us 
uniquely and gives to us our own uniqueness. As such, the source of the gift is 
the source of the ethical. My death is unique to me: it cannot be taken away or 
substituted. In my death I see my very subjectivity as unique and hence my own 
image of God and Enlightenment notions such as the individual as an empty slate (Locke) are 
examples. Obviously, such a vast range of sources require a great deal more attention than 
there is room for here. 
14 Goodrich (1995) supra, n. 7, p. 13, p. 28 
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otherness. 15 One cannot die 'for' someone else or bring them back to life 
through mourning. These are simply attempts to deny (impossibly) the other's 
uniqueness. 16 For Derrida, the metaphor of death as a mysterious gift signifies, 
not only the uniqueness of each other, 17 but also that at the heart of ethical 
judgment lies a secret, or mystery. We are confronted with an imperative to take 
responsibility for the Other, and the source of this imperative is itself other to all 
our attempts to understand it. No matter how much we 'rage against the dying 
of the light', we cannot escape from taking responsibility for our own particular 
death. Thus death is the source of an ultimate responsibility: given to each of us 
as a gift that cannot be refused. However, since we cannot say where this 
responsibility comes, our efforts to be responsible in making judgments must 
similarly contend with a mystery of origins. 
every revolution, whether aesthetic or religious, bears 
witness to a return of the sacred in the form of an enthusiasm or 
fervour, otherwise known as the presence of the gods within 
us.,,! 8 
It is possible to regard Derrida's quasi-theological ethics as rather imperious. 
Although the secret gift of death confers singular responsibility, the singular 
Other for whom we must take responsibility can never be grasped, since all 
15 Derrida, J. The Gift of Death, David Willis (trans. ) (Chicago and London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996) p. 41 
16 Ibid, p. 43 
17 "Ever), other (one) is every (bit) other", ibid. p. 82 
" ibid. p. 21 
251 
Chapter 7 
attempts to address it are mediated through the limitations of law. Law's 
inadequacy is, for Derrida, so severe that its representations of justice are no 
more than a profanation of the sacred singularity of the Other. Derrida warns of 
catastrophic consequences for humankind of such profanation. 19 In our attempts 
to pin down the sacred and absolutely Other in our political language, we are 
plunged into an abyss, which obscures the impending disaster that such 
impudence brings upon ourselves. Derrida argues: "The abyss does not, any 
more than language, let itself be dominated, tamed, instrumentalised, 
secularised. ýý20 For Derrida, the idea is that being 'responsible' always also 
involves 'Irresponsibility' inasmuch as it necessarily involves a certain lack of 
knowledge - for instance a core value that we do not fully grasp. In attempting 
to universally thernatise our responsibility we betray the otherness - or secrecy 
- of the other. Alain Badiou, whose work on ethics challenges what he regards 
as Derrida's orthodoxy of otherness, contends that the realm of the singular is 
not impossible, but rather universally available through revolt against the 
general situation of the state. 21 Levinas, whose work we shall return to in more 
depth later, expresses the impossibility of responsibility fully banishing 
irresponsibility thus: "In doing what I willed to do, I did a thousand and one 
,, 22 things I hadn't willed to do. The act was not pure, I left traces. That the traces 
19 Derrida, J. "The Eyes of Language" in Derrida, J. Acts ofReligion (New York, N. Y. and 
London: Routledge, 2002) pp. 189-227 at 194,196 
20 lbid, p. 198 
21 Badiou, A. Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, Peter Hallward (trans. ) (Verso: 
London; New York, 2001) Translator's introduction, pp. xxvi-xxvii 
22 Levinas, F. Entre Nous: Essqys on Thinking of The Other, trans. Michael B. Smith and 
Barbara Harshav (London: Athlone Press, 1998) p. ') 
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of accident and the unforeseen are carried with what is intended, signifies for 
Levinas a wholesale reversal of the other's subordination to Self, or Being. Like 
Derrida, Levinas tries to show that it is not knowledge, but sacred responsibility 
that grounds ethics. The Other can never be fully thernatised or understood. 
Each Other is infinitely different, unique and impossible to assimilate to a set of 
general laws and principles. 
We can find links of sorts between the ways that Derrida and Goodrich 
invoke metaphors of death and mourning here. For Goodrich the possibility of 
mourning as through a broken mirror is the possibility of an ethics of historical 
interpretation in law. For Derrida it is the inevitability of death itself and the 
physical limitations of mourning that remind us of our ethical responsibility 
toward the Other. In these metaphors, we see the present order of things as a 
collection of metaphors for representing and reconstructing our lost histories 
and origins. The former character and personality of a dead person can never be 
wholly assimilated to the memories of a moumer, since the original object of the 
memories is lost upon that person's death. For Cornell, recognition of the 
necessary failure of mourning to actually bring a loved one back to life is the 
opening of the possibility of an ethics that does not reduce the Other to the 
identity of the Se If . 
23 
23' Cornell, D. The Philosophy of the Limit (New York, N. Y. & London: Routledge, 1992) p-73; 
See also Derrida (1996) supra, n. 15, pp. 44-5 
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I The Tragedy of Antigone Revisited: Mourning Without End, But Not 
Without Purpose 
Sophocles's Antigone has long been a source of fascination for theoretical 
perspectives on the relationship between conflicting authorities of duty. 24 This 
chapter's addition to the existing literature is motivated by what I regard as 
Douzinas's flawed (though admittedly influential) reading of the play. Douzinas 
conceives the Other in much the same way as we have discussed above - 
unique, non-essentialisable, demanding justice without being assimilated to 
law's common language. 25 However, his reading of Antigone actually 
undermines the utopian, hopeful aspect of his postmodernism, which in a later 
polemic he declares is "the greatest contribution of our political culture to the 
new millennium". 
26 
Douzinas focuses upon what he regards as the "diametrically opposed 
perspectives , 27 and motivation between the central characters of Antigone, 
24 See Hegel, G. W. F. Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Hodgson (trans. ) (Berkeley C. A.: 
University of California Press, 1988); Bernasconi, R. 'Persons and Masks: The 
Phenomenology of Spirit and its Laws' in Cornell, Rosenfeld and Carlson (eds) Hegel and 
Legal Theory (London, New York: Routledge, 199 1); Posner, R. Law and Literature 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988); Segal, C. Tragedy and Civilization. - An 
I. nterpretation of Sophocles (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 198 1); Weinreb, L. 
Natural Law and Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987) 
25 Douzinas, C. and Warrington, R. Justice Miscarried: Ethics, Aesthetics and the Law 
(London and New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994) p. 20-1 
2" Douzinas The End oj'Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century, 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2000) p. 342 
27 Douzinas and Warrington (1994) supra, n. 25, p. 30 
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daughter of Oedipus and her uncle, King Creon of Thebes. At the beginning of 
the play, we learn that Antigone's brothers, Polynices and Eterocles, have 
recently died fighting one another in the War of Thebes. The new king, Creon, 
has decreed that, since Polynices was a traitor to the city, it is strictly forbidden 
to give him the honour of a burial. However, through loyalty to her brother, 
Antigone defies the decree and allows herself to be arrested. King Creon applies 
the law by insisting upon her execution despite being advised that this would be 
unjust and will lead to his own downfall. For Douzinas, Creon represents all that 
is wrong with law as such: its cold, public universalism and its basis in rules 
rather than justice. Conversely, Antigone represents the opposite: an ethics 
based on a tie of unique, singular, passionate love 28 and femininity. 29 On 
Douzinas's reading, Antigone is thus the story of the forces of reason and 
legality attempting to crush that singular love-tie which gains its imperatives 
from higher sources, outside the sphere of law. 30 As Badiou might say, 
Antigone's defiance is an 'event': a personal fidelity to a cause which sets the 
subject apart from the ordinary sphere of the moral hierarchies engendered by 
the state, and orients her towards the exceptional realm of singular, irreplaceable 
and innovative truths. 31 The two characters represent irreconcilably different 
measures of what is right. From his rule-orientated position, Creon regards 
Antigone as mad . 
32 Antigone's explanation of herself - "My way is to share my 
28 Ibid, p. 36-7 
29 bid, p. 78 
30 lbid, p. 61 
"Bad iou (2000supra, n. 21, Translator's Introduction pp. viii-xi 
1,1 -, Antioone' in Sophocles, The Theban Plays, Watling, E. F. (trans. ) (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Classics, 1974): Referrino to Antigone and her sister Ismene who defends her, Creon 
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love, not share my hate 133 - cannot be understood by Creon, who believes that 
loyal subjects and traitors must be distinguished. It does not make sense to him 
to offer the same dignity in death to both loyal subjects and traitors. 34 
Douzinas's argument is that the Other exerts an ethical force which is separate 
from mere legality. On this reading, Creon's own downfall results from his 
inability to deal with "the laws of those forces that do not follow his 
rationaliSrnýi. 35 I want to argue that Douzinas is wrong to interpret the play in 
terms of a clash between the laws of man and its other. Creon's decree is not 
defended on the basis of Positive law and Antigone's defiance and perspective 
on justice is not a defiance of man-made law as such. 
What insight can be drawn from Douzinas's reading of Antigone? 
Douzinas wants to show that where-as 'law' may be able to give us the 
possibility of a blandly tolerable state of affairs, justice is something unique to 
each case. Law deals only with the general and in doing so commits violence 
against the singular, particular cases that cannot be so easily generalised. Ethics 
is a concern for the otherness of such singularities. It is the heeding of the call of 
the other: making oneself vulnerable to injury or even death for the other, as 
Antigone does for her brother. This means that ethics is itself 'other' to law, 
since it recognises no consolidation, codification or precedent. However, we 
must be clear as to what we want a deconstruction of Self and Other to achieve. 
There is a danger that, in emphasising the irreconcilability of the perspectives of 
declares at p. 14 1: "1 do believe the creatures both are mad/One lately crazed, the other from 
tier birth. " 
33 Ibid., p. 140-, quoted in Douzinas p. 74 as "I was borne not to hate, but to love. " 
34 Ibid, "Creon: Do we owe honour to the dead even if they are traitors? " 
. ý' Douzinas and Warrington (1994) supra, n. 25, p. 38 I- 
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King Creon and Antigone, we are drawn towards a position from which it is 
difficult to make a positive contribution to the problem of ethics. Douzinas 
presents a monochrome choice between a system of cold, heartless legal rules 
and a glimmering, lovely, feminine ethical imperative. Douzinas's comments 
that this ethical imperative has no definable body, shape or rules simply 
reiterates the complete exteriority of the Other. This would suit the likes of King 
Creon very well, who would banish all forms of 'madness' from the realm of 
rationaL universalist law. On this view, ethics is an Other that is not only dead, 
but vaporised. To mourn its loss would not only be interminable, it would also 
be pointless, since law and ethics are so radically divorced. 
In a sense that is reminiscent of a Kantian moral contradiction, 
Antigone's actions seem particularly problematic because she feels compelled 
to act directly against the authority of the State, obedience to which King Creon 
regards as crucial . 
36 However, the binary opposition between law and ethics is 
not the only way of reading Antigone. Much of the text of the play is concerned 
with various characters justifying their respective positions on the dispute over 
whether Antigone should be executed under Creon's decree. What becomes 
clear from these speeches is that the dispute is not so much about the clash 
between positive laws of the city and particular ethics, but between the 
personalities and wills of the opposing protagonists. Despite his rhetoric of 
legality, Creon is not interested so much in ensuring the law's supremacy, but in 
the supremacy of his own will. Creon says to his son, Haemon: "... 1 hold to the 
law/ And will never betray it - least of all for a woman. /Better to be beaten by a 
Sophocles (1974) supra, n. 32, p. 144: Creon: "He whom the state appoints must be obeyed 
to the snialiest matter, be it right - or wrong. " tno ZN 
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man, if need be/ Than let a woman get the better of US. "37 And later, "[Creon]: I 
am king, and responsible only to myself. 1 [Haemon]: A one-man state? What 
sort of state is that? 5,38 There is a fine line to be observed here. If Creon is 
indeed the supreme ruler of Thebes he is clearly acting within the bounds of 
positive law to enforce his decree. In that case Antigone's defiance would 
indeed be, as Douzinas claims, a defiance of the law. 39 However I would 
contend that these passages show that it is Creon's own chauvinistic pride that 
drives him to execute Antigone, and that the law is merely his alibi and his 
attempt to evade responsibility for doing what he knows to be unpopular. The 
dispute between Creon and Haemon as to the relationship between king and 
state indicates that Creon's view of his duty is not a simple reflection of 
prevailing legal norms. Hence the clash between Antigone and Creon is not one 
between law and love, but between singular human wills, each of which calls its 
own legal foundation as counsel. In her defence, Antigone says to Creon: "I did 
not think your edicts strong enough/To overrule the unwritten and unalterable 
laws". 40 That on a positivist analysis Creon's edicts constitute the law does not 
prove that Antigone intends to defy man-made law in favour of the laws of 'the 
gods', but rather that she refuses to recognise the dictates of an idiosyncratic 
ruler. In the final scene, when Creon realises that his stubbornness has brought 
disaster upon himself, he abandons his line that the law must be applied: "Twas 
I imprisoned her/ And I will set her free. ,41 However, it is too late. Antigone has 
lbid 
'8 lbid, p. 146 emphasis added 
39 Douzinas and Warrington (1994) supra, n. 25, p. 39 
Sophocles (1974) supra, n. -')2, p. 
138 emphasis added 
" lbid, p. 156 emphasis added 
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taken her own life, and Haemon, who was betrothed to marry Antigone, 
subsequently does likewise. Upon hearing of Haemon's death, his mother 
Eurydice (Creon's wife), kills herself also. Heartbroken, Creon takes personal 
responsibility for the tragedy, and no more is said regarding the lawfulness of 
his actions: "It is true, I killed him. 42 The judgments of two other characters 
emphasise the personal nature of the dispute. Teiresias, a highly respected old 
prophet had criticised Creon for his decision regarding Antigone and had 
warned him that "only a fool is governed by self-will". 43 The Messenger, whose 
unfortunate duty it is to tell Eurydice about Haernon's death adds: "How great 
calamity can come to man/Through man's perversity". 
My disagreement with Douzinas finds partial alliance in Gillian Rose. 
For Rose, ethics is inconceivable without the possibility of reconciliation 
between the singular and the law. For there to be hoPe for a more just future, 
Rose insists that we cannot afford to suppose that the injustices of law are 
institutional or permanent. Referring to a painting by Poussin, 44 in which a 
young woman stoops to collect the unburied ashes of her wrongly executed 
husband for a secret, prohibited burial against a backdrop of the imposing 
architecture of Athens, Rose rejects the interpretation that the scene represents 
discreet love defying the institutional injustice of law. 45 It is important for Rose 
that the injustice of the husband's execution is a specific instance of injustice: a 
temporary departure from the norm, as opposed to the norm itself It is a 
42 Ibid, p. 161 Referring to Haemon. Emphasis added 
'-` Ibid, p. 153 
" 'Landscape with the Ashes of Phocion' (1648) 
4S Rose (1996) supra, n. 2, p. 25-, Rose attributes this interpretation to the television art critic 
Sister WendN 
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temporary divorce between law and justice, which is healed through mourning. 
For Rose, mourning allows reconciliation between soul and city, ethics and law: 
not to mourn is to accept the divorce between these notions. In mourning her 
husband, the widow in Poussin's painting gives presence to a temporarily lost 
idea of justice - and through this work of mourning is reunited with the City. 
46 I 
would suggest that what my reading of Antigone indicates is neither Douzinas's 
radical divorce, nor Rose's happy reunion, but rather a movement towards 
ethics: mourning without end, but not without purpose. On Douzinas's reading, 
there is no such movement. His relation between ethics and law is as static as it 
is distant. 
If Douzinas wants to define 'ethics' as that which directly contradicts the 
moral hierarchy of 'law', he effectively rules out the political and ethical 6work' 
of mourning that Rose refers to. For, if these are truly irreconcilable with 
general legal principles, how could the law even begin to comprehend or care 
what ethical questions arise? Surely banishment and execution is all that those 
who demand such an ethic can expect. This reading of Antigone gives no 
account of dilemma, except that we can choose to be hard-hearted like King 
Creon and apply the law straightforwardly, or else we can be loving and caring 
like Antigone and heed the call of the other. 47 In his earlier Postmodern 
Jitrisprudence Douzinas maintains this binary argument. "Typical" 
46 lbid, p. 26 
47 In this respect Douzinas finds himself an unlikely bedfellow in George W Bush: "Every 
nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the 
terrorists. (Applause. )" Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 
September 20 2001, Washington D. C. 
(ljttp: j'NvNv\v. N\ h itehouse - go v'tic ws, 
're leases'22 00 1 '09 2100 1 0920-8. htmi) 
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jurisprudence, it seems, is "rooted in the metaphysics of truth rather than the 
politics and ethics of justice" and is thus deconstructable. 48 It is difficult to 
avoid reading Douzinas as attempting anything more or less than the kind of 
crude reversal of hierarchy for which Postmodernism more generally is 
denigrated by critics such as Eagleton. 49 
4. Levinas: The Face of the Other 
Levinas's take on the Self/Other problem is that 'ethics' and 'responsibility' go 
beyond the representations of law, which relies on identification of essence to 
draw a totalising area of moral concern. Ethics is beyond this systematisation, 
argues Levinas, in the same way that the unique expressive and contour details 
of a person's face are beyond systernatisation. It is therefore only by sense - 
physical proximity to that face - and not theoretical conceptualisation that we 
can see the Other's uniqueness and address them ethically. 50 At this basic level, 
Levinas might be interpreted as addressing our problem of logical exclusion in a 
way that is recognisable in Derrida and Goodrich: that the identity and demands 
of the Other exceed the capabilities of law's logic of identity and difference. 
Indeed, Levinas does give some cause for such a reading. For instance, Levinas 
states that the Face "is a trace of itself' - i. e. it makes its demands without 
Douzinas and Warrington with McVeigh (199 1) supra, n. 4, p. 27 
4, ) See chapter six. 
50 Levinas, E. Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, Lingis, A. (trans. ) (The Hague & 
I -ondon: 
Ni Ihoff, 198 1) p. 11, p. 16 
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reference to presence or absence, which would suggest that the unique makes 
itself visible and impossible to ignore in all forms of judgment and action. 
However, Levinas's project is more ambitious than pointing out a 
tension between the general and unique in judgment. His position might be read 
as more like that of Douzinas and Warrington in that he wants to entirely 
overturn the prioritisation of Self (or Being) over the excluded Other. Levinas's 
argument is that 'ethics' is not an indeterminate play between Self (presence) 
and Other (absence), but an encounter with the irreducible Other which is prior 
to Self, and hence prior to shared identity. There is an "absolute separation" 
between self and other. 51 In fleshing out his metaphor of the physical encounter 
with the Other, Levinas makes this aim explicit through a rhetoric of 
vulnerability and violence. In a move that radically separates him from, say, the 
liberal theorists examined in Chapters One and Two, Levinas denies every 
possibility that ethical responsibility finds its motivation in any shared identity. 
All equivalence and mutuality is deemed secondary to the unpredictable, often 
frightening or painful experience of alterity. When I meet the other, I cannot 
know anything about him at all except that he is a "neighbour" or a "brother ý5 : 52 
"the persecuted one for whom I am responsible to the point of being a hostage 
53 tor him". - The language of neighbourliness and brotherhood are not supposed 
to suggest that I recognise the claims of others because I recognise traits of 
myself in them. "I hardly care what the other is with respect to me, that is his 
51 Levinas (1998) supra, n. 22, p. 185 
52 Levinas (198 1) supra, n. 50, p. 87 
lbid, p. 59 
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own business; for me, he is above all the one I am responsible for. , 
54 There is 
no common humanity as such to fall back upon for Levinas, since this would 
imply the primacy of self and a reduction of the Other to my own 
understanding. 55 In taking ethical responsibility for the Other I should not 
expect to gain anything in return, and should be ready to suffer injury and 
pain. 56 In the absence of all unifying narratives (Levinas rules them all out) the 
only basis on which I am supposed to take responsibility for the Other is that I 
cannot resist their call. 57 Furthermore, this 'call' is itself not necessarily a 
communicative act in any definable sense. In breaking down the unifying 
elements of shared discourse,, Levinas's metaphor of the face is a prioritisation 
of the role of sensibility and touch as an ethical 'language'. 58 
"Moral consciousness" is impossible, argues Levinas, prior to the 
experience of alterity. 59 But why should I heed the call of one with whom I 
share nothing and have no understanding or knowledge of? How can this other's 
voice make such a strong claim on my conscience? Cornell points out that, in 
naming the Other as absolute infinity, Levinas risks appropriating it to a 
totalising system of knowledge and doing the same violence for which he 
5' Levinas ( 1998) supra, n. 22, p. 105 
55 Ibid, p. 15 
56 Levinas (198 1) supra, n. 50, p. 50, p. 57, p. 63 
57 Levinas (1998) supra, n. 22, p. 187; also Levinas Ibid p. 12 
S8 Critchley, S. The Ethics of Deconstruction (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1992) 
pp. 179-80 
59 Levinas (1998) supra, n. 22, p. 17 
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criticises western philosophy. 60 If the Other is unknowable, then how can 
Levinas be qualified to write so much about it? This is a serious logical 
contradiction in Levinas's work. By writing about ethics at all, he is surely 
attempting to name that which he is also insisting is unnameable. Thus his own 
scepticism threatens to invalidate itself. In order to escape this contradiction, 
Levinas distinguishes two types of discourse: a past-tense discourse of the 
"Said" and a present-tense discourse of "Saying". 61 The Said is all that is named 
and systernised. If Self is understood as a signifier of determinable identity then 
the Said can be regarded as corresponding to this part of the Self/Other binary 
pair. The Said thus encompasses the realm of identity ethics, that is, ethical 
perspectives premised upon a shared identity or set of moral characteristics. The 
Saying, on the other hand, refers to that which escapes simple identification in 
language. It is all that is other to our definitions and categorisations, and as 
suggested by its present tense form, the Saying is that which is infinitely 
unfinished. 62 Being always something other to attempts to identify it, the Other 
occupies the realm of the Saying and the Said is always an injustice to it. 
Levinas's argument would suggest that 'ethics', being, like the human face, 
always more than our attempts to define it, is part of this unfinished discourse. 
But even to say this much amounts to an attempt to rationalise it, and therein 
arises the apparent contradiction in Levinas. This could regarded, not simply as 
logical contradiction, but as an example of the fraught relationship between 
60 Cornell, D. The Philosophy of the Limit (New York, N. Y. and London: Routledge, 1992a) 
p. 69 
61 Levinas (198 1), supra, n. 50, p. 46 
62 bid. p. 47 
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deconstruction and ethics more generally. Levinas does not provide any easy 
answer as to how we can be ethical when any attempt to articulate the ethical 
involves betraying it. Ethical discourse therefore must comprise of a series of 
interruptions of the Said by the Saying. As Critchley observes, this is the 
structure of Otherwise than Being: the ethical relation is articulated, then 
interrupted by doubts, then returned to and re-articulated. 63 Ethics is the infinite 
interruption of the Said, and hence, infinite responsibility towards the other. 
This notion of infinite responsibility allows Levinas to survive the 
contradiction of his scepticism, and here he finds common ground with Derrida 
and Cornell. In its infinite difference, the Other always escapes systernatisation, 
even by Levinas. The only assistance that Levinas can give in the effort to be 
ethical is an unending juxtaposition between responsibility and betrayal, and 
between language (Said) and the Other (Saying) . 
64 By the logic of infinity, the 
demands of the Other are unquenchable: they can never be met because we can 
never know exactly what they are or even who the Other is. Respecting the 
infinite uniqueness of the Other means accepting the fact that our responsibility 
towards them can never be fulfilled. 65 Cornell argues that the limited 
capabilities of language indicates that it is a mistake to think that 
logocentricism, self and Being can be entirely escaped. The value of Levinas's 
work is as a constant reminder that representational schemes always inflict 
violence upon the other. In the limits of language we run up against the limit of 
Critchley (1992) supra, n. 58, p. 229 
64 lbid, p. 165 
65 Ibid, p. 99; With Derrida, Cornell argues that the very nature of our language and the limits 
it necessarilv involves saying anything means that it is a mistake to think that logocentricism, 
self and Being can be entirely escaped. 
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philosophy, which, instead of condemning us to silence, "challenges us to re- 
,, 66 open the question - to think again. 
The limitations of Levinas's uncompromisingly radical position are 
made clear when one examines his attempts to conceive the singular ethical 
relationship in the context of the 'real world', inhabited by third parties. Levinas 
admits that the general experience of the world is not of a single relationship of 
oneself to one other, but of many different relationships, all of which demand 
attention in their own unique way. When Levinas considers the ethical 
relationship in this context, the hitherto absolute impossibility of generalising 
the Other is softened to a tolerable, necessary systernatising violence, but still 
founded in the non-violence of the unique face. Since a legal system is required 
to make systematic generalisations, there arises the ubiquitous threat of 
violence. However, the ethic of the face of the Other remains primary, and this 
ensures that there is a limit to the violence of such generalisations. This gives 
violence a legitimate place in Levinas's idea of the state. "There is a certain 
measure of violence necessary in terms of justice... one cannot say that there is 
no legitimate violence". 67 The demands of third parties necessitate "a certain 
abandonment of the absolute allegience" to the Other. 68 Levinas even goes on to 
assert that the ethics of alterity "preserves the ethics" of a liberal state. 
69 
Following his condemnation of systematic identity-based conceptions of justice 
for the violence that they inflict upon the Other, Levinas's apparent alignment 
66 Ibid, p. 71 
67 Levinas (1998) supra, n. 22, p. 105-6 
18 lbid, p. 203 
69 lbid- p. 195 
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with liberalism comes as something of a surprise. But Critchley reads this, not 
as a u-tum in defeat, but as a "doubling of discourse"70 _ that the "I-Thou" of 
71 
ethics entails both a face-to-face and a relation with all . Justice shows its 
origins in the ethic of the face by its constant revision and hope for a 'better' 
justice . 
72 Law's constant and never-ending search for legitimacy is its inability 
to free itself of its origin in the uniqueness of each other. 73 Indeed, it should be 
remembered that politics and justice require first the call of the Other. 74 An 
ethical critique of a political system involves identifying ways in which existing 
laws and institutions attempt to assimilate and exclude the Other. 75 The constant 
revisionism envisioned by Levinas's ethical politics is what, for Douzinas, 
stimulates concern for those abused in far away places, "concretised" as a 
c4,76 Like moral feeling of duty to alleviate the pain of suffering others' . 
Critchely, Douzinas's later writings stress the simultaneous impossibility and 
undeniability of the duty, making ethics the "internal exile" of law. 77 Violence 
abounds in the form of the comparisons and generalisations that law must make 
but remembering that ethical regard derives primarily from experience of the 
70 Critchley (1992) supra, n. 58, p. 227 
71 Ibid., p. 226; Levinas, E. Totality and Infinity An Essay on Exteriority, Lingis, A. (trans. ) 
(London: Kluwer, 1969) p. 213; Douzinas (2000) supra, n. 26, also refers to the "double 
discourse" of the unique and the general relationships at p. 356 
12 Levinas ( 199 8) supra, n. 22, p. 196 
I id. p. 203), See also Douzinas (2000) supra, n. 26, pp. 368-9 
74 Critchely (1992) supra, n. 58, p. 225 
75 lbid, p. 221 
76 Douzinas (2000) supra, n. 26, p. 354 
17 Ibid. p. 351 
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unique is what limits this violence. In the unceasing reconstruction of 
representations in law the trace of the unique call of the other is glimpsed, 
jolting the self-satisfaction of rational law's "banal" logic. 78 Cornell explains 
that, for Levinas, even although "the Good is precisely what eludes our full 
knowledge", nevertheless we "can also not escape our responsibility" in 
continually elaborating new principles of justice . 
79 For Derrida, similarly, 
'justice' is that which is always "to come", always requiring calculation and re- 
calculation in law. 80 There can be no rest in trying to understand where the 
Other is speaking from - to do so would be an abdication of responsibility 
towards the other. Responsibility, as well as being rooted in mystery and 
irresponsibility in requiring action without the possibility of full knowledge, is 
"without limits" since we cannot draw a limit to the identity of the other. 81 
It is the notion of otherness as always beyond a particular representation 
of it that compels us to strive to be ethical. It is this fact that otherriess is always 
something 'beyond' our conceptualisations of it that means that we can speak 
only about 'striving' and not actually 'being' ethical. For Derrida and Levinas, 
otherness is expressed as something always mysterious, secret, infinite, even 
78 Levinas (1998) supra, n. 22, p. 193 
'9 Cornell (I 992a) supra, n. 60, p. 100; see also Critchley (1992) supra, n. 58, p. 234: In insisting 
that conceptions of justice must be guided by the responsibility towards the other, Levinas 
redefines philosophy as the "wisdom of love" (see Levinas (198 1) supra, n. 50, p. 16 1) 
80 Derrida, J. 'Force of Law: The Mystical Foundations of Authority' in Cornell, D. 
Deconstruction and the Possibility ofJustice (New York, N. Y. & London: Routledge, 1992) 
chapter 1, pp. 3 - 67 at 27, a revised edition of this essay appears in Derrida (2002) supra, n. 19, 
pp. 228-298 at 257 
81 Ibl, (I, p. I 
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sacred . 
82 Levinas describes this as "God" - the infinitely other, the trace of 
whom we experience in encountering another person in the world as a unique 
other. 83 Common to these conceptions is the idea that we are compelled to be 
ethical because, in being a necessary leftover from the logic of western thought, 
the Other always surpasses our expectations. Derrida's reading, via 
Kierkegaard, of the Old Testament story of Abraham and his son Isaac on 
Mount Moriah gives some indication of the source of the ethical in the 
unknowable and the impossibility that this entails. Abraham is called upon by 
God to kill his own innocent son. Abraham is thus asked to act against his own 
earthly ties of love and worldly laws without being given any reason. Although 
he knows that such an act would make him a murderer and a traitor to family 
loyalty, Abraham cannot resist the voice of God: it is both unknowable and 
undeniable. 84 Derrida argues that ethical responsibility is exactly this: being 
called upon to make a painful, terrible sacrifice without knowing why. 85 
"Day and night, at every instant, on all the Mount Moriahs of 
this world, I am doing that, raising my knife over what I love and 
must love (p. 68) ... and I can never 
justify this sacrifice. (p. 70). " 
Where Habermas and Rawls are keen to show that none are necessary, Derrida 
reintroduces metaphysics as a crucial element of law and ethics. In making legal 
82 Derrida (1996) supra, n. 15, p. 57 
13 Levinas (1998) supra, n. 22, p. I 10 
84 Ibid., p. 58-9 
15 lbid, p. 67-8 
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and ethical decisions, we are asked to make sacrifices by an authority that we 
cannot understand. for reasons that we cannot fully thernatise. How else, one 
might be resigned to ask, can we explain the difficulty in providing a moral 
justification for the special attention given by the U. S. and U. K. to Iraq in the 
winter of 2002/3 over other states that arguably posed a security risk or abused 
human rights at that time? Complete justification is impossible because, like 
religious faith, the ultimate foundation of a judgment is secret: the act of 
judgment takes place over an abyss. 86 Elsewhere Derrida describes 'justice' in 
similarly mystical terms. "Justice is an experience of the impossible": any legal 
rule that is produced after reflecting upon the demands of justice can never be 
fully just because while the demands of justice are infinite, law is necessarily 
finite. 87 Deconstruction is only possible because there is always a gap between 
the demands of justice and the possibilities of law. 88 Such explicit reference to a 
non deconstructable metaphysics of justice may seem to fit awkwardly with the 
idea of diff6rance, which purports to unwind all logocentric logic. Balkin argues 
that such a separation of 'justice' from representations of it in language is 
89 
crucial in allowing a space for meaningftil ethical discourse. We deconstruct, 
not just because we can, but because we are driven to do so by the 
inexhaustibility of justice. "Value" is not a noun, but a verb -justice requires us 
86 Derrida (1996) supra, n. 15, p-86 
8' Derrida, 'Force of Law: The Mystical Foundations of Authority' in Cornell (1992) supra, 
n. 80, p. 16 and also in Derrida (2002) supra, n. 80, p. 242 
88 Ibid, p. 15 
89 Balkin, J. M. Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice (1994) 92 Michigan Law 
Review I1 33 1 at p. 11339 
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to be creative in our attempts to build just institutions and address injustice. 90 
The ethical-deconstructive metaphors are not deployed in order to claim that the 
subordination of the Other can ultimately be ended. Rather, they suggest that the 
relationship between Self and Other is one which can and must be rethought and 
indeed re-rethought. 
5. The Other's Undecidable Position in Ethics and Representation 
While Douzinas's reading of Antigone leaves the structures of injustice 
engendered by law intact, Levinas's self-refuting scepticism actually provides a 
basis from which to tackle the problem of the ethics of otherness. Building upon 
the above discussion, this final section proposes an approach to breaking down 
the exclusion of the Other through a reading of two ancient stories. 
5.1 The Other WithinlWithout. - The Death offarcissus 
The myth of Echo and Narcissus involves a beautiful young man, Narcissus, 
who is punished for his vanity and cruel rejection of the nymph, Echo, by being 
cursed to fall hopelessly in love with himself Hughes's translation reads: "Let 
Narcissus love and suffer, as he has made us suffer. Let him, like us, love and 
know it is hopeless. "91 The curse is his doom, as he wastes away staring at his 
90 lbid, p. I 13 1 
91 Hughes, T. (1997) supra, n. 5, p. 78. Innes's translation in Ovid (1955) supra, n. 5, p. 85 reads: 
'May he himself fall in love with another, as we have done with him! May he too be unable to 
cain his IoN ed one! " 
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image reflected in a forest pool. At face value this story does not appear to hold 
very much scope for lessons in ethics or legal judgment: Narcissism is 
commonly understood as a turning in on oneself and away from others. 
However, the spell cast upon Narcissus is both a curse and a gift. He is made to 
suffer, certainly, but he is also made to love. This excruciating combination is a 
metaphor for the impossible yet irresistible call of the Other. 
Narcissus is cursed to fall in love with his own reflection because he is 
already in love with himself in a more common sense: he "had a beauty that 
broke hearts', 92 and a pride that made him reject and humiliate the many others 
who fell in love with him. Before he is cursed, Narcissus exists in a state in 
which he recognises only Self - his own self. All others he reduces to 
repetitions of the same sad rejection. Otherness exists for Narcissus as 
undifferentiated, bland and absent from his own concerns. He could have 
anyone he wished for, but he is convinced that he can find all that he needs 
within himself It certainly appears that the only person who could be attractive 
enough to snare Narcissus is himself It is only after he is punished for this 
attitude by this being made literally true that he comes to appreciate the 
importance of otherness as excessive of himself. In this sense, Narcissus's curse 
is also a gift. In his reflection, he finally sees that which those who fell in love 
with him had always seen, but that he has himself never seen before: the 
mysterious imperative embodied in a singular, untouchable image. In his 
reflected image Narcissus appreciates the otherness within himself - that part 
that he is now doomed to always long for and yet will never conquer. Every 
image, attempt to reach it simply disturbs the water and of course destroys the i 
92 Hughes, ibid, p. 74 
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causing him to despair. In forever trying and failing to grasp and hold his 
reflection,, Narcissus is demonstrating that relationship of simultaneous 
imperative and mystery that Derrida locates in (Kierkegaard's reading of) the 
parable of Abraham and Isaacs. It is the incessant play between presence and 
absence that brings about the possibility of ethics. The Other is present to 
Narcissus inasmuch as he knows that it is within him and he can see it there in- 
front of him,, within touching distance. On the other hand it is absent from him 
as he cannot touch it. It does not satisfy his desire, existing only as an image 
that vanishes when he leaves or disturbs the water. And without his reflection to 
admire, Narcissus has no identity of his own at all. Presence and absence in its 
traditional order as sustaining the prioritisation of Self and Other is seen to be 
ruptured. 
The intertwining of Self and Other is represented in the story in various 
ways. In Ovid's writing, we perceive Narcissus as a poetic negotiation between 
his own image and his surroundings. The description of the perfect pool in 
which Narcissus sees his reflection echoes his own aloofness from the world: 
"No shepherd had ever driven his sheep 
To trample the margins. No cattle 
Had slobbered their muzzles in it 
And befouled it. No wild beast 
Had ever dashed through it.,, 
93 
93 Ibid., p. 78; A point suggested by Hinds, S. 'Landscape with Figures: Aesthetics of place in In 
the Metamorphoses and its Tradition' in Hardie, P. (ed. ) The Cambridge Companion to Ovid 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) p. 133 11 
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Once enslaved by the curse, Narciussus's sudden connection with another entity 
that exists beyond his own body is represented in his violation of the virginity of 
the pool when his tears break up his reflected image. 94 Further, the reader is 
invited to imagine Narcissus by the pool as "a fallen garden statue". 95 As Hinds 
remarks, the landscape "has made him its own": 96 as an aesthetic image, 
Narcissus has ceased to be a self-identical, intact, sensuous creature. Like 
Marx's commodity, he has taken on an identity that goes beyond the limits of 
his own sensuousness and is disseminated within the wider landscape. Realising 
that his life is wasting away, Narcissus prays that the one he loves might be 
freed from himself. "The one I loved should be let live - He should live on after 
me, blameless. But when I go - both go. 5597 Narcissus knows that he is doomed 
to die, and in at last accepting his mortality, he takes responsibility for his death. 
His concern that the one he loves should not die with him is an ethical one in 
Derrida's conception of ethics. The duty to be ethical towards the Other is both 
unconditionally demanded and impossible to fulfil. Narcissus dies wishing that 
his reflection could be separated from him, not only to satisfy his own desire for 
love, but because he perceives the injustice inflicted upon this innocent Other 
through his death. The absurdity of this concern - at once selfish and selfless - 
94 See Hinds, ibid. 
95 Hughes (1997) supra, n. 5, p. 79; Innes translation reads: "a statue shaped from Parian I 
marble" p. 85 
96 Hinds in Hardie (2002) supra, n. 94, p. 137 
97 Hughes (1997) supra, n. 5, p. 82; Innes's translation at p. 86: "1 could wish that the object of I 
my love might outlive me: as it is, both of us will perish together, when this on life is 
destroyed. " 
274 
Chapter 7 
accentuates the mysterious and impossible demand of otherness. Referring again 
to Derrida, ethical responsibility for Narcissus comes from the realisation of his 
own doomed mortality and the singularity of otherness - from the gift of death. 
Alternatively, Narcissus's relationship with his reflection could be viewed in 
terms of Levinas's comments on the physical suffering of making oneself 
vulnerable to the other. Prior to the curse, Narcissus does not allow himself to 
be exposed to anyone. He "kept all his admirers at a distance" to the extent that 
"none dared be familiar, let alone touch him". 98 But the curse compels him to 
allow the Other to "torture"99 him: to make him feel pain, to make him weep 
and beat his chest, eventually allowing himself to die rather than leave the pool. 
Narcissus is truly held hostage by his reflection, and despite his prayers his 
reflection is also held hostage by him. The point is that the unique, doomed 
relationship between Narcissus and his reflection is a metaphor for the 
interminable movement towards the Other. As the later, more hopeful Douzinas 
says, the Other is the internal exile of the Self and hence the source of ethical 
concern. 
As Narcissus agonisingly experiences it, the Other occupies a space that 
is both inside and outside. It hurts and abuses him and makes demands that are 
impossible and yet irresistible. As Levinas has said, an ethical regard is only 
possible through such a physical encounter. The experience of the ethical is the 
experience of its absence: Narcissus is aware that he wants to be ethical towards 
his Other in not killing it. His concern is an ethical attitude: an awakening to the 
98 Hughes, Ibid, p. 75; Innes translation at p. 83) "... his soft young body housed a pride so 
unvielding that none of these boys or girls dared to touch him. " C I- 
99 Hughes, lbid, p-82 ID I 
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injustices suffered by those that are beyond reach. In law, it is in the very the 
experience of interpreting the principles for judgment that this agony of the 
internal Other is made known. In deciding a case in which principles clash, a 
judge cannot avoid an injustice any more than Narcissus can avoid the death of 
his beloved. But it is at this point that we remember Goodrich's mourning 
widow: although we can never bring the Other back to life, our reconstruction of 
the Other can always be different. To succeed either in saving the Other from 
tragedy or banishing them to pure externality would be to achieve the 
impossible. Either the curse on Narcissus would be broken, leaving him once 
again entirely unconcerned for all but himself, or else his wish to be physically 
separated from it would be granted. To understand that both of these 
eventualities are impossible is to understand my argument about the ethical 
relationship between Self and Other in the legal judgments. The curse can never 
be broken or the Other separated from Narcissus without destroying him 
because the Other - his reflected image - is simultaneously rooted within his 
identity and also excessive of that identity. 
However, it should not be forgotten that when Narcissus finally dies his 
corpse vanishes, leaving only a flower, composed of "a ruff of white petals 
round a dainty bugle centre, yellow as egg yolk". 100 If one wanted to argue that 
the story should be read as suggesting the possibility of the separation of Self 
and Other, it might be suggested that this flower, left behind in the world, 
represents the fulfilment of Narcissus's wish that his beloved is allowed to live 
on, blameless. But if this is truly a separation, it has only been achieved through 
the destruction of the Self Just as we cannot be separated from a vital organ 
'00 Huahes, Ibid, p. 84 
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without fatal consequences, so the separation of Self and Other in Antigone and 
Echo and Narcissus necessarily involves disaster. King Creon's execution of 
Antigone leads to the eventual destruction of both himself and the house of 
Oedipus. It should be noted that the disappearance of Narcissus's body is 
preceded by his being sincerely mourned by the very ones whom he had 
previously spurned, including the nymphs and the unfortunate Echo. The 
beautiful flower, which still exists, might be thought of as returning to the world 
to stand in for the beauty of Narcissus himself that is lost to Echo and the other 
nymphs. Each of these cases of mourning represents the haunting, spectral 
presence of the Other in the realm of the Self: forever lost but not absolutely 
absent. 
5.2 Justice as the Other. - The Defeat of the Sly Fox 
There is another kind of death that allows us to appreciate the ethical 
significance of undecidability in the relationship between Self and Other. This is 
the death of the villain, and crucially, the means used by the hero to bring this 
death about. Like most tales of its kind, The Sly Fox and the Little Red Hen is 
overtly moral in tone, and simplistically so. A superficial interpretation of the 
victory of the little red hen over the sly fox suggests that 'right' and 'wrong' are 
signified by a straightforward identification of the good traits in the hen proving 
superior to the bad traits of the fox. In other words, 'good' and 'bad' are 
identical with the respective characters of the story. However a careful reading 
of the story shows that justice is itself other to this binary polarisation. As this 
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section argues, such a reading allows us to deconstruct the exteriority of 
otherness in representations of justice and injustice. 
The story opens by introducing the two characters. In the description of 
the hen,, we learn of an independent and inoffensive little creature who "lived all 
by herself, in a little house in the woods". 101 The fox on the other hand "lived 
with his mother, in a den". 102 As a young male presumably dependent on his 
mother, we are invited to suppose that, unlike our capable little red hen, the sly 
fox is in certain ways deficient and inept. Furthermore, his salient attribute is 
that he is "sly". Like all cowardly villains, lacking any proper or praiseworthy 
qualities, he is characterised by deviousness. While the little red hen is naturally 
industrious and honest, the fox lacks these good qualities, and is deficient in 
natural goodness or strength of character. As the story begins to develop, we see 
the sly young fox plotting to catch the little red hen. In a reinforcement of the 
strength of the moral binary hierarchy between hen and fox, we learn that the 
latter "tried many, many times to catch her" but "not one of the sly fox's plans 
worked". 103 In other words,, the fox's slyness is no match for the hen's quiet 
dignity. The little red hen represents the values that we are supposed to respect 
and wish to see flourish, while the fox represents everything that is morally 
weak. In his repeated failure through his own inability to live rightly, the fox 
signifies all that is other to the good. 
However, the purpose of this reading is to show that the ethical is 
located, not in identifying the distinction between prioritised self and 
101 Traditional (Southgate) (1973) p. 4, supra, n. 6 
102 Ib id., p. 6 
103 lbid, pp. 8-10 
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subordinated other, but in the undermining of that distinction. Towards the end 
of the story, the fox finally manages to trap the hen. He puts her in a bag and 
takes her home for his mother to cook. But on the way home the day is hot and 
the foolish fox makes the ultimately fatal mistake of taking a nap half-way 
leaving the bag open, allowing the hen to escape. But before she leaves, she 
decides to make sure that the fox is never able to threaten her again. "The little 
red hen then picked up some big stones. She put the stones into the bag. Then 
back home she ran. " 104 This is where the story gets interesting, deconstructively 
speaking. Why would the simple and honest hen pause to put heavy stones into 
the bag before leaving the scene? The fox is snoozing just a few feet away. The 
operation would be no small task for a little hen who should be terrified by the 
kidnapping and even more so by the possibility that the fox might awake. The 
hen would not be disposed to hang about. She is not vengeful or deceitful. She 
just wants to mind her own business and be left alone in her little house in the 
woods. Why does she therefore not do the simple and sensible thing and run 
away immediately, and make sure to be more vigilant next time? Could it be 
that the hen is being sly? Surely not, for, as we have been consistently reminded, 
it is not the hen but the fox that has this dishonourable attribute. But the story is 
a fairy-tale and as such must end with the demise of the obviously bad character 
at the hands of the good, so what else can the hen do? One might suggest that it 
is at this point that the story breaks free of the grasp that its author had on it 
until now. The narrative is driven by the necessity for a final, conclusive knock- 
out blow and thus make the text meaningfully comment on the just deserts of 
the two characters. When the fox awakens, unaware of the hen's escape, he 
104 lbid, p. 40 
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takes the bag home to his mother who has been boiling the water. When the 
stones are dropped into the pot the boiling water splashes onto the sly fox and 
his mother, killing them both instantly. Assuming she intended this end for the 
foxes, our little red hen has solved her problem in a brilliantly sly fashion. She 
has beaten the fox at his own game. Good has triumphed, but at what cost to the 
story's moral coherence? Good has defeated bad by embracing a crucial 
distinguishing attribute of the bad. If the meaning we have settled on for justice 
is, as stated above, that the good, hard-working person who minds his own 
business will succeed at the expense of the devious and sly then this is a 
problem. Honesty's purity is infected by slyness and what the fable tries so hard 
to retain as the realm of the good is there-by invaded by the bad. In Derrida's 
terms it is "traced" through by its excluded Other. If the hen can act in this cool 
sly way in the face of such danger it would seem that the story's foundations of 
good and bad unravel, because slyness is seen to be a quality both of the hen 
and the fox. 
As the story of the Sly Fox shows, justice cannot be unproblernatically 
contained within the confines of a determinate identity. In the story of the Sly 
Fox, the rupture of this assumption is a gesture towards the singular experience 
of justice. The narrative sets up the characters of the little red hen and the sly 
fox as moral opposites, but in forming a neat binary, in which the former is 
prioritised, this relationship does not recognise otherness as an ethical 
imperative. It is justice itself that is the other in this story, since, taking its form 
from both parts of this binary relationship, it cannot neatly fit into either mould. 
But whilst leaving its mark on both sides, nor can justice simply embrace both 
honesty and slyness. Its place vis-d-vis the story's narrative is, in the end. 
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undecidable. Through this reading, the killing of the sly fox finds its place 
amongst the deathly deconstructive metaphors discussed above. Justice is that 
which is beyond representation and categorisation, which calls us to be ethical 
without allowing itself to be fully understood. 
6. Conclusion 
Our readings of Narcissus and the Sly Fox, emphasising that the force of the 
other's call lies in its being both external to and also embedded within the self, 
allow us to read a convincing imperative into the voice of the Other. The fate of 
Narcissus is thus a metaphor for the Other, both as part of our ethical 
consciousness and at the same time separate from us, insofar as we can never 
truly claim it as our own. It interprets Derrida's characterisation of the ethical as 
the impossible choice - the "trembling" - and indicates why it is not possible 
for us to ignore the Other. If the Other is, as Douzinas has argued, absolute 
exteriority then there is no possibility for a movement towards ethics within 
law. The Other as simultaneously present and absent - prone to both 
philosophical and metaphorical operations - allows for re-descriptions and 
reinterpretations that are not purely exterior and oblivious to each other. 
Principles are interpreted according to one set of metaphors and rhetorical turns 
and then according to another. Interpretation constantly shifts because we know 
that the Other - the infinite and untotalisable within each judgment - will 
always escape us. The only certainty from this perspective is that to forget about 
otherness is unethical. This is the forgetfulness of discourses of law and ethics 
that make 'ud(yments according to a self-same identity: who is more reasonable? 
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Who is more rational? By such uncritical reductions, otherness faces 
assimilation to the identity of the self or else exclusion from its moral reach. 
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The scope of this work has been broad. In this final part I hope to draw together 
some of the salient points of the thesis through a brief discussion of its general 
implications for legal scholarship and by responding to some possible 
criticisms. These remarks should not be regarded as an attempt to provide a 
solid justification for the theoretical manoeuvres of the thesis or to pre-empt 
discussion. Being concerned primarily with the act of interpretation, the idea 
here is to give an interpretative after-word on the central arguments raised and 
also an indication of where I regard this work in relation to the wider context of 
academic writing. 
1. Implicationsfor Legal Scholarship 
As noted in the body of this work, there are those who would discard 
philosophical perspectives on legal and political critique in favour of supposedly 
more relevant sociological ones. ' It has been an important objective of this 
thesis to demonstrate that analysis of philosophical theorisations of principle 
and its operation with legal rhetoric has a crucial role to play. I would suggest 
that this role is both descriptive and prescriptive. The thesis has identified how 
decisions of judges incorporate liberal philosophical content in their 
interpretations of 'facts' 2 and how certain legal principles - themselves in part 
1 See Chapter Two, s. 4. 
, Facts' appears in quotation marks here because our preoccupation is with the construction 
rather than mere identification of factual SItUations in the legal 'udgments. "j 
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produced through the writings of philosophers of the Eighteenth Century 
onwards - are interpreted in the light of these interpreted 'facts'. Also. by 
examining the ethical implications of the way in which liberal principles are 
deployed in order to draw moral distinctions 3a critical evaluation of the role of 
principle has been made possible. Such a study stands in need of careful 
analysis of the philosophical foundations of liberal principle, and in the context 
of the cases of Hindley, Thompson and Venables and Re A, this is what my 
thesis aims to contribute. Of course, such a pronouncement relates only to the 
general significance of my attempt to present a critique of the philosophical 
content of the rhetoric of legal judgement. The specific significance of my 
observations and arguments lies in the particular relationships identified 
between the critical concepts wielded in this work. For instance, the 
identification of liberal principle as determined by a relationship of mutual 
inter-dependence with matters of contingency is made through a very particular 
interpretation of the language of the judgments and theorisations of liberal 
principle. Concentrating upon the legal judgments for a moment, the precise 
interpretation of the relationship between principle and contingent consequences 
required attention to the reasons for certain decisions by the judges. Why, for 
instance, did the judges of the Court of Appeal in Re A regard Mary and Jodie as 
conflicting individuals instead of a unified entity? Why, secondly, did the 
judges in the murder tariff cases regard the parties' claims to have lacked 
responsibility so differently? The thesis has set out to answer these questions by 
examining the link between legal judgment and liberal normative principle. It 
I ' For instance that between Jodie and Mary, and also between Hindley and the Bulger killers 
(see Chapter Four). 
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has been argued that liberal theorisations of the 'individual' as the bearer of 
certain essential qualities of reasonableness, rationality and self-consciousness 
are employed as tools for interpreting the 'facts' of the cases in a way that 
allows for an escape from ethical dilemma. The argument has been made that 
when liberal principles clash or the correct legal interpretation of a principle is 
unclear, then the liberal notion of the 'individual', interpreted in the light of 
calculations of benefit and detriment, provides a means for morally prioritising 
one party over another. In the final chapter, it was argued that the moral 
hierarchy of Self and Other engendered by this combination of the liberal idea 
of the individual and consequentialist calculations in legal rhetoric is actually 
reinforced by the radical Postmodernism of Costas Douzinas. Our foray into 
deconstruction has attempted to show that there are two critical approaches open 
to us. The first is the approach that legal rhetoric shares with Douzinas: Self and 
Other as identities that correspond to the qualities of justice and injustice. On 
this approach, the identification by legal rhetoric of justice with Self leads 
towards decisions such as Re A, Hindley and Re Thompson, which morally 
prioritises its subjects according to an assessment as to which party most closely 
resembles the liberal individualistic ideal. Douzinas's perspective critiques this 
hierarchy by simply turning it on its head: justice, embodied in the character of 
Antigone, becomes identified with all that is Other to law. My own argument is 
that the moral hierarchy may actually be partly dissolved by showing how the 
moral qualities of justice are not merely other to law, but rather excessive of it, 
and, furthermore, excessive of a simple identification with either Self or Other. 
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2. Criticisms and Responses 
Any work that attempts to incorporate both theoretical and legal interpretation 
must, to a greater or lesser extent, make certain decisions as to the extent of its 
scope and the integration and deployment of these aspects. As noted above, 
discussions of the philosophical foundations of liberal theory focus upon the 
characteristics of the 'Individual' as a moral and legal actor. The deontological 
universality of matters of principle requires such an idea in order to be able to 
assume that persons can be held accountable for their actions, and that cases can 
be interpreted as problems of conflicting rights. Such a perspective on the 
theory and the judgments provides the necessary foothold for the introduction of 
deconstruction in Chapter Five. Since deconstruction seeks to locate and disrupt 
the logocentricism of western thought, the identification of the liberal 
idealisation of the 'individual' within legal judgment makes this - and further 
critique from an ethical point of view - possible. A criticism of my approach 
would be that this identification makes such critique too easy: that my reading 
of the cases as using liberal notions of individuality interpreted in the light of 
consequentialism in order to escape from ethical dilemma, sets up a scenario 
simply to be knocked down again. I would reply that this would only be fair 
criticism of my thesis if the argument in Chapter Four (that makes the 
connection between judgment and liberal theory) can be described as forced or 
unconvincing. I would contend that this is not so, and hope that my analysis of 
the language of the judgments persuasively illustrates the connection between 
liberal principle and contingent consequences within legal rhetoric. 
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However, I believe that my approach is open to legitimate (though at 
least partly answerable) criticism in terms of its theoretical purpose. This 
criticism is linked to the choice to use deconstruction as the main theoretical 
perspective in the last three chapters. The question is this: Is the relationship 
(identified in Chapter Four) between principle and context a discreet 
relationship, or does it signify a general state of affairs? The question of 
whether my argument claims to introduce a theory of legal judgment, or 
whether the cases are simply read and interpreted as independent moments of 
law and ethics is not addressed directly in any part of the thesis. Certainly there 
is no detailed comparative analysis of other judgments, and in the instance of Re 
A at least, it is difficult to imagine a case that would qualify as being of a 
sufficiently similar 'type' for meaningful comparison. If, however, the argument 
is intended to convey a certain view of the role of principle in law generally 
then could it be that it has unhelpful implications for legal criticism? After all, if 
the general implication of Chapter Four is that core liberal principles have no 
practical meaning of their own, then surely the important issue of law's ethical 
content is 'up for grabs' in the Postmodern sense. Such an interpretation might 
be thought to be confirmed by my choice to concentrate on Derrida and 
deconstruction in developing my analysis in the last three chapters. Why not 
adopt, for instance, a Serniotic or Structuralist approach, which would open up 
opportunities for exploring the meaning and role of liberal principles in terms of 
binary oppositions and differences, without having to deal with the further 
. 
)'ýrance? Does the choice to concentrate upon problem of undecidability and dýf 
deconstruction pose unnecessary difficulties? 
287 
Conclusion 
I hope to have met both objections. First, the cases are examined 
following a discussion of the possibility of deriving (as Rawls and Habermas try 
to) a post-metaphysical universal approach to liberal normativity. Inasmuch as 
the argument of Chapter Four attempts to show that these cases could not render 
an unproblematically universal judgment, the implication is that in this 
particular instance at least, there is reason to think that the project of liberal 
universalism itself meets with serious difficulties. This does not imply a descent 
into freeplay of equally irrational ideas, but rather a critique of universality as an 
aspiration of postmetaphysical liberalism. Hence, Chapter Four ought to be 
construed, not as an attempt to simply undermine legal or ethical certainty, but 
as a study of the conditions in which principles can be put into operation in law. 
Secondly, there is the choice to concentrate upon deconstruction in developing 
the examination of rhetoric. That deconstruction makes certain fascinating 
illuminations of the relationship of principle and context possible is not in 
doubt, even if, as shown in Chapters Five and Six, it carries very heavy 
theoretical baggage, both in terms of its 'strategies' and also the controversies of 
its relationship to political and moral philosophy. 
I would accept that the decision to concentrate on deconstruction rather 
than possible alternative theoretical paths raises certain questions as to the 
emphasis of my argument. It is for this reason that Chapter Six is given to a 
discussion of the very question of deconstruction's implications for philosophy 
and political theory. Although the point is not definitively settled there (and I 
submit that it would be foolish to suppose that it could be) I hope to have shown 
sorne awareness of the critical debates surrounding the issue. It is 
deconstruction's problematic aspects that help us understand and set mto 
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context the implications of Chapter Four's argument. Chapter Six's examination 
of the critical significance of deconstruction therefore ought not be regarded as a 
diversion from the central question of liberal principle in law, but as a necessary 
stage in the development of the thesis. By addressing the criticisms of 
deconstruction in this way, and illustrating (in Chapter Seven) a possible useful 
application for deconstruction for ethical critique, I hope to have shown how it 
can be relevant to legal theory. 
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